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Purpose of the study 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the joint effects of the internal corporate 
governance structures, audit fees and earnings management in Finnish listed 
companies. More precisely, the thesis examines the effects of the existence internal 
governance structures firstly to the audit fees and secondly to the magnitude of 
earnings management. The connective factor between the two presented research 
directions is financial reporting quality. The secondary purpose of this thesis is to 
explore the endogeneity issues raised in the previous literature and the methods for 
alleviating this problem. 
 
Data 
The data employed in this study is mainly sourced from Thomson Financial and Orbis 
databases. Also, the audit fee and governance related data is handpicked from the 
financial statements of the sample companies. Earnings management was proxied by 
the modified Jones cash flow discretionary accruals. The sample consists of 
companies listed in OMX-Helsinki, whose fiscal year ended in the year 2008. The 
financial companies were excluded from the sample, which has 107 observations in 
total. 
 
Methods 
The quantitative methods used in this study to analyse the hypothesized effects are 
performed using multivariate OLS and 2SLS regressions with the Stata statistic 
program. The 2SLS regressions performed were also tested extensively for the validity 
and powerfulness of the used instrumental variables. The validness of the instrumental 
variables was also tested separately for each variable. 
 
Results  
The results of this thesis support the complementary view between the existence of the 
audit committee and the amount of audit fees. Also, there is evidence that the auditors 
are most efficient in constraining earnings management. No statistically significant 
support for the association of the internal audit was found. These results are fairly 
robust when controlling for endogeneity between the hypotheses variables. However, 
the IV models do suffer from weak instrumental variables, which can skew the results. 
 
The robustness of the results were also confirmed by using alternative measures for 
earnings management, audit fees and internal audit. The additional analyses provide 
some evidence on the positive effect of the earnings management to the audit fees, 
when the earnings management was measured with the last quarter earnings reversal. 
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Tutkimuksen tavoitteet 
Tutkimuksen päätavoitteena on tutkia yrityksen sisäisten hallintorakenteiden, 
tilintarkastuspalkkioiden ja tuloksenjärjestelyn keskinäisiä vaikutuksia suomalaisissa 
pörssiyhtiöissä. Tutkielman päätavoitetta tarkastellaan kahdesta eri näkökulmasta: 
hallintorakenteiden ja tuloksenjärjestelyn vaikutuksia tilintarkastuspalkkioihin sekä 
hallintorakenteiden ja tilintarkastuspalkkioiden vaikutusta tuloksenjärjestelyyn. 
Yhdistävä tekijä näiden kahden esitetyn tutkimusnäkökulman välillä on taloudellisen 
raportoinnin laatu. Toisena päätavoitteena on tutkia aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa 
esiinnoussutta endogeenisuusongelmaa kyseisten toimijoiden välillä sekä käyttää 
sopivia menetelmiä ongelman lieventämiseksi.  
 
Lähdeaineisto 
Tutkimuksessa käytettävä aineisto on pääosin koottu Thomson Financial ja Orbis 
tietokannoista. Tilintarkastuspalkkiota ja hallintoa koskevat tiedot on käsinpoimittu 
yritysten vuosikertomuksista. Tuloksen järjestelyä mitattiin muunnellun Jonesin mallin 
mukaisilla harkinnanvaraisilla jaksotuserillä. Otosjoukko koostuu Helsingin pörssiin 
listatuista yrityksistä, joiden tilikausi on päättynyt vuoden 2008 aikana. Rahoitusalan 
yritykset on jätetty otoksen ulkopuolelle, jolloin lopullinen otoskoko on 107. 
 
Aineiston käsittely 
Tässä kvantatiivisessa tutkimuksessa on käytetty erilaisia monimuuttuja regressio-
malleja (OLS ja 2SLS) hypoteesien tutkimiseksi. Endogeenisuutta kontrolloivissa 
2SLS-malleissa käytettyjen instrumentaalimuuttujien validiutta ja tilastollista 
vaikuttavuutta on myös tutkittu tarkemmin sekä yhteisesti että muuttujakohtaisesti. 
 
Tulokset 
Tutkimuksen tulokset tukevat sisäisten hallintorakenteiden komplementaarista näkö-
kulmaa, mikä näkyy tilintarkastusvaliokunnan olemassaolon ja tilintarkastus-
palkkioiden positiivisena yhteytenä. Saadut tulokset myös tukevat hypoteesia 
tilintarkastuksen ja tuloksenjärjestelyn laajuuden negatiivisesta yhteydestä. 
Tutkimusmallit eivät kuitenkaan löytäneet tukea sisäisen tarkastuksen olemassaolon 
vaikutuksista kummassakaan tutkimusnäkökulmassa. Endogeenisuutta kontrolloivat 
2SLS mallit tukevat varauksin näitä tuloksia. Käytetyt testit osoittivat että 2SLS mallien 
instrumentaalimuuttujat olivat heikkoja, joten näiden mallien tulokset voivat olla 
vääristyneitä.  
 
Tulosten luotettavuutta tutkittiin myös käyttämällä vaihtoehtoisia muuttujia 
tuloksenjärjestelylle, tilintarkastuspalkkioille sekä sisäiselle tarkastukselle. 
Lisäanalyysit löysivät positiivisen yhteyden viimeisen neljänneksen tuloksen järjestelyn 
sekä tilintarkastuspalkkioiden välillä. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis 
 
Recent world events have led to increased demand on companies‟ transparency requirements 
in their financial reporting either through legislative or through other standards related to 
disclosure. As pointed out by Ball (2008), financial reporting is an important economic 
activity. The demand for financial reporting arises from information asymmetry between the 
managers and owners of the company (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Healy & Palepu 2001). 
High quality of financial reporting is a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of capital (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). Thus financial reporting quality is of interest to those who use financial 
reports for decision-making. External financial statement users including current and potential 
investors, creditors and many others need reliable financial information on which to base their 
resource allocation decisions. While numerous studies have investigated the effects of various 
corporate governance and audit quality variables on earnings management, empirical evidence 
is rather inconsistent. Thus, there is a clear need for more evidence on the interplay of these 
various corporate governance actors on financial reporting quality. 
 
One of the key actors in ensuring the financial reporting quality is the external auditor. There 
is an extensive body of research focusing on the relationship between audit quality and 
financial reporting quality. Prior studies suggest that audits of higher quality are more 
effective in restricting management discretion over accounting issues than audits of lower 
quality, and thus resulting in higher earnings quality. High quality audits increase reporting 
reliability by reducing both intentional and unintentional measurement errors in historical 
earnings, which analysts use to predict future earnings, their forecasts are likely more accurate 
and less dispersed when audit quality is high (Behn et al., 2008, p.328). Companies often use 
a variety of services to increase their credibility in reporting, when the extent and accuracy of 
disclosed information increases and the frequency of reporting accelerates. These services 
should enhance the fact, that the users of this information can rely on the information obtained 
and make better judgment about the company. For the companies to answer the demand for 
more accurate and more reliable information, the companies and their boards and/or audit 
committees can make use of the expertise of internal and external audit functions. 
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The previous studies on the effect of internal audit and audit committee on audit fees have 
also been very inconsistent. The current prevailing theory and audit related textbooks see the 
work of internal audit function to be a substitutive related to the external auditors‟ work. 
According to this view the work of external auditors and internal auditors does not overlap as 
the external auditors do not need to audit the work internal auditors have already audited and 
vice versa. Now more recent studies (e.g. Knechel & Willekens, 2006 and Hay et al., 2008) 
have questioned this view and see the internal auditors‟ role on external auditors‟ workload to 
be more complementary instead of direct substitution. 
 
Similarly, the effect of audit committees on auditors‟ workload is as controversial as the 
internal audit findings in related studies. One of the main tasks of the audit committee is the 
coordination of different control mechanisms in the organization, like internal audit and 
external audit. They can oversee and monitor the work various functions and they can assess 
the joint-effectiveness of various additional services, so that the company would have the 
most cost-effective monitoring package needed to meet the tightening requirements of 
stakeholders and authorities. One obvious way to enhance cost-effectiveness is by minimizing 
overlapping work. However, the existence of audit committees is also seen to increase audit 
fees in more recent studies (e.g. Stewart & Kent, 2006, Hay et al., 2008). The audit 
committee, through its expertise on the matter, may require more reports and face-to-face 
meetings thus increasing the bureaucracy of the auditors. 
 
The level of earnings management has been widely used as a proxy for financial reporting 
quality. As the overall economic situation has deteriorated along the profits of the companies, 
the incentives for earnings management should be expected to increase. Company‟s earnings 
can be managed by manipulating variety of discretionary accruals (e.g. activations), or by 
changing the accounting principles where possible within the standards and 
recommendations. These efforts can affect the company's reported result, when considering 
the valuation of the public company or the accounting data related compensation of the 
executives, so that is most favourable to the company‟s purposes. As the company purposely 
manages earnings according to their needs, they do not necessary give a true and fair view of 
the company‟s earnings. Therefore, the quality of the reported earnings can be harder to 
interpret by an outsider and thus these manipulating efforts can diminish the quality of the 
financial reporting. As mentioned, the key players in ensuring the high quality of financial 
reporting are the various corporate governance actors. 
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As Cohen et al. (2004) found in their study internal audit and audit committee have an effect 
on both the audit quality and financial reporting quality. A close relationship between internal 
auditors and the audit committee has the potential to enhance the corporate governance 
capabilities of both parties. The independence of the internal audit is strengthened when it 
reports directly to the audit committee and is not hampered by concerns of divulging sensitive 
findings as compared to when internal audit reports to top management. Further, the breadth 
and hence, perceived value, of the internal audit is likely to be enhanced when it is employed 
as an important agent of the audit committee. Correspondingly, the effectiveness of the audit 
committee is strengthened when it is able to deploy the resources of the internal audit staff to 
obtain significant information on issues of concern within the company such as the strength of 
internal controls and quality of accounting policies. (Cohen et al., 2004).  
 
Cohen et al. (2004) noticed that different corporate governance parties can strengthen each 
others‟ capabilities, which makes the corporate governance system more cost-efficient as a 
whole. This two-way relationship has been the interest of the modern accounting research, as 
it may skew the results of the earlier studies. This problem is called endogeneity. Chenhall & 
Moers (2007b) emphasize the seriousness of the possible endogenous issues in accounting 
research. Their main point is that “endogeneity is a serious matter as if it „exists‟, we can no 
longer be confident that the results from the regression support the causality implied in the 
structural equation” (Chenhall & Moers, 2007b, p.219). They challenge their colleagues to a 
“lively debate on theory development and empirical testing of alternate theories can help 
develop better theory and assist in understanding how variables interrelate and help address 
issues of potential endogeneity (Chenhall & Moers, 2007b, p.220). 
 
Hay et al. (2008) further explain the endogeneity problem related to the corporate governance 
studies and compare the different research directions: “Variables for control or governance, 
which are endogenous, namely internal audit and audit committee. There is expected to be a 
two-way relationship between external auditing and control. It has been argued in many 
„substitution view‟ papers (e.g., Simunic 1980, 1984) that an organization can choose to trade 
off more or less internal auditing against external auditing; and it has also been argued that 
external auditing may have an impact on voluntarily forming an audit committee (Eichenseher 
& Shields, 1985 and Pincus et al., 1989). Alternatively, using the complementary controls 
arguments presented earlier, the relationship between controls and auditing is expected to be 
endogenous, but complementary. Increased external auditing could lead to increases in 
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control and governance, for example if auditors identify weaknesses in internal controls or 
recommend formation of an audit committee.” (Hay et al., 2008)  
 
Thus, there has been an ever-growing interest to study the effects of the internal governance 
structures to the audit fees or to the earnings management in the recent literature. Especially, 
there is a growing interest to study these effects in the context of endogeneity. Also, as the 
previous results are rather mixed, there is a need for additional studies to further our 
understanding relationships in the complex and vast corporate governance network. 
 
 
1.2 Objective of the thesis 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the interplay between audit committees, 
internal audit and external auditors in ensuring financial reporting quality. More specifically, 
as indicated by prior research, it is hypothesized that external auditors, internal auditors and 
audit committee contribute to minimizing earnings management thus improving financial 
reporting quality. Also, these same actors should help in improving financial reporting quality 
through audit quality, which is proxied by the amount of audit fees. In this study commonly 
used audit fee regression model developed first by Simunic (1980) and modified Jones 
earnings management regression (Dechow et al., 1995) are been used to explain the effect of 
the above mentioned governance structures on audit quality and financial reporting quality.  
 
The secondary objectives of this study is to alleviate the possible endogeneity problems by 
using a two stage least squares (2SLS) method with extensive reporting on the results as 
Chenhall & Moers (2007a) and Larcker & Rusticus (2009) called for. If the variables are 
endogenous, use of OLS regression could lead to biased and inconsistent results. Therefore, 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to estimate the relationship between audit fees, 
earnings management and the corporate governance variables. Also, this study tries to find 
strong instrumental variables to diminish the endogeneity problem and to provide as 
statistically sound results as possible. 
 
The results should add to the growing body of literature on various facets of financial 
reporting quality and audit fees by strengthening our understanding of the determinants of 
audit fees, especially in the Finnish setting. Also, the results of this study should further our 
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understanding of the relationship between audit fees under different types of disclosure 
systems and earnings management in Finland. In this sense, this study should also contribute 
to the literature related to earnings quality.  
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant prior 
research and literature in the field of auditing, internal auditing, and audit committee and 
earnings management. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical foundation for the testable 
hypotheses based on the previous chapter‟s prior research and literature. Chapter 4 contains 
the methodology for this study, including a description of the sample selection, sample 
characteristics, descriptive statistics and models to be tested. Chapter 5 presents the main 
testing results of the models and additional sensitivity analyses. Finally, Chapter 6 provides 
conclusions of the study with the considerations on the study‟s limitations and future research. 
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2. Theory and professional standards 
This chapter reviews the relevant theories and professional standards used to explain the joint 
effects of the internal governance actors, audit fees and earnings management. In the first 
section 2.1, corporate governance mosaic is presented, which is used as a framework 
throughout the thesis. The following section 2.2 concentrates on the agency theory, which 
describes the demand for different monitoring functions to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the companies‟ owners and managements. Then the three different internal 
governance actors studied in this thesis are defined and their respective professional standards 
and guidelines are presented in detail in sections 2.3 through 2.5. The following section 2.6 
explains the concept of earnings management. The final section 2.7 ties it all together by 
introducing the different determinants for the audit quality and financial reporting quality. 
 
 
2.1 Corporate governance mosaic 
 
As Messier et al. (2008) mention in their book, there is no universal definition of corporate 
governance: “While there is no generally accepted definition, corporate governance may be 
defined as a system „consisting of all the people, processes and activities to help ensure 
stewardship over an entity‟s assets” (Messier et al., 2008, p.36). For a more practical 
definition of the corporate governance, Lin & Hwang (2010) define the benefits of well-
organized corporate governance: “A good corporate governance structure helps ensure that 
the management properly utilizes the enterprise‟s resources in the best interest of absentee 
owners, and fairly reports the financial condition and operating performance of the enterprise” 
(Lin & Hwang, 2010, p.59) 
 
As the above definitions of the corporate governance state, the corporate governance is a 
network of many actors trying as effectively as possible to cater the needs of both the 
company itself and the also the interest groups outside and inside. For a more illustrative 
presentation of the complex corporate governance network, Cohen et al. (2004) have 
constructed a corporate governance mosaic, which aims to describe how different corporate 
governance actors affect the financial reporting quality. This mosaic is presented on Figure 1 
in the next page. 
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The corporate governance mosaic is divided to external and internal actors in relation to the 
company‟s governance structures. The upper part of the figure includes such external actors 
as courts and the legal system, financial analysts, legislators, regulators, stock exchanges and 
stockholders. These external players often shape and influence the interactions among the 
actors who are more directly involved in the governance of the corporation and are integral to 
safeguarding the interest of a company's stakeholders (Cohen et al., 2004, p.90). For example 
there are some additional reporting requirements to stock exchanges when the company is 
listed. Further, when the company is listed, it is required to follow corporate governance 
recommendations set by the stock exchange. Also, there is some pressure to the company to 
meet the expectations of the financial analysts and stockholders. 
 
The most interesting part and the scope of this study is in the middle part of the figure. The 
middle part consists of internal actors of the corporate governance, which include audit 
committee, board of directors, internal auditors, external auditors and management. Almost 
all of the internal actors in the mosaic have a two-way relationship suggesting that they have a 
joint effect on the corporate governance and finally the financial reporting quality. However, 
the mosaic suggests that internal auditors do not have a connection with the board of 
directors. This is due to the fact that the internal auditors mostly influence the corporate 
Figure 1 Corporate governance mosaic and financial reporting quality (Cohen et al., 2004) 
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governance through the audit committee. The forming of audit committee is mandatory for 
the listed companies in the US under the SOX. However, there can also be a link between 
these actors, when the audit committee has not been formed. While all of the actors in the 
mosaic should contribute to better financial reporting quality, these five internal actors are 
expected to have a more direct impact on a company‟s financial reporting quality. This study 
focuses on the main three of those actors: external auditor, internal auditor and audit 
committee. 
 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA315) defines the internal control in the paragraph 42 
emphasizing its purpose to the financial reporting quality: “Internal control is the process 
designed and effected by those charged with governance, management, and other personnel to 
provide reasonable assurance about the achievement of the entity‟s objectives with regard to 
reliability of financial reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of operations and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations. It follows that internal control is designed and 
implemented to address identified business risks that threaten the achievement of any of these 
objectives.” Thus, the better quality of the internal controls should improve the reliability of 
the financial statement giving the true and fair view to its users.  
 
The quality and magnitude of internal controls (such as internal audit and audit committee) 
should also be relevant to the auditors, when they perform their auditing duties, as they may 
have a significant effect on the audit workload. Also, as the designated internal control actors 
have “specialized” to their own niche of the control environment, this should be cost-effective 
to the company and its stakeholders as well. The next section describes the agency theory 
relating to the cost-efficiency of the control structures in the context of the demand for 
auditing. 
 
 
2.2 Agency theory 
 
The demand for audit is based on the agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), theorizing 
that the company consists of various agreements between the company‟s owners (principals) 
and the management (agents). They define an agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
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service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent.” 
Agency theory also suggests that agents have more information about the company than the 
principals. This asymmetry of information diminishes the principal's ability to control that the 
agents act according to the principal's own interests. In addition to information asymmetry, 
the agent theory assumes that both parties act rationally and they seek to maximize their own 
benefit disregarding the interests of another party. “If both parties to the relationship are 
utility maximizers there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the 
best interests of the principal.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To reduce the likelihood of this 
moral hazard, both parties try to seek a pareto-optimal situation as cost-efficiently as possible.  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) distinguish two different costs that could occur when trying to 
reduce the moral hazard between the agent and principal: monitoring costs and bonding costs. 
Firstly, the principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate 
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant 
activities, of the agent. Secondly, in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources 
(bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions that would harm the principal 
or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. According to 
Jokipii et al. (2008), agency theory assumes a trade-off between different monitoring 
mechanisms used for corporate governance. In other words, to minimize total agency costs, a 
firm chooses a mix of monitoring devices, which are assumed to be at least partial substitutes. 
 
As Lin & Hwang (2010) noted, the independent corporate governance actors are the key part 
in diminishing the agency costs and aligning the interest of the different parties. Owing to the 
separation of ownership and control (and the resulting agency problems) in the modern 
business world, a system of corporate governance is necessary, through which management is 
overseen and supervised to reduce the agency costs and align the interests of management 
with those of the investors (Lin & Hwang, 2010). When seeking this pareto-optimal situation, 
one of the most cost-efficient ways is using different external and internal monitoring services 
(e.g. external, internal audit and audit committee) by bringing an independent and trusted 
party to verify the reported information. 
 
In practice, the demand for auditing and other control mechanisms is broader than the agent 
theory assumes. As seen in the corporate governance mosaic, there are other parties, in 
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addition to the owner and management, who use the financial information to their own 
interests and they benefit from the credible information. In this case also the other 
stakeholders can be confident that the information gives a fair and true view about the 
company's financial situation. Also stricter legislation with the improving accounting and 
auditing standards seek to diminish the information asymmetry between different parties. 
 
Principal-agent problem in the context of the demand for auditing has been widely studied 
(Chow, 1982; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983 and Francis & Wilson, 1988). Prior studies have 
also linked this problem to internal control mechanisms like the internal auditing (Simunic, 
1980 and Wallace, 1984) and audit committees (Eichenseher & Shields, 1985, Pincus et al., 
1989, and Bradbury, 1990). The role of external auditors in the corporate governance 
framework is further studied in the next section 2.3. After that, the roles of internal audit 
function and audit committee are explained in sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.  
 
 
2.3 External audit 
 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), an independent standard-
setting body within the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), have published 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA), which are used widely to guide the work of the 
auditors. The objective of the IAASB is to serve the public interest by setting high quality 
auditing and assurance standards and by facilitating the convergence of international and 
national standards, thereby enhancing the quality and uniformity of practice throughout the 
world and strengthening public confidence in the global auditing and assurance profession. 
These standards also give the auditors extensive guidelines to base their audit work on. 
Standards include detailed recommendations on how to perform the audit work in various 
audit items and matters, which the registered auditors must follow when expressing the audit 
opinion. ISA standards are also in use in Finland through The Finnish Institute of Authorized 
Public Accountants (KHT-yhdistys), which develops and makes recommendations on 
generally accepted auditing practices applied in Finland. 
 
As a basis for the auditor‟s opinion, ISAs require the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements, as a whole, are free from material misstatement, 
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whether due to fraud or error. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance. It is obtained 
when the auditor has obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to reduce audit risk (that 
is, the risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate opinion when the financial statements 
are materially misstated) to an acceptably low level. (ISA200, IFAC, 2009) When evaluating 
the reasonable assurance level of the audit, audit formula is used to calculate the total audit 
risk to conceptualize the meaning of reasonable assurance. 
 
Audit risk is a function of the risk of material misstatement and detection risk. The assessment 
of risks is based on audit procedures to obtain information necessary for that purpose and 
evidence obtained throughout the audit. The assessment of risks is a matter of professional 
judgment, rather than a matter capable of precise measurement. (ISA200, IFAC, 2009) The 
risk of material misstatement can be further divided to inherent risk and control risk, thus the 
Audit risk formula consists of three risk components:  
 
Audit Risk (AR) = Inherent risk (IR) x Control Risk (CR) 
x Detection Risk (DR) 
 
IFAC defines these risk components in ISA200. Inherent risk and control risk are the entity‟s 
risks; they exist independently of the audit of the financial statements. Inherent risk is higher 
for some assertions and related classes of transactions, account balances, and disclosures than 
for others. For example, it may be higher for complex calculations or for accounts consisting 
of amounts derived from accounting estimates that are subject to significant estimation 
uncertainty. External circumstances giving rise to business risks may also influence inherent 
risk. For example, technological developments might make a particular product obsolete, 
thereby causing inventory to be more susceptible to overstatement. Factors in the entity and 
its environment that relate to several or all of the classes of transactions, account balances, or 
disclosures may also influence the inherent risk related to a specific assertion. Such factors 
may include, for example, a lack of sufficient working capital to continue operations or a 
declining industry characterized by a large number of business failures. (IFAC, ISA200, 2009, 
p.95) 
 
Control risk is a function of the effectiveness of the design, implementation and maintenance 
of internal control by management to address identified risks that threaten the achievement of 
the entity‟s objectives relevant to preparation of the entity‟s financial statements. However, 
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internal control, no matter how well designed and operated, can only reduce, but not 
eliminate, risks of material misstatement in the financial statements, because of the inherent 
limitations of internal control. These include, for example, the possibility of human errors or 
mistakes, or of controls being circumvented by collusion or inappropriate management 
override. Accordingly, some control risk will always exist. The ISAs provide the conditions, 
under which the auditor is required to, or may choose to, test the operating effectiveness of 
controls in determining the nature, timing and extent of substantive procedures to be 
performed. (IFAC, ISA200, 2009, p.96) 
 
For a given level of audit risk, the acceptable level of detection risk bears an inverse 
relationship to the assessed risks of material misstatement at the assertion level. For example, 
the greater the risks of material misstatement the auditor believes exists, the less the detection 
risk that can be accepted and, accordingly, the more persuasive the audit evidence required by 
the auditor. Detection risk relates to the nature, timing, and extent of the auditor‟s procedures 
that are determined by the auditor to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level. It is 
therefore a function of the effectiveness of an audit procedure and of its application by the 
auditor. According to ISA200, matters such as adequate planning, proper assignment of 
personnel to the engagement team, the application of professional scepticism and supervision 
and review of the audit work performed assist in enhancing the effectiveness of an audit 
procedure and of its application and reduce the possibility that an auditor might select an 
inappropriate audit procedure, misapply an appropriate audit procedure, or misinterpret the 
audit results. Detection risk, however, can only be reduced, not eliminated, because of the 
inherent limitations of an audit. Accordingly, some detection risk will always exist. (IFAC, 
ISA200, 2009, p.96-97) 
 
ISA315 and ISA330 with the appendices have more than a hundred different items the auditor 
must consider and assess to form the audit opinion of the entity‟s operating environment and 
internal controls. The company's internal governance structures can have a very big impact in 
lowering the audit risk and therefore reducing the auditor‟s workload, which should therefore 
result in lower audit fees. The role of internal auditors is further explored in the following 
section 2.4.   
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2.4 Internal audit 
 
The institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) defines internal auditing as follows: 
 
“Internal audit is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, 
and governance processes.” 
 
The IIA provides comprehensive guidance for the profession through its International 
Professional Practices Framework (IPPF), similar as the ISA for the auditors. The IPPF 
comprises the official definition of internal auditing, the International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (the Standards), the Code of Ethics, Practice 
Advisories, Position Papers and Practice Guides, and developmental and practice aids. 
Conformance with the Standards and the Code of Ethics is mandatory for all members of the 
IIA and Certified Internal Auditors (CIAs). (IIA, homepage) The internal auditing practice in 
Finland follows the same standards, because the Institute of Internal Auditors Finland 
(Sisäiset tarkastajat ry.) is an IIA member.  
 
Although internal auditors are independent of the activities they audit, they are integral to the 
organization and provide ongoing monitoring and assessment of all activities. On the 
contrary, external auditors are independent of the organization, and provide an annual opinion 
on the financial statements. Internal and external auditors have mutual interests regarding the 
effectiveness of internal financial controls. Both professions have code of ethics and 
professional standards set by their respective professional associations, which they need to 
comply when carrying out their assignment. However, there are major differences with regard 
to their relationships to the organization, and to their scope of work and objectives.  
 
The internal auditors are part of the organization and professional standards, the board, and 
management determine their objectives. Thus, their primary clients are management and the 
board. The internal auditors serve the organization by helping it accomplish its objectives, and 
improving operations, risk management, internal controls, and governance processes.  
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By contrast, external auditors are not an integral part of the organization and primarily laws, 
regulations and their client, the board of directors, set their objectives. The primary mission of 
the external auditors is to provide an independent audit opinion on the company‟s financial 
statements. Also the Finnish Audit Act (13.4.2007/459) and the ISA state that the liability of 
the audit engagement and the resulting auditor‟s report is solely the responsibility of the 
auditor. Liability issues of the audit cannot be completely transferred to other actors like the 
internal audit. Therefore the auditors must assess the usability of the internal audit‟s work for 
their auditing purposes. 
 
The IFAC has set a particular standard (ISA 610) for the external auditors on using the work 
of internal auditors, which emphasizes the complementary view of the work done by the 
internal auditors. ”The objectives of the internal audit function are determined by 
management and, where applicable, those charged with governance. While the objectives of 
the internal audit function and the external auditor are different, some of the ways in which 
the internal audit function and the external auditor achieve their respective objectives may be 
similar.” (IFAC, ISA 610.3, p.643) 
 
ISA 610 also requires an evaluation of the internal auditor function before their work can be 
used for auditing purposes and differentiates the responsibilities when expressing the audit 
opinion. “Irrespective of the degree of autonomy and objectivity of the internal audit function, 
such function is not independent of the entity as is required of the external auditor when 
expressing an opinion on financial statements. The external auditor has sole responsibility for 
the audit opinion expressed, and that responsibility is not reduced by the external auditor‟s 
use of the work of the internal auditors.” (IFAC, ISA 610.4, p.643) The evaluation consists of 
determining internal audit‟s objectivity, technical competence, due professional care and 
communication. ISA610 provides an extensive guidance on the matter, which the external 
auditors‟ can rely, when considering using the internal auditor‟s work in their auditing 
procedures. 
 
As one of the main responsibilities of the internal audit function is to audit and evaluate the 
organization's policies and internal controls related to financial reporting. The auditing 
process of the company‟s internal controls should not differ much from the internal auditing 
process and some of their objectives and therefore results should be as similar. The internal 
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audit should also contribute to lower risk of fraud and thus it should also reduce the audit 
work, if the auditors expect to be able to rely on internal audit. 
 
Prior studies explaining the effect of internal audit function to audit fees have been very 
controversial. These studies and textbooks see the internal and external audit work as an 
substitute for the audit effort, where the auditor does not need redo the auditing work an 
internal audit have already done, thus minimizing overlapping work. But more recent internal 
audit studies have supported the complementary view of the internal control mechanisms in 
relation to each other and have questioned the earlier view of direct substitution. For example 
Anderson et al. (1993) find that internal auditing increases relative to external auditing with 
firm size while directors‟ monitoring decreases relative to total auditing.  
 
Similar contradicting views have been reported when explaining the association of the audit 
committee to audit fees and earnings management. In addition to the internal and external 
audit functions, an audit committee can also be appointed to help the company's board and 
management to reduce the overlapping control mechanisms by optimizing the “monitoring 
package”. This relationship is further explored in the following section 2.5. 
 
 
2.5 Audit committee 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002, section 2, par. 3) defines an audit committee as:  
 
“A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of 
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the 
issuer".  
 
In the beginning of 2003 Hex Plc (nowadays NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd), The Central 
Chamber of Commerce of Finland and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers 
(nowadays the Confederation of Finnish Industries, EK) took note of the growing significance 
and international development of the Corporate Governance (CG) practices and they 
established a working group for amending the recommendations. Corporate Governance 
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Recommendation for Listed Companies (CG-code) was issued on the basis of this work in 
December 2003.  
 
This Code recommends the boards of the listed companies to establish an audit committee to 
aid the board in financial oversight of the company. “The proper function of the corporate 
governance of a company requires that board work be organized as efficiently as possible. 
The establishment of board committees may enhance the efficient preparation of matters 
within the competence of the board.” (CG working group, 2003) For example, the duties of 
the audit committee may include: 
 
• follow-up of the financial position of the company 
• supervision of financial reporting (financial statements, interim reports) 
• evaluation of the adequacy and appropriateness of internal control and risk 
management 
• handling of internal audit plans and reports 
• evaluation of compliance with laws and regulations 
• preparation of the decision concerning appointment of external auditor 
• contacts with the auditor, and examination of the auditor‟s reports 
• evaluation of the advisory services supplied by the external auditor (CG working 
group, 2003, p.10) 
 
The code was in effect from 1.1.2004 to all the Helsinki Stock Exchange-traded listed 
companies. Compliance with the recommendations has been quite diverse among the 
companies, depending on the size of the company (compliance with the recommendations is 
not reasonable in relation to the company's activities) or other information obligations (in the 
U.S. listed companies have already reported on corporate governance due the SOX). On the 
other hand the recommendation for "Comply or Explain" -principle forces companies to 
assess their compliance with the corporate governance recommendations. This principle also 
applies to the audit committee. If the committee is not established, it must be mentioned in the 
footnotes of the financial statement or in CG-statement. 
 
Corporate governance Code has been updated at 20.10.2008, where the recommendation 30 
concerning the audit committee has remained similar to previous code of 2003. A new 
recommendation has been added, which states that if the company does not have an audit 
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committee, the audit committee‟s tasks are the responsibility of the board. The new code did 
enter into force from 1.1.2009 in most parts.  As the fiscal year of the sample companies 
ended in the end of year 2008 or earlier, the new code may not have any influence on the 
companies studied in this thesis.  
 
According to the 2003 CG Code the extent of the operations of the company may require 
some directors to concentrate particularly on matters relating to financial reporting and 
control. The audit committee has better possibilities than the entire board to review questions 
connected with the financial administration and control of the company and ensure contacts 
with auditors and the internal audit function. The audit committee should comprise at least 
three members, the members of the audit committee should be independent of the company 
and the members should have the qualifications necessary to perform the responsibilities of 
the audit committee. (CG working group, 2003, p.10) 
 
The Code of 2008 contains a more precise recommendation on the qualifications of financial 
expertise of the audit committee members than the previous Code. The members shall have 
the qualifications necessary to perform the responsibilities of the audit committee, and at least 
one member shall have expertise specifically in accounting, bookkeeping or auditing (CG 
working group, 2008, p.14). 
 
The basic rationale for the existence of such committees is that they provide a link between 
management and the auditor in the review of the annual accounts and the determination of 
audit fees (Sherer and Kent 1983, p.33). One of the most important tasks of the audit 
committee is to monitor the external and internal auditors‟ audit plans and engagements. 
Therefore the audit committee has an important role in minimizing the overlapping work of 
the external and internal auditor, since it can evaluate the overall picture of the assurance 
parties. Thus, in theory, audit committee should contribute to lower audit fees through more 
efficient distribution of work between internal and external auditors.  
 
Collier & Gregory (1996) suggest that strong internal controls will reduce the amount of audit 
work when relying on internal controls and the auditor can limit his substantive testing 
procedures. But if the control tests indicate that internal controls are not operating properly 
then the auditor will be unable to restrict his substantive testing. Even though internal audit, 
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audit committee and external auditors have some overlapping tasks, each actor should 
strengthen the internal controls of the company as whole. 
 
Older empirical research supports this substitutive view of internal control strength and audit 
fees. Wallace (1984) found a direct relationship between expenditure on internal control and 
reduced external audit fees, while Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986) showed that weak control 
environments involved more audit work because audit tests would find higher error rates 
which would necessitate further testing. Thus they state that, ceteris paribus, companies with 
strong internal controls would experience lower audit fees. 
 
Given the role of audit committees in improving internal controls through their monitoring of 
the work of internal and external auditors it might be anticipated that internal controls are 
stronger in companies, which had an audit committee, and that consequently their audit fee 
would be lower to reflect this. Felix et al. (2001) found also that facilitating coordination 
between the internal and external auditors can reduce the audit fees. The audit committee has 
an important function, when coordinating the work between internal and external auditors. 
 
In the context of earnings management, there is also evidence (see e.g. Cohen et al., 2004 and 
Lin & Hwan, 2010) that voluntary formation of the audit committee has a constraining effect 
on earnings manipulation and fraud, which should improve financial reporting quality. One 
possible way of measuring the quality of financial reporting is with the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals. If the different corporate governance actors can restrain the possibility 
of fraudulent earnings management, the quality of the accruals improves resulting to higher 
usability and reliability of the reported earnings. The concept of earnings management is 
further studied in the next section. 
 
 
2.6 Earnings management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define the earnings management in their study:  
 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
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Scott (2009) takes a more relaxed and practical view in defining earnings management 
opposed to Healy and Wahlen above: 
 
Earnings management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies, or actions 
affecting earnings, so as to achieve some specific reported earnings. 
 
Scott (2009) has listed some patterns of earnings management that the company and its 
managers may engage: 
 
1. Taking a bath – This can take place during periods of organizational stress or 
reorganization. If a firm must report a loss, management may feel it might as well report a 
large one – it has little to lose at this point. Consequently, it will write-off assets, provide for 
expected future costs, and generally “clear the decks”. Because of accrual reversal, this 
enhances the probability of future reported profits. (Scott, 2009, p.405) 
 
2. Income minimization – This is similar to taking the bath, but less extreme. Such a pattern 
may be chosen by a politically visible firm during periods of high profitability. Policies thus 
suggest income minimization include rapid write-offs of capital assets and intangibles, 
expensing of advertising and R&D expenditures, successful-efforts accounting for oil and gas 
exploration costs, and so on. Income tax considerations, such as for LIFO inventory in the 
United States, provide another set of motivations for this pattern, as does enhancement of 
arguments for relief from foreign competition. (Scott, 2009, p.405) 
 
In Finland, the accounting legislation and generally accepted accounting practices are still 
closely tied to taxation and the income minimization purposes of the earnings management 
are very likely in effort to minimize taxes. “Distinguishing distributable equity is usually main 
reason for setting an earnings target. With the earnings target, the company can evaluate the 
tax burden and practice tax planning.” (Alhola et al., 2002, p.10). 
 
3. Income maximization – From positive accounting theory, mangers may engage in a 
pattern of maximization of reported net income for bonus purposes, providing this does not 
put them above the gap. Firms that are close to debt covenant violations may also maximize 
income. (Scott, 2009, p.405)  
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4. Income smoothing – From contracting perspective, risk-averse managers prefer a less 
variable bonus stream, other things equal. Consequently, managers may smooth reported 
earnings over time so as to receive relatively constant compensation. Efficient compensation 
contracting may exploit this effect, and condone some income smoothing as a low-cost way to 
attain the managers‟ reservation utility. The more volatile the stream of reported income, the 
higher the probability that covenant violation will occur. This provides another smoothing 
incentive – to reduce the volatility of reported income so as to smooth covenant ratios over 
time. Managers may feel, with some justification, that they may be fired when reported 
earnings are low. Income smoothing reduces the likelihood of reporting low earnings. Finally, 
firms may smooth reported net income for external reporting purposes. Smoothing can 
convey inside information to the market by enabling the firm to communicate its expected 
persistent earnings power. (Scott, 2009, p.405) 
 
Scott also suggests the concept of “good” earnings management, when stakeholders can use 
the inside information obtained from earnings management actions, where possible to detect, 
to make a better judgment of the company‟s future actions. Accruals let managers 
communicate their private inside information and thereby improve the ability of earnings to 
reflect underlying economic value (Krishnan, 2003). Therefore the earnings management 
applied can be taken into account by the investors when valuing the company. The big 
problem is the detecting the earnings management, because there may be other unknown 
reasons to the chosen policy change. 
 
Thus, earnings management may not necessarily always reflect opportunistic behaviour. 
Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) argue that voluntary disclosures can be a vehicle for managers 
to communicate private information about the firm's future prospects. Subramanyam (1996) 
extends the disclosure-oriented perspective of Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) by suggesting 
that accruals also function as a vehicle for managers to communicate private information 
about the firm's prospects. He finds that both nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals are 
positively associated with firm valuation. However, the communication value of accruals is 
undermined if outsiders are suspicious of managers' ability to opportunistically use accruals 
for private gain. To be credible, reported accruals must conform to a reasonable application of 
GAAP and be subject to verification through the audit. (Francis et al., 1999)  
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As presented, all earnings management is not necessarily bad, if the users of the information 
can interpret it correctly and they also can rely on the information received from the financial 
reporting. But usually this interpretation is very difficult, because the incentives for the 
earnings management are not known to the outside, or even inside, stakeholders and the 
possibility of earnings management might not come into mind of the user of the information. 
 
According to Scott (2009) the devices for earnings management can be divided to two main 
parts. He divides the earnings management to include making choices in both accounting 
policies and real actions affecting the earnings.  
 
First of the devices is the real actions affecting the earnings are done by e.g. lowering R&D 
and marketing efforts to cut costs. While these affect directly to the cash flows and they have 
long-run implications to the company, the reasons behind the actions are more easily obtained 
by the stakeholders or investors. Therefore, this type of earnings management is not focus of 
this study.  
 
The second device for earnings management is the managers‟ choices on accounting policies. 
This type of earnings management also includes the discretionary accruals, which is used as 
an indicator for earnings management in this study. Scott further divides choice of accounting 
policy to two parts: “A choice of accounting policy per se, such as straight-line versus 
declining-balance amortization, or policies for revenue recognition. The other category is 
discretionary accruals, such as provisions for credit losses, warranty costs, inventory values, 
and timing and amounts of non-recurring and extraordinary items such as write-offs and 
provisions for reorganization.” (Scott, 2009) The concept of accrual accounting is one of the 
cornerstones of the current generally accepted accounting principles and is further explained 
in the following two chapters. 
 
If the company reports in accordance to International Financial Reporting Standards‟ (IFRS) 
requirements, the financial statements are to be prepared on the accrual basis of accounting. 
Under this basis, the effects of transactions and other events are recognized when they occur 
(and not as cash or its equivalent are received or paid) and they are recorded in the accounting 
records and reported in the financial statements of the periods to which they relate. Financial 
statements prepared on the accrual basis inform users not only of past transactions involving 
the payment and receipt of cash but also of obligations to pay cash in the future and of 
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resources that represent cash to be received in the future. Hence, this provides the type of 
information about past transactions and other events that is most useful to users in making 
economic decisions. (IASB, 2009, IFRS framework, par. 22) 
 
The accrual basis of accounting can be divided to two principles: revenue recognition 
principle and expense matching principle. The revenue recognition principle states that 
revenues should be recognized when the firm has delivered a product or has produced a 
substantial proportion of it, and the cash receipt is reasonably certain. The matching principle 
requires that the revenues recognized during one period be matched with the costs associated 
with them. Over the lifetime of the firm, cash flows and earnings are the same but when 
accounting principles are applied over finite time periods, cash flows have to be adjusted to 
produce the earnings number. These adjustments are made with accruals on the balance sheet, 
and thus, earnings are the sum of period‟s change in accruals and its cash flows. (Spohr 2005, 
p.6) 
 
In the most of the earnings management studies, the main method for explaining the possible 
earnings management has been the amount of discretionary accruals. As explained above, the 
companies use accruals to recognize revenues or expenses to their respective period according 
to the accounting principles. Beneish (2001) summarizes the reasons why the accrual-based 
earnings management research is more popular. This is because, firstly, the “earnings 
management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. 
Secondly, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the 
effect of various accounting choices on earnings. Third, if earnings management is an 
unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of 
earnings management.” (Beneish, 2001) 
 
In the earnings management studies, total accruals have been divided to non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals by typically using a regression, which tries to capture the non-
discretionary accruals with the variables explaining the “expected/normal” accruals. The “not-
expected/abnormal” part is the discretionary accruals, which is not explained by the selected 
variables. Widely used Modified Jones discretionary accruals model by Dechow (1995) is 
used in this study and is further explained in the methods part of the thesis in Chapter 4. The 
next section summarizes the previous theory sections and explains the relation between the 
presented corporate governance actors, audit quality and financial reporting quality. 
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2.7 Audit quality, earnings management and financial reporting quality 
 
The purpose of this section is to tie all the previous sections together and as the heading of 
this section state, to provide the explanation to the relation between the audit quality, earnings 
management and financial reporting quality. 
 
As the corporate governance mosaic in section 2.1 shows, there are several actors affecting 
the quality of the financial reporting. Rich (2009) has listed some existing research suggesting 
that there are economic benefits to high quality financial reporting. For example, Hong (2001) 
finds that firms with low levels of discretionary accruals experience higher risk-adjusted 
returns than firms with high discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Francis et al. (2005) 
provides evidence that firms with low Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality face higher 
costs of debt and equity capital than firms with high quality accruals. One possible 
explanation for these results is that investors perceive low quality financial reporting to 
indicate the presence of high agency costs. Evidence supporting this idea comes from studies 
highlighting opportunistic use of financial reporting by managers before equity offerings 
(Teoh et al. 1998), and stock option exercises (Bartov and Mohanram 2004). 
 
One of the main users of the financial reporting is the investors and they have an interest for 
the higher quality and therefore higher usability of such reporting. Investors typically lack the 
information necessary to assess the actual reliability or quality of company disclosures 
(Jennings, 1987). Therefore, investors must assess the credibility or believability of company 
disclosures in addition to the information content of the disclosure. Kinney (2002) notes that 
the need for the better quality of financial reporting is due both to an increase in investors‟ 
confidence in the competence and care of the application of stated measurements methods and 
trustworthiness of the display of measurement results (Holt, 2009). 
 
Mercer (2004) provides a framework for assessing investor perceptions of disclosure 
credibility. She notes that one key factor that affects perceptions of disclosure credibility is 
the degree of external and internal assurance. This assurance may come from external parties 
such as auditors, business journalists, and financial analysts, or from internal parties such as 
the board of directors, audit committee, and internal auditors (Mercer, 2004). 
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There is less evidence on whether investors consider these factors when assessing disclosure 
credibility, but preliminary research suggests that they do. Black et al. (2003) find that firms 
with a large percentage of outside directors and/or an audit committee command higher 
market valuations, and argue that these effects occur because investors value the same 
earnings stream more highly for such firms. Wild (1996) finds that the formation of an audit 
committee leads to greater reliance on the firm's earnings disclosures. Thus, the existing 
evidence suggests that investors consider the composition of a firm's board of directors and 
audit committee when assessing disclosure credibility. The heightened scrutiny on boards of 
directors due to recent accounting scandals may result in boards of directors playing an even 
greater role in disclosure credibility in the future. (Mercer, 2004) 
 
Audit committee accounting expertise has also been linked to more informative earnings. 
More specifically, prior studies provide evidence of higher earnings response coefficients for 
firms having at least one accounting expert on their audit committee (Bryan et al. 2007; Qin 
2007) than firms without an accounting expert. These results suggest that accounting 
expertise is associated with investor perceptions that earnings are persistent (Collins and 
Kothari 1989), and therefore of high quality. (Rich, 2009) 
 
Another potential within-firm source of assurance is the firm's internal audit department. 
Internal auditors often serve as the first line of defence against disclosure errors, ferreting out 
unintentional errors caused by weaknesses in a company's internal controls and intentional 
errors due to fraud. Consequently, if investors can assess internal audit quality, then firms 
with a strong internal audit department may have higher disclosure credibility. There is little 
existing research on the relation between internal audit department strength and disclosure 
credibility. One likely reason for the dearth of studies is that it is difficult for both investors 
and researchers to determine whether a firm has high-quality internal auditors. (Mercer, 2004) 
 
As Mercer (2004) explained, one of the external parties in improving investors‟ assurance on 
the financial reporting is the auditors. The assumption in this study that audit quality is 
positively linked to earnings quality is not new and has been extensively documented in the 
accounting and auditing literature.  
 
Several prior studies document an association between measures of higher quality auditors 
(such as auditor size or industry expertise) and higher quality of financial reporting (e.g. 
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Becker et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2002; Krishnan, 2003; Balsam et al., 2003; Myers et al., 
2003; Ghosh and Moon, 2005). This linkage is based on the argument that high-quality 
auditors, as a result of more effective monitoring, are more likely to detect questionable 
accounting practices and misrepresentations by management than low-quality auditors. If 
managers are unwilling to address the auditor‟s concerns with regard to questionable 
accounting practices and misrepresentations, high-quality auditors are more likely to issue 
qualified audit reports. In this sense, the quality of financial reporting (earnings quality) may 
be viewed as a joint product of managerial and auditor efforts. (Gul et al, 2009)  
 
In sum, internal auditors, audit committee and auditors should diminish the possibility of the 
earnings management and therefore improve the financial reporting quality, which 
furthermore improves the credibility of the information to its users. The next chapter presents 
the research hypotheses of this thesis and the relevant prior studies on the matter.  
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3. Prior studies and hypothesis development 
This chapter presents the relevant prior studies and develops the research hypothesis to be 
modelled in the next Chapter 4. The research is ultimately conducted with two separate 
models, one for examining the relationships of the internal governance actors to audit quality 
and the second model for studying their effects on the magnitude of earnings management. 
 
Audit quality is measured by audit fees paid to the auditor and magnitude of earnings 
management is measured by discretionary accruals. Also, audit quality model is to be 
included with the earnings management proxy, and vice versa, for additional hypothesis on 
their effects to each other. Overall, these both should have an impact on the financial 
reporting quality as explained in section 2.7. The Figure 2 below clarifies the hypotheses and 
finally the main idea of the audit fee and earnings management models to be used in this 
study. 
 
Figure 2 Audit quality and earnings management models with hypotheses and their signs 
 
As seen from the Figure 2, the hypotheses H1-H3 should be positively associated to audit 
quality and finally positively associated to financial reporting quality. Also, the hypotheses 
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H4-H6 should have a negative effect on the magnitude of the earnings management and 
finally the magnitude of earnings management should have a negative effect on the financial 
reporting quality.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the magnitude of earnings management itself is often used as the 
indicator for the financial reporting quality. But here, the financial reporting quality is used as 
a common nominator to the both audit quality and the magnitude of earnings management to 
clarify the research setting. The effects of the audit quality and earning management to the 
financial reporting quality are not studied separately as additional hypotheses. 
 
As mentioned, there are total of six different hypotheses to be studied and they are divided to 
two main groups. Firstly, the hypothesized association of the internal audit, audit committee 
and earnings management to the audit quality, proxied with audit fees, are presented in 
section 3.1. Secondly, the section 3.2 hypothesizes the relationships between the same internal 
governance structures and audit fees to the magnitude of earnings management using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy.  
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3.1 The effect of internal governance structures and earnings management to 
audit fees 
The effect of internal auditors, audit committee and discretionary accruals to audit fees is 
linked by the concept of lowering information asymmetries and audit risk as reported above. 
Therefore, there should be an effect on the external auditor‟s workload and fees. As the audit 
fees are used as an indicator of audit quality, these internal governance functions and the 
magnitude of earnings management should have a positive effect on the amount of fees as 
hypothesized in the following sections. 
 
3.1.1 Internal audit function 
 
As Gray & Manson (2008) mention the internal audit is an important element in the internal 
control system and existence (or non-existence) reflects top management‟s attitude towards 
internal control. The very existence of an internal audit department thus should have an 
impact on the external auditor‟s assessment to control risk.  
 
However, as the internal audit‟s role to audit fees has been studied extensively, the results are 
rather mixed. Felix et al. (2001) found that, the greater the contribution of internal auditors to 
the financial statement audit, the lower the audit fee. They used a questionnaire, where 
external auditors could assess the contribution and quality of internal audit function to 
financial statement audit work performed. Their findings suggest that internal audit 
contribution can result in reduced external audit fees, and that client firms can potentially 
affect internal audit contribution by investing in internal audit quality. 
 
Based on agency theory, especially, internal audit function is considered a bonding cost “by 
which the management lowers the moral hazard in their expense to improve transparency of 
the company to owners” (Watts, 1988, p.129). Other researchers have also recognized the role 
of internal audit as a bonding function in the contracting process of the company. For example 
Sherer and Kent (1983, p.99) perceive internal auditing to be “a bonding cost borne by the 
senior managers to satisfy the demands for accountability made by external participants, 
especially shareholders”. They also argue that internal audit is an adjunct of the function 
performed by external audit, “the difference being that the cost of an internal audit is incurred 
directly by the managers” (Sherer & Kent, 1983, p.99) and that agent/managers have an 
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incentive to incur costs of internal audit in total cost of the audit process, both internal and 
external, is less than the perceived cost of external auditing on its own. For example, cost 
savings may arise as a result of internal auditors‟ specific industry knowledge and expertise in 
systems and operational audits. (Sherer & Kent, 1983, p.99) 
 
On the other hand, in order to use the work of internal audit, external auditors have to 
determine whether the work of internal audit is adequate to the purposes of the audit, which 
will result in more audit work. For example, if external auditors are to rely on internal audit 
work they must fully document the decisions to use internal audit work. There could also be a 
possibility that the external auditors cannot use the work of internal auditors or their work is 
not suitable for the purposes of the audit. 
 
In their book, Gray & Manson (2008) summarize the practical approach to control testing: “In 
practice, auditors seek to identify inherent risks and then record, test and evaluate controls to 
form a view as to whether the controls are adequate to reduce the impact of inherent risk to a 
low, acceptable level. If they conclude that both inherent risk and control risk is high, they 
will have to rely upon substantive procedures (tests of details of transactions and balances or 
analytical procedures) to reduce the overall audit risk.” (Gray & Manson, 2008, p.179) They 
also acknowledge the work of the internal auditors can reduce control risk, which mitigates 
the impact of inherent risk. However, they also remind the importance of evaluating the 
usability and independence of internal audit‟s work to the auditor.  
 
Hay et al. (2006, 2008) have studied effect of the internal governance functions on each 
other‟s work. Their results support the complementary view of the internal audit function in 
the auditing process. According to study the demand for audit work grows, if the companies 
invest in other governance functions e.g. the internal audit function. Also Knechel & 
Willekens (2006) found support for the complementary view of the internal audit in demand 
for audit fees. Further, Jokipii et al. (2008) found similar results on the positive effect of 
internal audit and other internal monitoring functions on demand for audit services.  
 
This study hypothesizes that the internal audit function is in a complementary relationship to 
other internal governance structures and thus there should be a positive effect on audit fees: 
 
H1: Existence of the internal audit is positively associated to the audit fees. 
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3.1.2 Audit committee 
 
Similarly, the studies on the effects of audit committees to audit fees were as controversial as 
studies explaining the internal audit. One of the main tasks of the audit committee is to 
coordinate the different control functions in the company. At the same time, they can oversee 
and assess the effectiveness of various additional services as whole. At its best, they can 
arrange the internal control mechanisms, so that the company would have the most cost-
efficient monitoring package, which still meets the requirements of the organizational control. 
On the other hand the existence of audit committees has been seen to increase audit fees, since 
it also requires more extensive audit work from the auditors. Also, the audit committee has 
been proven to increase bureaucracy of the auditors with increased reports needs and meetings 
with the auditors. 
 
The interest of the researchers on the effect of audit committees to the audit fees has been 
increasing from the start of this decade. The probable reason for this late interest might be the 
growing existence of audit committee in companies and also the corporate governance codes 
are becoming more common throughout the world. CG recommendations have also led to 
mandatory publication of the information related to corporate governance through “comply or 
explain” principle, which should also contribute to easiness of obtaining the information for 
researching purposes. 
 
More recent studies have reported the positive association between the audit committee and 
audit fees in contradiction to the older theories and recommendations. However, the positive 
association has been documented earlier. For example, the Cadbury Committee noted about 
the audit committee‟s positive effect on audit fees: “The existence of the Audit Committee 
may result in increased audit fees, because the audit committee should ensure the fulfilment 
of the minimum requirements by requiring a higher quality audit.” (Cadbury Committee, 
1992, pp.36-37, par.5.10) 
 
Collier & Gregory (1996) summarize the mixed role of audit committee in relation to the 
audit fees: “To the extent that audit committees should enhance audit quality, partly by 
ensuring that audit hours are not reduced, an audit committee may be expected to increase 
total audit fees. At the same time, an audit committee may reasonably be thought to be a 
proxy for internal control strength. Ceteris paribus, companies with strong internal controls 
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may be expected to pay lower audit fees than those with weak internal controls.” (Collier & 
Gregory, 1996)  
 
Recent studies have shown that audit committees are associated with the demand for high 
quality audit and therefore higher audit fees. For example they show (e.g. Stewart & Kent, 
2006, Hay et al., 2008), that the existence of an audit committee leads to more meetings with 
the auditors and they need to prepare various reports to the Audit Committee, which will 
increase the audit fees. As Stewart and Munro (2007) summarize, the existence of an audit 
committee is expected to lead to an increase in audit fees due to the added bureaucracy of the 
auditors. The audit committee also reduces the possibility of auditor switch, which may 
strengthen the position of the auditor in fee negotiations and leads to longer auditor tenure 
(Abbott et al., 2003). Hypothesis is again formed according to the more recent studies‟ 
findings: 
 
H2: Existence of the audit committee is positively associated to the audit fees. 
 
 
3.1.3 Earnings management 
 
As the main purpose for audit work is to determine whether the financial statements are fairly 
presented. When audit quality is poor, the financial statements are more likely to contain 
items that obscure the company's "true" operating results and financial condition. The quality 
of reported earnings thus reflects the quality of audit work. 
 
The effect of earnings management to audit fees has not been extensively studied in prior 
research, but their link can also be justified through audit risk concept presented earlier. The 
larger the magnitude of discretionary accruals should lead to higher the inherent risk, which 
can result to higher audit effort and therefore higher audit fees. The same positive association 
have been documented by Abbott et al. (2006, p.88): “The audit risk model would suggest 
that any misstatement (regardless of direction) should result in greater audit work.” 
 
In addition, if and when the auditors try to protect their reputation from audit failures and 
litigations, they should direct more audit effort to diminish the possible fraudulent earnings 
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manipulation. Large accruals are found to be positively associated with subsequent audit 
failures and auditor litigation (Geiger and Raghunandan 2002; Heninger 2001).  
 
Caramanis & Lennox (2008) found a positive relationship between audit hours and abnormal 
accruals (especially income-increasing earnings management) even after controlling for 
endogeneity. Thus their results suggest that auditors might have to work harder if they believe 
that their clients are attempting to manage earnings.  
 
Based on the above reasoning, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H3: The magnitude of earnings management is positively associated to audit fees. 
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3.2 The effect of internal governance structures and audit fees to earnings 
management 
 
While early research on earnings management focused almost exclusively on understanding 
the existence of earnings management, recent studies have moved away from detecting 
earnings management to an examination of the factors, like corporate governance actors, 
limiting earnings management. In addition to the previously hypothesized effects of internal 
governance structures to audit fees, this thesis tries to further the understanding on the role of 
these governance actors by using earnings management model to explain their relationships in 
the context of earnings management. The summary of the hypothesis to be presented is, that 
the more efficient the internal governance structures are, the smaller the magnitude of the 
earnings management should be. Therefore, the existence of the internal governance 
structures and high quality audits should improve financial reporting quality. The following 
sections justify hypothesized effects of the internal audit, audit committee and external 
auditor to earnings management measured with discretionary accruals. 
 
 
3.2.1 Internal audit function 
 
Still continuing the contracting substitute/complementary views on the effect of individual 
internal corporate governance actors, the results seem to be more in unison than in the case of 
audit fees. However, most of these studies study the effect of the internal audit as separate, 
not as the part of the corporate governance system. Overall, the research studying the role of 
internal audit to earnings management sees the internal auditors diminishing the possible 
earnings management.  
 
In their, meta-analysis, Gramling et al. (2004) found evidence that the internal audit is 
positively associated to corporate governance quality, including financial reporting quality 
and firm performance. Especially, they found evidence on that the presence of efficient 
internal audit function improves the internal control environment and thus deters financial 
reporting irregularities. Also, they concluded that the internal auditors have an increasing role 
in ensuring and further improving the quality of corporate governance with the other 
corporate governance actors. 
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Davidson et al. (2005) have listed some of the research studying the effects of internal 
auditors on earnings management: Schneider & Wilner (1990) find that companies with an 
internal audit function are less likely to have financial reporting irregularities. Eighme and 
Cashell (2002) regard the role of internal audit in detecting earnings management as being a 
complementary one to that of external audit. They believe that both should be actively 
involved in the detection of inappropriate earnings management. Clikeman (2003) argues that 
internal auditors should not only be actively involved in detecting earnings management, but 
that they also should take a proactive approach to educating managers and directors about the 
dangers of the practice. Using specific components on the quality of the internal audit 
function, Prawitt et al. (2009) find a statistically negative relationship between internal audit 
function quality and absolute abnormal accruals. Thus, they suggest that the higher-quality 
internal audit function is associated with lower level of earnings management.  
 
As the mentioned studies suggest, the presence of an internal audit function should be 
associated with a lower level of earnings management and the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H4: The existence of internal audit is negatively associated to the magnitude of earnings 
management. 
 
 
3.2.2 Audit committee 
 
To effectively monitor the financial discretion of management, the audit committee is 
expected to review the financial reporting process, as well as to facilitate a flow of 
information among the board of directors, the internal and external auditors, and management 
(McMullen and Raghundan, 1996). In order to more efficiently perform their duties, the board 
of directors often delegates the responsibility for overseeing financial reporting to an audit 
committee. The audit committee is viewed as enhancing the board of directors‟ capacity to 
monitor management in the financial reporting process by providing more detailed knowledge 
and understanding of financial statements and other financial disclosures issued by the 
company. The existence of an audit committee may be perceived as indicating higher quality 
monitoring and should reduce the occurrence of opportunistic earnings management. 
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Janin et al. (2007) see the role of audit committee in improving the quality of the audit 
process and therefore improving the earnings quality. First, by supervising major accounting 
choices, the committee should mitigate earnings management practices. Second, by 
coordinating the internal and external audits, and by protecting external auditors‟ 
independence from managerial pressure (McMullen & Raghundan, 1996), the audit 
committee should maximize the likelihood that irregularities discovered by auditors will be 
reported at a sufficiently high level. (Janin et al., 2007) Also, according to Davidson et al. 
(2005) the existence of an effective audit committee provides a firm with an added layer of 
governance, which is expected to constrain earnings management behaviour. 
 
In their meta-analysis, Lin & Hwang (2010) find very mixed results on the existence of the 
audit committee to the earnings management. They find significant relationship between the 
existence of an audit committee and earnings management in the articles they studied. For 
example, while Bédard et al. (2004) and Jaggi & Leung (2007) report a significantly negative 
relationship between earnings management and the existence of an audit committee, all the 
other existing studies either fail to find a significant relationship or find a significant but 
positive (contrary to expectation) relationship (Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
 
For example Mercer (2004) found some audit committee characteristics that affect the 
magnitude of earnings management. Firms with more independent boards and audit 
committees, as measured by the number of outside members, experience less earnings 
management and fraud. Less earnings management is also found in firms whose boards and 
audit committees meet more frequently and have greater financial expertise. This evidence 
implies that firms whose boards and audit committees are more independent, diligent, and 
have the expertise needed provide higher quality disclosures.  
 
The hypothesis is constructed considering that the very existence of the audit committee 
should diminish the magnitude of earnings management and thus improving financial 
reporting quality: 
 
H5: The existence of audit committee is negatively associated to the magnitude of earnings 
management. 
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3.2.3 Audit fees 
 
The agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control, along with 
information asymmetry between management and absentee owners, create the demand for 
external audit. External auditors are responsible for verifying that the financial statements are 
fairly stated in conformity with GAAP and that these statements reflect the „true‟ economic 
condition and operating results of the entity. Thus, the external auditor‟s verification adds 
credibility to the company‟s financial statements. Also, the external auditors are required by 
auditing standards to discuss and communicate with the audit committee about the quality, not 
just the acceptability, of accounting principles applied by the client company. Therefore, a 
high quality audit is expected to constrain opportunistic earnings management as well as to 
reduce information risk that the financial reports contain material misstatements or omissions. 
(Lin & Hwang, 2010) 
 
Audit quality is reflected by the role that auditors play in reducing the estimation errors in 
accruals. Audit effort and competence enable the auditors to get information and make 
judgments on the accrual estimation errors. A truly independent auditor will require the 
management to correct their estimates and modify their accounting methods to improve 
accrual quality. Furthermore, the presence of a competent and independent auditor will deter 
managers from making intentional errors and motivate them to exercise greater care in 
reducing the unintentional errors. 
 
Since the auditing should reduce information asymmetries that exist between managers and 
firm stakeholders by allowing outsiders to verify the validity of financial statements. The 
effectiveness of auditing, and its ability to constrain the management of earnings, is therefore 
expected to vary with the audit quality. Audit quality differences result in variation in 
credibility offered by the auditors, and in the earnings quality of their audit clients. Because 
auditor quality is multidimensional and inherently unobservable, no single auditor 
characteristic can be used to proxy for it‟ (Balsam et al., 2003, p.71). 
 
In comparison to low-quality audit, high-quality audit is more likely to detect questionable 
accounting practices and, when detected, to object to their use and/or to qualify the audit 
report. Thus, high-quality audit acts as an effective deterrent to earnings management because 
management's reputation is likely to be damaged and firm value reduced if misreporting is 
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detected and revealed (Becker et al., 1998, p.6). Therefore, the earnings management should 
be lower in high quality audits and the final hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
 
H6: Audit fees are negatively associated to the magnitude of earnings management. 
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4. Research methodology and sample 
 
The following chapter presents the audit fee models and the earnings management models 
used to portray the hypothesized effects on audit quality and earnings quality.  
 
Widely used audit price regression model developed by Simunic (1980) is used to study the 
effect of the existence of internal governance function and the magnitude of earnings 
management to audit fees. Similar models have been used in several previous similar studies 
(e.g. Firth, 1985; Gist, 1992; Collier & Gregory, 1996; Menon & Williams, 2001; Niemi, 
2004; Hay et al., 2008 and Jokipii et al., 2008), using the audit fees as a dependent variable. 
The other variables are related mainly to the size, audit risk and complexity of the auditee. 
 
Earnings management is modelled by using absolute discretionary accruals. There are various 
different models trying to capture this effect. The most used of these models is probably the 
modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995), which is also used in this study. Data sample 
(section 4.1), models (sections 4.2 and its subsections) and related variables with their 
descriptive statistics (section 4.3) are presented in this chapter. 
 
 
4.1 Data sample description 
 
The initial sample consists of 126 companies, which were listed in OMX-Helsinki at the end 
of calendar year 2008. The construction of sample is presented in the Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Construction of the final sample 
Year 2008 n 
Initial sample (OMX-Helsinki listed at 31.12.2008) 126 
Less: Financials 15 
Less: Companies listed in US 1 
Less: Companies with missing data items 3 
Final sample 107 
 
Total of 19 companies are excluded from the initial sample to reach the final sample of 107. 
Following the prior research, 15 of the excluded companies are financial institutions, which 
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have a different type of financial reporting structure and do not have all the data items as the 
others have (e.g. inventory). Also one company had to be excluded because of the tighter 
corporate governance requirements of the US stock exchange, where it was also listed. 
Finally, three more companies are excluded due the insufficient data obtained from the 
databases used. Therefore, the final sample used in this study consists of 107 OMX-Helsinki 
listed Finnish companies representing about 85% of the all companies listed. 
 
The data for the models is obtained from number of different sources. The data concerning the 
existence of internal audit function and audit committee is handpicked from the companies‟ 
financial reports, corporate governance reports and, if not found in either sources, from the 
web pages of the companies. Also the audit fee data is handpicked from the aforementioned 
sources. The data related to other financial figures of the sample companies is obtained from 
the Thomson Financial database with Thomson One Banker tool. Orbis database is used to 
obtain subsidiary data and data related to major stockowners. The data for this study consists 
of companies, which had fiscal years ending any time during the calendar year 2008. Also, 
financial data for year the 2007 is also used to calculate some of the variables, mainly for 
those variables, which are lagged or indicate change. 
 
The data consists only of listed companies, since they have to comply with the corporate 
governance code required by the stock exchange and are large enough to use additional 
internal corporate governance actors. When a company complies with the corporate 
governance code, it must disclose the amount of audit fees and other fees paid to the auditor. 
Therefore, the audit fee data may also be harder to obtain from private companies‟ financial 
statements. Also, for the same reason obtaining governance data from the private companies 
is very difficult. Thus private companies are excluded from the data set and the listed 
companies are used as explained above. Table 2 on the next page describes the data related to 
audit fees. 
 
Table 2 is classified to size groups by the listing classification of the OMX-Helsinki stock 
exchange related to their market capitalization size. As the means of the market 
capitalizations of the different categories shows, the classification is consistent with the OMX 
size classification. The size classifications are also consistent, when compared to other size 
variables like sales, total assets and number of subsidiaries. Also, all the audit fee variables 
are larger as the OMX size category suggests. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of fee and size variables classified by OMX size categories *) 
OMX size category  Variable Mean Median Std Dev Std Error Min Max 
All (n=107) Audit fees 0.524 0.137 0.795 0.077 0.015 4.232 
  Other fees to auditor 0.339 0.095 0.581 0.056 0.000 2.900 
  Total audit fees 0.863 0.248 1.282 0.124 0.024 5.600 
  Market capitalization 698.4 105.7 2 120.1 205.0 2.6 15 890.3 
  Sales 1 362.6 242.5 2 572.3 248.7 3.8 15 043.0 
  Total assets 1 401.6 177.3 3 474.8 335.9 3.9 22 840.4 
  Total subsidiaries 28.9 15.0 35.4 3.4 2.0 151.0 
        Large (n=25) Audit fees 1.524 1.300 1.019 0.204 0.193 4.232 
  Other fees to auditor 1.004 0.800 0.780 0.156 0.080 2.900 
  Total audit fees 2.528 1.900 1.526 0.305 0.329 5.600 
  Market capitalization 2 613.9 1 479.7 3 847.8 769.6 450.7 15 890.3 
  Sales 4 445.7 3 399.2 3 804.6 760.9 697.0 15 043.0 
  Total assets 4 852.2 2 939.4 5 973.1 1 194.6 574.1 22 840.4 
  Total subsidiaries 74.1 75.0 45.3 9.1 8.0 151.0 
        Medium (n=31) Audit fees 0.405 0.181 0.482 0.087 0.025 1.900 
  Other fees to auditor 0.242 0.100 0.428 0.077 0.007 2.294 
  Total audit fees 0.647 0.338 0.835 0.150 0.054 3.985 
  Market capitalization 243.8 226.4 132.9 23.9 71.5 624.7 
  Sales 841.3 475.4 885.9 159.1 55.4 3 236.0 
  Total assets 769.9 380.3 920.8 165.4 44.6 4 500.0 
  Total subsidiaries 23.1 18.0 19.3 3.5 4.0 101.0 
        Small (n=51) Audit fees 0.105 0.070 0.125 0.018 0.015 0.802 
  Other fees to auditor 0.072 0.036 0.121 0.017 0.000 0.798 
  Total audit fees 0.177 0.128 0.232 0.032 0.024 1.600 
  Market capitalization 35.7 28.2 28.6 4.0 2.6 142.3 
  Sales 168.2 78.3 481.3 67.4 3.8 3 443.2 
  Total assets 94.1 56.1 139.4 19.5 3.9 922.5 
  Total subsidiaries 10.2 8.0 7.3 1.0 2.0 34.0 
*) Numbers are in millions of Euros, except total subsidiaries. 
 
The amount of audit fees also follows with the size classification, as the Large Cap group has 
a median of total audit fees of 1.9 millions of Euros compared to the Small Cap group‟s 
median of 0.128 millions of Euros, while the median for the whole sample is 0.248 millions 
of Euros. Also, the Table 2 suggests, that the larger the company, the larger the amount of 
other fees paid to the auditor. This might be due to the increasing complexity of the larger 
companies‟ business environment, which makes such companies to purchase additional 
services from their auditors. However, the portion of the other fees remains pretty similar 
(about 1/3 of the total fees) throughout the different size groups. This can be seen from the 
Appendix 3 by studying the FEERATIO variable included in the coming models. Other 
interesting point in the Table 2 is that some of the smaller companies have not paid any non-
audit related fees to their responsible auditor, while the other companies have paid at least 
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some amount. This might have an effect to the independence and the objectivity of the auditor 
and is included in the audit fee model as an instrumental variable. 
 
As mentioned earlier, listed companies must disclose information about the internal controls 
and the board committees if established. Corporate governance code (CG working group, 
2008) requires that the company‟s corporate governance report “must include the organization 
of the internal audit function and the central principles applied to internal audits, such as the 
reporting principles.” The Code also requires that information about the established audit 
committee must be included: “The board shall confirm the central duties and operating 
principles of a committee in a written charter, the essential contents of which shall be 
described” (CG working group, 2008). The data related to corporate governance dummy 
variables, including the BIG4-auditor and major shareholder, can be found in the Table 3 
below. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of dummy variables classified by OMX size category  
OMX size category   Frequency Mean 
All (n=107) Own IA function 42 0.400 
  Outsourced IA function 7 0.100 
  Internal audit functions in total 49 0.458 
  Audit committee 53 0.495 
  Major Shareholder >20 %  51 0.477 
  BIG4-auditor 100 0.900 
    Large (n=25) Own IA function 24 0.960 
  Outsourced IA function 0 0.000 
  Internal audit functions in total 24 0.960 
  Audit committee 22 0.880 
  Major Shareholder >20 %  10 0.400 
  BIG4-auditor 25 1.000 
    Medium (n=31) Own IA function 12 0.387 
  Outsourced IA function 1 0.032 
  Internal audit functions in total 13 0.419 
  Audit committee 16 0.516 
  Major Shareholder >20 %  14 0.452 
  BIG4-auditor 29 0.935 
    Small (n=51) Own IA function 6 0.118 
  Outsourced IA function 6 0.118 
  Internal audit functions in total 12 0.235 
  Audit committee 15 0.294 
  Major Shareholder >20 %  27 0.529 
  BIG4-auditor 46 0.902 
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The Table 3 shows that 45.8 % of the data sample has an own internal audit function or has 
outsourced it. Also, all but one (96 %) of the large companies has established their own or 
outsourced the internal audit function. The smaller the company size seems to be, the smaller 
the portion of the existence of the internal audit functions in some form is. Also, the smaller 
companies seem to be more eager to outsource their internal audit functions when compared 
to their larger counter parts in the sample. This might be due the previously mentioned reason 
for the cost-efficiency of outsourcing rather than the arranging an own internal audit function, 
when the scope of the business is narrower. The outsourcing of the internal audit is within the 
CG-code of 2004 (Recommendation 51), which only states, that the organization of the 
internal audit must be disclosed, but forming an internal audit function is not required by the 
code: “The organization and working methods of internal audit depend on the nature and 
scope of the company‟s operations, the number of personnel and other similar factors.” (CG 
group, 2003, p.15) As the above Table 3 shows, the organization of the internal audit 
functions is somewhat similar as the CG-code recommends. 
 
The Recommendation 27 of the CG-code recommends forming an audit committee to further 
strengthen the quality of the company‟s financial reporting, if needed: “The audit committee 
shall be established, if the extent of the company‟s business requires preparation of matters 
relating to financial reporting and control to be dealt with by a group with more compact 
composition than the entire board. The extent of the operations of the company may require 
some directors to concentrate particularly on matters relating to financial reporting and 
control. The audit committee has better possibilities than the entire board to review questions 
connected with the financial administration and control of the company and ensure contacts 
with auditors and the internal audit function.” (CG group, 2003, p.10) Audit committee has 
been established by almost half of the total sample (49.5 %), of which the companies in the 
large category, in accordance with the CG-code, have been the most keen to add another layer 
of corporate governance as the size of the company is larger.  
 
Some of the listed companies also have a major stockowner, which controls more than 20% of 
the voting shares. In the whole group, the mean for the existence of the major shareholder is 
47.7%, which seems quite high when considering that the companies are listed. This might be 
explained by the fact, that in most cases the major owner is the Finnish Government or the 
founder of the company. This is particularly apparent in the small size category, where the 
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more than a half of the companies have a major shareholder owning more than 20 % of the 
voting rights.  
 
Also, most of the sample companies (93.5%) are audited by a Big4 auditor, while the 
companies in the large classification are all audited by a Big4 auditor. This is partially due to 
the fact, that the listed companies have to be audited by auditor or an audit company, which 
has been approved by the Finnish Institute of Authorized Public Accountants (KHT-yhdistys). 
All of the Big4 audit firms are such firms. Also, there might be credibility or cost-efficiency 
factor to using the Big4 audit firms as they all are operating worldwide as their auditees do. 
There are numerous other reasons for using a Big4 auditor (reputation, cost-efficiency, etc.), 
but this is not the scope of this study and the variable is omitted from the coming models. 
This is because that it is not statistically relevant as almost all of the sample companies are 
audited by such audit firm. The non-statistical relevancy of the variable was also confirmed in 
preliminary tests. 
 
The Table 4 below presents the means of the board, executive group and audit committee 
variables of the sample group classified by OMX size category. The more detailed statistics 
can be found in the Appendix 2. 
 
Table 4 Means of the board, executive and audit committee data classified by OMX size category 
 Variable ALL (n=107) Large (n=25) Med. (n=31) Small (n=51) 
Board size 6.084 7.400 6.258 5.333 
- of financially educated % 0.439 0.432 0.491 0.411 
- of independent % 0.680 0.774 0.699 0.622 
Executive group size 7.617 9.520 8.452 6.176 
- of financially educated % 0.410 0.461 0.408 0.387 
Board and exec. group size in total 13.701 16.920 14.710 11.510 
- of financially educated % 0.417 0.438 0.434 0.396 
AC size 1.505 3.040 1.419 0.804 
- of independent % 0.868 0.841 0.906 0.872 
Voting rights held by insiders 0.176 0.063 0.124 0.264 
 
As seen in the Table 4 above, the means of the board and executive group variables are larger 
when the companies are larger. This might be explained by the increasing requirements for 
the governance structures, as the companies gets larger and thus may be more difficult to lead 
efficiently with smaller corporate governance structures.  
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As the Recommendation 11 in the 2004 CG-code states, the minimum number of the board 
members is five. But this recommendation also allows three members, if it is justified and the 
smaller board can perform its duties efficiently. ”To ensure the effective implementation of 
the duties of the board, it should comprise at least five directors. In some circumstances, 
however, it may be justified to elect less than five directors. In a relatively small company, a 
board consisting of three directors may be able to adequately discharge the duties pertaining 
to the board.” (CG-group, 2003) As seen from the Appendix 2, where the more detailed 
statistics can be found, the large and medium sized companies have the required minimum of 
five members, thus complying with the recommendation. Some of the smaller companies 
have a smaller board than the required five, but none of the companies have a board smaller 
than three.  
 
For example, Cencorp Oyj has three board members during the year 2008 and explains the 
size of their board in their annual statement: “The annual general meeting has concluded that 
the size of the board is adequate, when considering the scale of the company‟s business. The 
number of board members is evaluated yearly by the AGM.”  
 
As explained previously, usually the smaller companies tend to have their founder as the 
major owner relying to his/hers own judgment, which is best for the company, whatever the 
reason might be. One way of committing the board and key executives to follow the interests 
of the shareholders is by owning the shares of the company. This is also seen in the above 
Table 4, as the smaller companies have a larger portion of insider holdings than the larger 
ones, which have a more diversified shareholder base. 
 
Also, the portion of the financially educated members is larger as the company size gets 
larger. The CG-code of 2004 states about the knowledge of the elected members in the 
recommendation 15: “Successful board work requires knowledge of the business operations. 
It is imperative for the board work and its effective functioning that the board is composed of 
directors with versatile and mutually complementing capabilities and skills.” As this is not as 
clear to interpret as the previous recommendation, all of the companies seem to have 
complied with this recommendation, since no explanations for not complying for this 
recommendation are found within the sample companies. However, all of the companies 
disclose the educations of its board members and executives in their annual statements or in 
the corporate governance statements, thus leaving the evaluation of the board‟s knowledge-
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mix to the reader. The financial education is not the prerequisite for the board work, but it 
should be relevant in the context of this study as it might have an effect on the audit fees 
and/or earnings management. This might also have an effect on the forming of internal audit 
functions and audit committee and therefore it has been selected as an instrumental variable in 
the models. 
 
Additionally, the bigger portion of the financially educated members might be explained by 
the fact that the larger companies can be more appealing to such members, which are in 
accordance to the corporate governance recommendations (e.g. financially educated and 
independent from the company and major shareholders). The larger companies tend to pay 
more to their board members and they also offer a more interesting environment for its 
members and executives. 
 
The independency of the board members is defined by the CG-code of 2004 in 
recommendation 17 and 18 as follows: The duties of the board consist of supervision and 
control of the operative management of the company. This task requires that the majority of 
directors should have no interdependent relationship to the company. Although it is 
recommended that directors hold shares in the company, the majority consisting of independ-
ent directors should include at least two directors independent of significant shareholders of 
the company. Such composition of the board supports the objective that the board should act 
in the interests of the company and all of its shareholders.” (CG group, 2003, pp.8-9) The 
independency variable here is calculated as the portion of the members, who are both 
independent from the company and the shareholders, from the total size of the board or audit 
committee. The independency variables in the Table 4 suggest that the sample companies 
generally have a greater portion of independent members both in the boards and audit 
committees. 
 
As seen from the Table 4, the size of the audit committee varies a lot within the groups. The 
mean of the size is about 1.5 members, which is lower than the recommendation 27 of the 
CG-code: “To ensure the effective implementation of the duties of the audit committee, it 
shall comprise at least three members. The members must have sufficient knowledge of the 
accounting practices and preparation of financial statements, because the audit committee 
deals with matters relating to the financial reporting and control of the company.” (CG group, 
2003, p.10) The low mean of the whole sample can be explained by the fact that most of the 
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sample companies do not have an audit committee. Therefore, this is skews the results, as in 
these companies the size of the audit committee is zero. Nevertheless, after removing the 
zeros from the sample, the means for the All, Large, Medium and Small categories are 3.03, 
3.45, 3.04 and 2.73 respectively. Thus, there are several companies having less than three 
members in the audit committee throughout the size categories. For example, some large 
category companies, Outotec and Pöyry, have a two member audit committee and they 
explain the reasons for not to comply with the CG-code in their annual statement. They both 
conclude that when considering the members‟ financial experience and the scope of the 
business, the composition of the audit committee is adequate for their needs.  
 
The next section 4.2 presents the research models and the variables to be used for to study the 
hypothesized effects. 
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4.2 Research models and variables 
 
This section shows the variables and the models constructed in order to study the 
hypothesized effects to audit quality and to financial reporting quality. Firstly, an overview of 
the 2SLS regression method is shown in subsection 4.2.1, used for helping to alleviate the 
endogeneity problems associated with internal governance. Secondly, the subsection 4.2.2 
presents the basic OLS regression models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions 
testing for the audit fee related hypothesis H1-H3 introduced in chapter 3. Finally, the 
subsection 4.2.3 similarly presents the models and variables related to earnings management, 
which purpose is to test the above mentioned hypothesis H4-H6. The results of these models 
are then presented in the following chapter 5. 
 
 
4.2.1 Endogeneity and the 2SLS model 
 
As the 2SLS method is not as familiar as the more often used OLS method, the concept and 
the methods related to the 2SLS method are explained in more detail. The most recent studies 
(e.g. Hay et al., 2008 & Jokipii et al., 2008) have used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression model in order to reduce endogeneity of the variables (a variable correlates with 
the error term or with another variable). As Larcker & Rusticus (2009) explain the 
instrumental variable (IV) methods are commonly used in accounting research (e.g., earnings 
management, corporate governance, executive compensation, and disclosure research) when 
the regressor variables are endogenous. In this study the internal audit and audit committee 
variables are seen to be endogenous due to their two-way relationship in the companies‟ 
internal governance structure, which is used as a dependent variable and as an independent 
variable in the regressions. There are also some additional tests performed, where the audit 
fee and the discretionary accruals are seen as endogenous to further study the joint effect of 
the hypothesis variables. 
 
As Hay et al. (2008) explain in their article, this two-way relationship between internal 
governance structures and auditors have been argued in many “substitution view” papers (e.g. 
Simunic, 1980, 1984) that an organization can choose to trade off more or less internal 
auditing against external auditing; and it has also been argued that external auditing may have 
an impact on voluntarily forming an audit committee (Eichenseher & Shields, 1985; Pincus et 
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al., 1989). In this thesis, the existence of internal audit and audit committee is presumed 
endogenous in all of the 2SLS models as Hay et al. (2008) suggest. If there is a two-way 
relationship between the auditors and controls, the OLS regression could lead to biased and 
inconsistent results and therefore 2SLS method is used to alleviate the possible endogeneity 
problems. 
 
Chenhall & Moers (2007a) explain the differences of the endogenous variables in their paper: 
In general usage, a distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables may be made 
that relates the origins of the variables to be either „inside‟ or „outside‟ the structural equation. 
A variable is endogenous if it is determined within the context of the model, while an 
exogenous variable is a variable that affects the values of endogenous variables, but whose 
values are determined outside the model.” They further illustrate this with an econometric 
example (Chenhall & Moers, 2007a, p177): 
 
       
 
  
 
         Eq.1 
 
Assume that the following equation applies: 
 
                     Eq.2 
 
Equation (2) indicates that the variable X1 is endogenous, as it is the explained variable. The 
main question, however, is whether it is endogenous in equation (1). The variable X1 is 
endogenous in equation (1) if it is correlated with the structural error term, that is, Cov(X1, u) 
= 0. If X1 is correlated with the structural error term, then X1 is determined inside the model 
(equation (1)), because the presence of this correlation is either due to Cov(Z1, u) = 0 or due 
to Cov(v, u) = 0. That is, (some of) the factors that affect X1 also affect Y and as a result 
equations (1) and (2) are parts of the same model. If X1 is not correlated with the structural 
error term of equation (1), then it must hold that both Cov(Z1, u) ≠ 0 and Cov(v, u) ≠ 0, and 
X1 is thus determined outside the model and not endogenous. (Chenhall & Moers, 2007a, 
p.177) In sum, the explained variable is, by definition, endogenous because it is always 
correlated with the structural error term.  
 
Larcker and Rusticus (2009) explain the usual way of employing the 2SLS in their very 
insightful working paper on the matter: “In a typical 2SLS application, the researcher first 
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selects a set of variables that are assumed to be exogenous and then uses two-stage least 
squares or similar estimation methods to estimate the coefficients in the regression model. 
This standard textbook solution to endogeneity is appropriate if the researcher can find 
instrumental variables that are correlated with the endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with 
the error in the structural equation.” (Larcker & Rusticus, 2009, p.1) 
 
To address the endogeneity issue in this thesis, the 2SLS method is used with appropriate 
instrumental variables in the first-stage. In the first-stage, the endogenous variables are 
regressed as the dependent variable with the variables included in the second-stage and 
instrumental variables as independent variables using OLS method. In the second stage, the 
predicted values of the endogenous variables from the first-stage models enter as independent 
variables, with the other control variables, in the both final audit fee and earnings 
management models. 
 
As the endogenous variables are dichotomous in this thesis, one might argue, that the method 
used in the first-stage regression should be a probit of logit method instead of the proposed 
OLS. Estimating the first-stage using probit or logit is unnecessary, because in 2SLS the 
consistency of the estimates in the second stage are not dependent upon specifying the correct 
functional form in the first stage (Kelejian, 1971). Also, Heckman (1978) proves that using 
probit or logit methods for the dummy variables in the first-stage are not needed, but can be 
used, if the sole purpose is to interpret the results of the second-stage. “It is unnecessary to 
obtain consistent estimators of the parameters of reduced form equations in order to 
consistently estimate structural equations. Since the linear probability procedure is the 
simplest one to use, it is recommended. However, it is likely that the use of the probit 
instrument results in more efficient estimators although no proof of this assertion is offered.” 
(Heckman, 1978, p.947) Similarly, for example Angrist (2001, p.8) concludes in the same 
spirit, that “it is generally safer to use a linear first-stage”. 
 
Larcker & Rusticus (2009) remind the users of the 2SLS and other IV methods to report and 
study the different statistics on the validity of the used instrumental variables to further justify 
that the used method is statistically solid. They especially warn on the effect of using weak 
instruments, which are weakly correlated with the regressor. This is common in these types of 
studies, where it is very hard to find powerful instrumental variables to alleviate the 
endogeneity problem. If the instrument is only weakly correlated with the regressor, IV 
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methods can produce highly biased estimates when the instrumental variable is even slightly 
endogenous. In those cases, it is likely that IV estimates are more biased and more likely to 
provide the wrong statistical inference than simple OLS estimates that make no correction for 
endogeneity (Larcker & Rusticus, 2009). 
 
In order to check the appropriateness of the instrumental variables, a number of tests are used 
in the coming 2SLS models as Larcker and Rusticus suggested. The calculation and the 
interpretation of these tests (Partial R
2
, Partial F-test, Weak instrument F-test, Over-
identification test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test) are presented in the following 
chapters with more detail as these tests may not be as familiar as with the OLS methods. If 
these tests fail to support the using of the 2SLS method, the OLS method is then used to study 
effects of the hypotheses. 
 
Larcker & Rusticus (2009) explain the interpretation and the calculation of the partial R
2
 as 
follows. “One problematic aspect of accounting IV applications is that if a first-stage R2 is 
reported, it is the explanatory power for the total first-stage model, and not the partial 
explanatory power for the instruments that are unique to the first-stage regression. Thus, using 
reported first-stage explanatory power would lead to a substantial overstatement of the 
strength of the instrumental variables in the first-stage regression.” (Larcker & Rusticus, 
2009, p.6)  
 
The typical analysis in empirical research involves an endogenous y that is a function of an 
endogenous x variable and a set of exogenous control variables (z1). In addition, there are 
multiple instruments, exogenous variables (z2) that are not included in the equation describing 
y. In this case, the proper measure of the strength of the instrument is the partial R
2
. The 
partial R2 can be easily computed using: (Ry,z
2 -Ry,z1
2 )/(1-R
y,z1
2
), where the z is the combined set 
of z1 and z2. (Larcker & Rusticus, 2009, p.6) In short, the partial R
2
 is the R
2
of the first-stage 
regression with only the instrumental variables included. 
 
In addition to the partial R
2
, a similar test of the strength of the instruments is the partial F-
test. The validness of the instruments jointly can also be interpreted from the weak 
instrument F-test. The difference of these tests is that the partial F-test is conducted for a 
single first-stage model, whereas the weak instrument F-test is conducted jointly for all of the 
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firs-stage models. A simple way to detect the presence of weak instrument problems is to look 
at the first stage F-test that the instruments are jointly zero (or partial F-test if there are other 
control variables). If the F-statistic is low, this implies that the selected instruments are weak. 
In their survey of the weak instrument literature Stock & Yogo (2002) developed some 
benchmarks for the critical values of the F-statistic. When the number of instruments is 1, 2, 
3, 5, 10, the suggested critical F-values are 8.96, 11.59, 12.83, 15.09, and 20.88 respectively. 
If the first stage (partial) F-statistic falls below these critical values, the instruments are 
considered to be weak and inference problems are potentially serious. (Larcker & Rusticus, 
2009, p.29) The critical values for this test at the significance level of 0.05 are shown with the 
test statistics with the results of the 2SLS models.  
 
As mentioned by Larcker & Rusticus (2009), an overidentification test must be conducted 
and reported before the appropriate endogeneity test. If and only if an equation is 
overidentified, we may test whether the excluded instruments are appropriately independent 
of the error process. That test should always be performed when it is possible to do so, as it 
allows the researcher to evaluate the validity of the instruments. The overidentification test 
performed in this thesis is the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions produced by 
Stata with the ivreg2 command used to calculate the 2SLS models. 
 
The Sargan-Hansen test regresses the residuals from an IV or 2SLS regression on all 
instruments. This test statistic is chi-square distributed with the number of over-identification 
restrictions as the degrees of freedom. In the upcoming models, there are 2 or 3 endogenous 
explanatory variables, and 4 to 6 exogenous instruments, so there is 2 to 3 degrees of 
freedom. A Sargan-Hansen test statistic of more than 5.99 (for 2 d.f.) and 7.82 (for 3 d.f.) 
would thus lead to rejecting the null hypothesis using a 95% confidence level.  
 
Counter-intuitively to the usual statistical tests, the null hypothesis of this test is that 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation, and that the 
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation (Baum et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the test statistic and its significance should be under the appropriate F-value and 
the significance of the test should be over the selected 0.15 level for the instruments to be 
valid. As Baum (2003) summarizes, the Sargan–Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
should be performed routinely in any overidentified model estimated with instrumental 
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variables techniques. If a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan–Hansen test is 
encountered, the validity of the estimated should be strongly doubted.  
 
After the overidentification test has been conducted, the common way to justify the use of 
2SLS rather than OLS results is to perform the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity. As Baum (2006) suggests, the test is perhaps best interpreted not as a test for 
the endogeneity or the exogeneity of regressors per se but rather as a test of the consequence 
of using different estimation methods on the same equation (Baum, 2006, p.212). The test 
statistic is distributed as chi-square where the degrees of freedom are the number of regressors 
being tested for endogeneity. A strong rejection of the null favours using the 2SLS instead of 
OLS model‟s estimates. 
 
Next, the models and variables used are explained in the following two subsections. 
Subsection 4.2.2 presents the models, when the influence of the auditors and earnings 
management is presumed to be exogenous and in similar matter the subsection 4.2.3 presents 
the models, where these are seen to be endogenous in the internal governance framework.  
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4.2.2 Regression models with exogenous fee and discretionary accruals 
 
This subsection presents the different regression models and variables used in the analysis 
chapter, when the auditors and earnings management is presumed to be exogenous. There is 
going to be several regression equations for to reach the final 2SLS models. Also, for 
comparison purposes there is going to be “basic” OLS models, where the possible 
endogenous hypothesis variables are entered as they are. Further, a regression (Eq.3-5) is 
required for to obtain the discretionary accruals variable adding the number of different 
regression equations used in this thesis to 27 (plus the additional sensitivity tests). Figure 3 
below provides a helpful illustration of the different models to be presented in this subsection. 
 
Figure 3 Illustration of regression models with exogenous audit fees and discretionary accruals 
 
As seen in the Figure 3, there are two main groups of models in this thesis: audit fee models 
(in the upper part of the figure) and earnings management models (in the lower part of the 
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figure). In the audit fee models the audit fee variable is the dependent variable in the OLS and 
in the second-stage of the 2SLS. Similarly for the earnings management models, discretionary 
accruals are the dependent variable in the same models. For the ease of reading, the variable 
sets are grouped and they consist of the following variables presented in Table 5 below: 
 
Table 5 Variable sets for exogenous audit fees and earnings management models 
FEE 
Dependent variable in the fee models and hypothesis variable in the EM models 
(LNFEEALL in the main models) 
DACC 
Dependent variable in the EM models and hypothesis variable in the fee models 
(ABSDACCMJS-CF in the main models) 
CGHYPOTHESIS IAFALL COM 
FEECONTROLS LNASSETS SQRALLSUBS FOREIGN CRATIO INVREC SWITCH FEERISK 
EMCONTROLS LNMKTCAP LOSS OPCYCLE365 MKTRET SALESGPCG ZRATIO SMALLEPSCNG 
CGEXOGENOUS MAJ20 BINDEPENDENT 
CGINSTRUMENTALS ANALYSTS LIABRATIO FINEXP LITI 
CGENDOFEE Predicted                  and            from equations 9 & 10. 
CGENDOEM Predicted                  and            from equations 15 & 16. 
 
For each main group, three types of regression models are regressed. Firstly, there are the 
“basic” OLS models, where the variable sets are added incrementally. The first OLS 
regression consists of the hypothesis variables and the related control variables. Then, the 
variable sets are added to the OLS models finally adding up to three separate OLS regressions 
for each of the model groups. 
 
Secondly, the two of the rightmost columns in the Figure 3 consists of the first-stage and the 
second-stage regressions of the 2SLS method as described earlier. In the middle, the number 
of first-stage regressions is dependent on the number of endogenous variables being 
instrumented. The endogenous variables are used as the dependent variables in the first-stage 
models with the control variables (in addition to the exogenous FEE/DACC) and the 
instrumental variables. Finally, as seen in the right-most part of the Figure 3, the predictions 
from the first-stage are entered in the second-stage models of the 2SLS with the exogenous 
variables.  
 
There are two dependent variables that are the main interest of the study: natural logarithm of 
total audit fees (LNFEEALL) and absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals 
(ABSDACCMJS-CF). In addition to being dependent variables, FEE and DACC variables also 
enter as a hypothesis variables to each others‟ models: FEE in the earnings management 
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model and, vice versa, DACC in the audit fee model. The following paragraphs provide a 
more detailed explanation of all the variables used in the models, where the FEE and DACC 
are presumed exogenous. The text follows the structure of Table 5 presented above. 
 
Audit fee (FEE) 
The first of these dependent/hypothesis variables is the natural logarithm of audit fees 
LNFEEALL, which also does include the non-audit fees in the main analysis. The natural 
logarithm of total audit fees has been extensively used to portray the audit effort or the audit 
quality. Following the related literature and research it is suggested that audit fees reflect 
audit effort, which further benefits auditor‟s decision-making and thus improves the quality of 
services provided by the external auditor (e.g. Carcello et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2003; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Niemi, 2004; Srinidhi et al., 2007 and 
Caramanis et al., 2008). 
 
The audit research has also suggested several measures for audit quality including audit firm 
size, audit firm industry specialization, audit tenure, audit fees. But as Miettinen (2008) 
suggests in her dissertation studying the US companies, the total audit fees are relevant in a 
very homogenous audit environment. This assumption can also be justified in the Finnish 
setting as most of the sample companies were audited by Big4-auditors as the descriptive 
statistics suggested and they should have very similar audit processes as with their US 
parents. There are also other measures used for audit effort. For example, Niemi (2005) and 
Jokipii et al. (2008) have used the actual work hours of the auditors, which should better 
portray the audit work effort, but this data is not publicly available. As mentioned before, the 
audit fee data is publicly available in the financial statements of the listed companies as the 
corporate governance code requires and it is therefore used in this thesis. 
 
It should be noted that the value 1 is also added to the total audit fees, and also to the other 
audit fee related variables, before the logarithmic transformation. This ensures that firms with 
no fees will have a 0 value on the variables even after the transformation (as the log of 1 is 0). 
Adding a value of 1 is relevant especially in the case of the non-audit fees as there were some 
firms, who report that they have not paid such fees to their auditors. 
 
As the Figure 3 suggested, the LNFEEALL variable is used as a dependent variable in the 
audit fee models and also as an exogenous and endogenous hypothesis variable in the 
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earnings management models. Caramanis & Lennox (2008) summarize the endogeneity 
problem related to the audit fees and earnings management well in their article. They 
conclude that auditors might work harder if they believe that clients are attempting to manage 
earnings. In this case, endogeneity would induce a spurious positive relation between audit 
hours and earnings management. On the other hand, clients that wish to manage earnings can 
anticipate that hard-working auditors are more likely to thwart their earnings management 
attempts and might therefore contract with their auditors to exert less effort. In this case, 
endogeneity would induce a negative relation between audit hours and earnings management. 
(Caramanis & Lennox, 2008) Either way, the audit fees are firstly tested to be exogenous and 
secondly they are also tested as endogenous hypothesis variable in the earnings management 
models. 
 
Discretionary accruals (DACC) 
Second of the dependent/hypothesis variables is the absolute modified Jones cash flow 
discretionary accruals, ABSDACCMJS-CF. Earnings management research follows the 
general discretionary accruals framework proposed by McNichols & Wilson (1988). Their 
framework divides accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary components and argues 
that high levels of discretionary accruals indicate that the firm is engaged in earnings 
management. There are several discretionary accruals calculation methods proposed by 
various researchers and some of these are also tested in the sensitivity tests after the 
presentation of the main model, where the absolute modified Jones cash flow discretionary 
accruals are used.  
 
In this study, the discretionary accruals variable is calculated from the modified Jones model 
by Dechow et al. (1995) with the cash flow related total accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) have 
added the change in revenues to the second term of the discretionary accruals model to control 
for the company growth. Finally, the absolute measure of the model‟s residual is used to 
proxy for magnitude of earnings management and financial reporting quality. Because 
earnings can be managed either upward or downward depending on the manager's objectives, 
the larger the absolute discretionary accruals is the indicator of lower earnings quality. This is 
consistent with studies in which the direction of the managers' incentives to engage in 
earnings management is not clear (e.g. Klein, 2002). 
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The modified version of the Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) estimates the discretionary 
accruals from regressions of total accruals on changes in sales, change in receivables and on 
property, plant, and equipment. To determine the coefficients for the Modified Jones model, 
the following OLS regression is run:  
 
      
     
    
 
     
    
      
     
    
   
     
      
The variables are defined as follows: 
TACFit = Total accruals for each company i for the period t = Net income – Cash Flows from Operations 
Ait-1 = Total assets for each company i in the beginning of period t 
ΔREVit = Change in revenues for each company i in period t  
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for each company i in period t 
εit = residual for each company i in period t 
 
Total accruals are calculated as the Net Income – Cash flows from Operations for the period. 
This is the cash flow method of calculating the unexplained portion of accruals from the 
reported earnings. This study uses net income instead of income before extra-ordinary or 
special items to avoid any abnormal accruals misclassification by Jones model. As suggested 
by Bernard and Skinner (1996), these special items are usually not discretionary but Jones 
model misclassifies them as discretionary because they are not linearly related to changes in 
revenues. 
 
Then the estimated   0,   1 and   2 from the previous (non-modified) Jones model are used 
to calculate modified Jones cash flow nondiscretionary accruals (NDA): 
 
           
 
     
      
                 
     
      
   
     
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NDAit = Nondiscretionary accruals 
Ait-1 = Total assets for each company i in the beginning of period t 
ΔREVit = Change in revenues for each company i in period t  
ΔRECit = Change in total receivables for each company i in period t  
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for each company i in period t 
 
Then the modified Jones cash flow discretionary accruals (DAit) are calculated subtracting the 
total cash flow accruals from the nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit) calculated in the equation 
1b above. Therefore, the discretionary accruals are calculated as follows: 
 
 
Eq.3 
Eq.4 
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The variables are defined as follows: 
DAit = Discretionary accruals  
TACFit = Total accruals for each company i for the period t = Net income – Cash Flows from Operations 
Ait-1 = Total assets for each company i in the beginning of period t 
NDAit = Nondiscretionary accruals 
 
Finally, the magnitude of earnings management is measured with the absolute discretionary 
accruals (ABSDACCMJS-CF). This absolute measure of earnings management is used by 
several other studies (see e.g. Bartov et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Frankel et al. (2002), Chung & 
Kallapur, 2003 and Yu, 2008) as a proxy for the combined effect of a positive and negative 
earnings management. Because all the variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the period, the magnitude of a firm's discretionary accruals is indicated as a percentage of the 
assets of the firm (Yu, 2008). Thus, the absolute value of discretionary accruals represents the 
inverse of the quality of the disclosed earnings. A higher value of the absolute DACC 
indicates more use of discretion over the reported earnings and therefore lowers the quality of 
the disclosed earnings and vice versa. 
 
Due the limitations of the small sample size, the modified Jones model does not include 
industry specifications (e.g. there is only one company in the Energy sector). Also, the 
modified Jones model‟s coefficients are obtained using the original cross-sectional Jones 
method for to keep the sample as large as possible as Dechow et al. (1995) suggest. 
 
Bartov et al. (2000) suggest that the cross-sectional original Jones model is statistically 
dominant than the time-series counterpart. As Bartov et al. (2000), and Subramanyam (1996) 
point out, the cross-sectional version of the Jones model has statistical properties that make it 
better, ex ante, than its time-series cousin. First, the number of observations per model is 
considerably higher under the cross-sectional version. This increases the precision of the 
estimates. Second, by not imposing availability of time series data, the cross-sectional sample 
is less subject to survivorship bias and allows the researcher to include firms with short 
histories. Third, misspecification of the coefficients due to non-stationary is not an issue for 
the time series version.  
 
Eq.5 
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There are also other different calculation methods for total accruals as well as there are 
different methods calculating the discretionary accruals. For example Van Tendeloo & 
Vanstraelen (2008) have used an aggregate earnings management indicator, which consists of 
many different EM indicators to capture a wide range of different manipulative behavior. 
Further, Aaker & Gjesdal (2009) have identified more than a hundred different models 
proxying for the earnings management. Some of these different models have been tested as an 
additional analysis in the section 5.3. 
 
As well as the audit fee variable, the earnings management variable is tested as an exogenous 
and also as an endogenous hypothesis variable in the audit fee models and it is the dependent 
variable in the earnings management models. 
 
Hypothesis variables (CGHYPOTHESIS) 
As mentioned, the previous two dependent variables are also used as hypothesis variables. 
Further, there are two additional hypothesis corporate governance related variables (IAFALL 
and COM), which are also the main interest of this study with the previously presented 
variables. 
 
First of the hypothesis variables is IAFALL, which is a dummy variable taking value of 1, if 
the company has established an own internal audit function or has outsourced it. This same 
variable has been used by e.g. Davidson et al (2005) and Jokipii et al. (2008). In the additional 
analysis further ahead, the IAFALL is replaced by a dummy variable not including the 
outsourced internal audit functions (IAF) and a dummy including only the outsourced internal 
audit functions (IAFOUT). 
 
There are also more “precise” methods used for to study the effect of internal audit on audit 
fees and earnings management (see e.g. Gramling et al., 2004, for comparison of the different 
internal audit quality measures). For example, Prawitt et al. (2009) use an internal audit 
quality variable, which consists of the various measures for their involvement in the audit 
process, size of the internal audit function, training hours and professional certifications of the 
internal auditors to better capture their effect on earnings management. While this might be a 
better approach in explaining the influence of the internal audit function, there are no such 
data available from the public records or the databases used for the Finnish companies. 
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Therefore, for practical purposes, a more rudimentary, but also extensively used, measure is 
used in the thesis. 
 
The existence of the internal audit function is seen to be endogenous, because as the previous 
studies and agency theory suggests that both the internal governance and the magnitude of 
audit fees increase with organizations‟ size and complexity. This can also been seen from the 
previously presented descriptive statistics, where the companies were classified by the OMX 
size classification. But as hypothesized earlier, the existence of the internal audit function 
should be positively associated to both audit fees and negatively associated to earnings 
management. 
 
The second hypothesis variable is COM. It also is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1, 
if the board has appointed an audit committee. The variable has been used by Knechel & 
Willekens (2006), Hay et al. (2008) and Jokipii et al. (2008) and many other various audit fee 
and earnings management studies. 
 
Earlier audit fee studies have used some of the audit committee characteristics for to study the 
more precise effects of existence of the audit committee to the audit fees (e.g. size of the audit 
committee, number of meetings held, independence of the members, financial expertise of the 
members, etc.). Similar characteristics of the audit committee have also been studied in the 
earnings management literature.  
 
However, in this study a dummy variable for the existence of the audit committee is used for 
to be equivalent with the existence of the internal audit function as presented earlier and its 
effect is also easier to interpret. The existence of audit committee is predicted to be associated 
positively to audit fees and negatively to the magnitude of earnings management as 
hypothesized previously. 
 
Control variables in the fee models (FEECONTROLS) 
The following seven variables are used to control the effects of audit quality in the audit fee 
models and most of them are similar as in the study by Hay et al. (2008) with some 
exceptions. The audit fee models‟ control variables are based on the following interpretations: 
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First control variable is LNASSETS representing the size effect of the auditee. Auditee‟s size 
is reported to be positively associated to larger fees (e.g. Niemi, 2004), because of the 
workload should increase as the company is larger in size and it should be seen as larger audit 
fees. For example, Hay et al. (2008) explain the use of this variable as follows. “Larger 
companies are likely to face more and varied risks from their environment. Furthermore, it is 
well documented that audit fees are significantly associated with the size of an organization.” 
Hay et al. (2008) Thus, a positive association is expected with the audit fees. 
 
Secondly, SQRALLSUBS is used to control the complexity of the auditee‟s operations (e.g. 
Menon & Williams, 2001; Niemi, 2004 & Hay et al., 2008). The larger the number of 
subsidiaries, the more audit work it should require. Organizations that are more diverse and 
widespread can also face incrementally more risks, and experience higher fees (Hay et al., 
2008). Thus, a positive association is expected.  
 
Third control variable for the audit fee regression is FOREIGN. It is a calculated by dividing 
foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. It represents the more tedious work, when the 
auditors need to audit the foreign subsidiaries. Companies with foreign operations are 
expected to require greater audit effort due to more heterogeneous information and business 
complexity (Miettinen, 2008). Foreign assets are an indicator of a more complex company, 
and a more complex audit, and are expected to be associated with higher fees (Simunic, 
1980). Therefore, a positive association between FOREIGN and audit fees is expected. 
 
Fourth control variable in the audit fee models is CRATIO. It controls for the financial 
condition of the auditee. It is calculated by dividing the current assets with current liabilities. 
Organizations that are suffering from fiscal distress and/or are unprofitable are often 
perceived as being riskier and more challenging to audit (Simunic, 1980). The smaller the 
ratio, the greater the audit risk and therefore it should require more audit work. Therefore, 
negative association to audit fees is expected. 
 
Fifth variable is INVREC, which controls for the inherent risk and complexity of the audit 
engagement and it is calculated as the percentage of the inventory and receivables from the 
total assets. As Hay et al. (2006, 2008) summarize certain assets are perceived as being riskier 
to audit, resulting in higher audit fees due to the more audit work or specialized audit 
procedures in order to lower the audit risk to acceptable level.  Also, Niemi (2002, 2005), and 
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Knechel et al. (2008) have used this variable to control for the complexity of the audit 
engagement with Finnish companies. This variable should also be positively associated to the 
audit fees. 
 
Sixth control variable is the recent change of audit firm SWITCH. A dummy variable is used 
to indicate this effect and it takes the value of 1 if the company has switched auditors from the 
previous year. Client companies that have changed auditor in the last year might have lower 
audit fees, if lowballing takes place. A common reason for clients to change auditors is to 
obtain a reduced fee from a new audit firm. Lower fees may be due to audit firms 
intentionally offering services at a discount in order to win new business (often referred to as 
low-balling) or because a new auditor can offer more efficient service, justifying a fee 
reduction (Hay et al. 2006). According to Hay et al. (2006) some papers define the change of 
auditor when auditor tenure is one year or less, while others use a cut-off of two or three years 
(e.g. Niemi, 2005). However as Hay et al. (2006) conclude, the results should still be the same 
and the SWITCH variable should indicate audits where the auditor is relatively new and fees 
are likely to be lower. Thus, a negative relationship is predicted. 
 
Hay et al. (2008) also used a dummy variable to control the big audit firm premium. These 
audit firms are regarded as having higher audit quality, and are expected to be able to earn 
higher audit fees as a result. But, as the previously presented descriptive statistics show, 
almost all of the sample companies have been audited by a big audit firm. The preliminary 
testing of the variables indicated that this type of variable is not statistically relevant and it is 
therefore omitted from the audit fee model. In order to control the “supply side” effect to the 
audit fees a following variable is used in place of the Big4-auditor dummy. 
 
The final control variable for the fee models, FEERISK, controls for the importance of a 
particular client to the audit firm. FEERISK is calculated by dividing the particular client‟s 
total audit fees by the total audit fees received by the audit firm in the sample. Therefore, the 
variable represents the importance of the client to the audit firm, which may have an effect on 
the pricing of the audit. As DeAngelo (1981) contends, the greater the portion of total 
revenues the auditor receives from a particular client, the less objective the auditor will be on 
that client‟s engagement. Also, as auditors become less objective (or their professional 
scepticism begins to erode) the risk of auditor litigation is likely to increase (Heninger, 2001). 
The non-Big4 auditors have been pooled as a combined group and have not been calculated 
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separately, because most of them have only one client in the sample. FEERISK should be 
positively associated to audit fees and has stronger correlation than the other hypothesis 
variables. 
 
Control variables in the earnings management models (EMCONTROLS) 
The six control variables used in the earnings management models are explained in the 
following paragraphs. They are to some extent similar as in a recent article on innate accruals 
quality and corporate governance by Kent et al. 2010.  
 
First of the control variables is LNMKTCAP. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
total market capitalization at the end of the year. Kent et al. (2010) used a natural logarithm of 
total assets as a size indicator, but as the earlier presented descriptive statistics and the high 
correlation (0.903) between these variables show they should measure for the similar effect. 
As mentioned this variable relates to the size of the company and as Miettinen (2008) 
explains it is expected to have a negative relationship with the magnitude of earnings 
management. Large companies may engage in income-decreasing earnings management in 
order to mitigate political pressure (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This political costs 
hypothesis suggests a negative relation between abnormal accruals and firm size. Large 
companies are expected to have systematically lower discretionary accruals due to operating 
characteristics such as greater stability and diversification of portfolio of activities (Miettinen, 
2008). But as Gul et al (2009) note, the size effect is not as straightforward when accounting 
for longer periods: while some researchers argue that larger firms have more stable 
discretionary accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), others document that the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals reported by larger firms is systematically lower (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 
2003). Therefore, a negative relationship is expected. 
 
Second control variable for the earnings management models is the occurrence of loss, LOSS. 
LOSS is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the net income of the fiscal year is 
negative and is otherwise 0. For example, Kent et al. (2010) used a dummy variable, which 
takes a value of 1 if a loss was recorded in some of the three previous years. The variable in 
this thesis is chosen to keep the already small sample size as large as possible by using only 
one year range. The earnings management literature suggests that financially distressed 
companies may be more prone to use accruals to manage earnings upwards (Dechow & 
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Dichev, 2002; Li & Lin, 2005; Antle et al. 2006, Srinidhi et al. 2007 and Miettinen 2008). 
Therefore, a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable is anticipated. 
 
Thirdly, OPCYCLE365 controls for the uncertainty of operations and it is widely used in 
previous earnings management research (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Srinidhi et al., 2007; 
Miettinen, 2008, Gong et al., 2009 & Kent et al., 2010). OPCYCLE365 is the average age of 
inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days) in the year 2008 after winsorizing at 
365 days. It is calculated as follows: 
 
OPC CLEinventory 
365
Sales
Average accounts receivables
 
365
Cost of goods sold
Average inventory
 
 
For companies with no inventories OPCYCLE365 is only the average age of receivables (in 
days) and is calculated as follows: 
OPC CLEno inventory 
365
Sales
Average accounts receivables
 
 
Dechow et al. (2002), Srinidhi et al. (2007) and Kent et al (2010) argue that longer operating 
cycle is associated with more uncertainty and more estimation, thus leading to lower earnings 
quality. Therefore, OPCYCLE365 is expected to have a positive effect on DACC. 
 
Kent et al. (2010) also used a standard deviation of operating revenue in five year period as 
one of the control variables in their model. But as with the LOSS variable, calculating such a 
variable including several years of data, could lead to smaller sample size in this thesis. Thus, 
this variable is replaced by some of the other frequently used control variables found in the 
earnings management literature. 
 
The fourth control variable is MKTRET. The variable is calculated as the change in 
company‟s stock in the year 2008 deducted by the change of the stock index following all the 
companies listed in the Helsinki stock exchange. If the company had two different share 
classes in the OMXH, the more liquid stock was used to control for the market growth. The 
market adjusted stock return has been used as control variable for the earnings management 
by e.g. Frankel et al. (2002), Li et al. (2005) and Gong et al. (2009). The annual return of the 
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stock should control for the success of the companies‟ operations and finally on the 
expectations of the investors. There might also be some association to the performance based 
compensation of the managers, which may induce the managers to manipulate earnings as the 
shares are lower than the benchmark index. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient is unclear. 
 
Fifthly, growth percentage of sales SALESGPCG is used (e.g. Kothari et al., 2005) to capture 
the effect of growth opportunities on discretionary accruals. Sales growth percentage is the 
one period change in sales, scaled by previous period‟s sales. Some studies have also used a 
compounded growth percentage including several years. High growth firms have high equity 
incentives and thus have greater incentives to manage earnings than low growth companies 
(Antle et al. 2006). Therefore, SALESGPCG is expected to be positively associated with 
earnings management. 
 
Sixth control variable in the earnings management models is ZRATIO as calculated by 
Laitinen & Laitinen (2004) for the Finnish companies. The variable is calculated as follows: 
 
ZRATIO = 2.6 x Quick ratio + 0.6 x EBITDA-% + 2.4 x Equity ratio 
The variables are defined as follows: 
Quick ratio= (Current assets – Inventories) /Current liabilities  
EBITDA-%= Income before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization / Sales x 100 
Equity ratio  Shareholder‟s equity / Total assets x 100 
 
The variable used by Laitinen & Laitinen (2004) is similar to the more widely used Z-score 
by Altman (1969) measuring the possibility of bankruptcy. This compounded variable should 
control for the potential impacts of firm performance and distress risk on managers‟ forecast 
errors and accruals. If the value is less than 70, there is prominent risk that the company will 
get a payment default (maksuhäiriö) in the near future. Prior research (e.g. Frost, 1997; 
Rogers et al., 2005 and Gong et al., 2009) suggests that managers of poorly performing firms 
or financially distressed firms have greater incentives to provide optimistic earnings forecasts 
to support market earnings expectations. Firms‟ operating performance also directly affects 
the level of accruals through the accrual accounting system (Gong et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
poorer the financial situation of the company is, poorer the Z-ratio and the larger the 
magnitude of the earnings management should be. Thus, a positive association is expected.  
 
The final control variable is SMALLEPSCNG. This variable should control for the possible 
income smoothing by managers to minimize the volatility of the earnings as mentioned in the 
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theory by Scott (2009). The variable is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1, if the 
earnings per share have had an absolute annual change of 0-5 cents. This variable has been 
used by e.g. Burgstahler et al. (1997), Davidson et al. (2005) and Li et al. (2005) as an 
indicator for earnings management. There are also variations of this measure, where the range 
of change is smaller or the variable measures only for positive change. Also, some researchers 
have used the consensus estimate as the benchmark for the variable. As Scott (2009) suggests, 
this variable should be positively associated to discretionary accruals. 
 
Exogenous corporate governance variables (CGEXOGENOUS) 
In the spirit of the audit fee study by Hay et al (2008), two of the corporate governance 
variables (MAJ20 and BINDEPENDENT) are presumed to be exogenous in both of the main 
models. 
 
First of the corporate governance related variables, which are presumed to be exogenous is 
MAJ20. This is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the company has a shareholder 
having more than 20% of the voting rights. A major shareholder often has the ability to 
directly intervene in the operations and controls of an organization and impose an audit 
requirement on the organization (Hay et al, 2008). Jensen (1993) describes active investors 
who hold large investments in a company and participate in its strategic direction as important 
to good governance and effective internal control. The existence of such a major shareholder 
may also lead to further demand for increased external auditing, both as a means for the major 
investor to monitor its investment, and for other shareholders to protect themselves from the 
major shareholder. Thus, a positive relationship for the audit fees is expected. The sign of the 
coefficient is not clear for the earnings management models as the major owner may have 
own incentives for exercising earnings management, especially when the major owner is not 
independent from the company as they often are not. 
 
Second exogenous corporate governance variable is BINDEPENDENT. This is the ratio of 
the independent board members from the total board size. For board member to be classified 
as independent, he/she should be independent from both the major shareholders and the 
company. As with previous variable, a positive association is expected with the audit fees as 
the corporate governance is more efficient. For example, Carcello et al. (2002, p.371) state the 
following on this effect: “Given the incentives that outside directors have to ensure reliable 
financial reporting, more independent boards may support the purchase of differentially 
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higher-quality audit services, thus leading to increased audit fees.” (p. 371). Also, a negative 
association is expected to the magnitude of earnings management, because the higher the 
proportion of the independent directors should diminish the earnings management actions 
through better monitoring of the management and there should be fewer incentives for 
earnings management. 
 
Instrumental variables for the internal audit and audit committee (CGINSTRUMENTS) 
As mentioned earlier, some valid instrumental variables are needed for the 2SLS model. As 
Hay et al. (2008) express “the appropriate set of instrumental variables to use has not been 
explored in the previous (audit fee) literature”. In addition to the lack of instrumental 
variables in previous studies, their efficiency is usually hard to interpret, when the relevant 
tests or the first-stage regression are usually not reported. Therefore, some of the instrumental 
variables are from the article by Hay et al. (2008) and some of the selected instrumental 
variables are justified in the spirit of Larcker and Rusticus (2009). 
 
First instrumental variable is ANALYSTS. Variable is calculated as the number of 
recommendations from the analysts following the company. As mentioned, this variable has 
been used as an instrumental variable by Hay et al. (2008) in their audit fee model. They 
hypothesize a positive relationship of the analysts following and the demand for corporate 
governance: “The greater following by share market analysts, as higher profile in the market 
is likely to induce directors to demand more control mechanisms in order to protect their 
reputation.” (Hay et al., 2008, p.14). A positive association is expected with the endogenous 
corporate governance variables. 
 
Second of the instrumental variables is LIABRATIO, which controls for the debt holders‟ 
influence on the internal control functions. This variable is calculated as the total liabilities 
divided by total assets as calculated by Davidson et al (2005). For example, the debt holders 
might require as a debt covenant for the company to have a member in the board or require 
additional governance in order to lower the risk of the borrower. While debt is sometimes 
used in audit fee models as a measure of risk, it is often not significant (Hay et al., 2006) and 
appears to be more directly related to governance (Hay et al., 2008).  
 
There might be some conflicts with the theory when using this variable as an instrumental 
variable in the earnings management 2SLS-models. This variable is often (e.g. Dechow et al., 
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1995) used to control for the possibility of earnings management to avoid debt covenant 
violations. However, for example Healy & Palepu (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1994) do not 
find statistically significant association with the (income increasing) earnings management 
and debt covenant violations. As there is some evidence, that this variable is not always 
significant in the earnings management models and, as Hay et al. (2008) mentioned, it should 
be more directly related to governance, this variable is used as an instrumental variable in 
both of the models. A positive association is expected with the endogenous corporate 
governance variables. 
 
Third instrumental variable is FINEXP. Hay et al. (2008) use the number of chartered 
accountants as an instrumental variable for the internal audit and audit committee, but this 
information is not disclosed by the companies or the databases used for this thesis. This 
instrumental variable is then calculated as the portion of the board members, who have a 
higher degree financial education, from the total board size. For the higher level financial 
education, an academic bachelor degree has been used as a cut-off point. For example, 
second-level educations (Business college graduate or merkonomi) have not been deemed as 
good enough financial experience for the individual board member. The reasoning behind the 
greater financial education of the board is that knowledge for the different roles of the 
governance actors might be higher. Therefore, the greater percentage of financially educated 
board members in the whole board should have greater demand for the different corporate 
governance actors. Thus, a positive association is expected. 
 
The final instrumental corporate governance variable is LITI controlling for the higher 
litigation risk of particular industries. Hay et al (2008) use a utility industry dummy as an 
instrumental variable in their article, but as they have not formalized the composition of the 
dummy, a similar type of variable is composed for the use for this thesis. LITI is a dummy 
variable, which takes a value of 1, if the company operates in a industry, which has a higher 
risk for litigation as identified by Francis et al. (1994) and also used by e.g. Heninger (2001), 
Antle et al. (2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Gul et al. (2009). The high litigation risk 
industries are companies which operate in industries with the SIC-codes as follows: 
biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 
7370-7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961). This 
instrumental variable should be “out of control” for the companies as the industry is usually 
predetermined when the company is founded. Also, the companies can be keener to 
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streamline their operations in effort to specialize in one particular industry and thus there 
should be no industry selection interest related to this variable. 
 
There is some evidence that LITI should have a positive effect on the existence of the 
corporate governance functions. The companies in the mentioned industries should make 
some effort to diminish this is risk by appointing additional corporate governance functions. 
 
Predicted corporate governance hypothesis variables with fee controls (CGENDOFEE) 
These predicted variables are obtained from the first-stage regressions (Eq.9 and Eq.10) and 
they enter as the independent variable in the 2SLS audit fee model (Eq.11). The predicted 
corporate governance variables IA A              and             are regressed with the audit fee controls 
and the exogenous corporate governance variables. Also here, in the exogenous DACC 
model, these variables are also regressed with the discretionary accruals. They should be 
similarly associated (positively) as their non-predicted counterparts as explained above and as 
hypothesized in the Chapter 3.  
 
Predicted corporate governance hypothesis variables with earnings management 
controls (CGENDOEM) 
Similarly, predicted corporate governance variables for the earnings management models are 
obtained from the first-stage regressions with the exogenous audit fee variable, earnings 
management control variables and exogenous corporate governance variables as the 
independent variables. Then the predicted IA A              from Eq.15 and            from Eq.16 enter in 
to the second-stage regression as independent variables, where the endogeneity problems 
should be controlled for. 
 
The next section presents the second set of OLS and 2SLS models, where the audit fees and 
the earnings management proxy are treated endogenously. Also, the additional variables 
related to these models are presented. 
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4.2.3 Regression models with endogenous fee and discretionary accruals 
 
In the previous section, the audit fee and the discretionary accruals were presumed to be 
exogenous. Here, for further analysis, these variables (LNFEEALL and DACC) are presumed 
to be endogenous, which leads to a second set of the different regression models as illustrated 
in Figure 4 found below. 
Figure 4 Illustration of regression models with endogenous audit fees and discretionary accruals 
 
As the Figure 4 shows, two new OLS models are presented (Eq.18 and Eq.23), where the new 
instrumental variables for the discretionary accruals and audit fees are entered. These new 
instrumentals are added to keep the overidentification requirements valid as there are two new 
variables to be instrumented in the first-stage of the 2SLS. The first-stage of the 2SLS models 
(Eq.19-21 and Eq.24-26) and therefore also the second-stage regressions (Eq. 22 and Eq. 27) 
have also changed to include the additional instrumentals and the new predictions for the 
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LNFEEALL and DACC variables. The variable sets CGHYPOTEHSIS, FEECONTROLS, 
EMCONTROLS, CGEXOGENOUS and CGINSTRUMENTALS remain the same as presented 
in the previous section. 
 
The new variable sets introduced for the endogenous fee and earnings management models 
are EMINSTRUMENTALS, FEEINSTRUMENTALS, ENDOFEE and ENDOEM. The new 
variable sets are presented in Table 6 below and their use is further justified in the following 
chapters. 
Table 6 Variable sets for endogenous audit fee and earnings management models 
FEE 
Dependent variable in the fee models and hypothesis variable in the EM models 
(LNFEEALL in the main models) 
DACC 
Dependent variable in the EM models and hypothesis variable in the fee models 
(ABSDACCMJS-CF in the main models) 
CGHYPOTHESIS IAFALL COM 
FEECONTROLS LNASSETS SQRALLSUBS FOREIGN CRATIO INVREC SWITCH FEERISK 
EMCONTROLS LNMKTCAP LOSS OPCYCLE365 MKTRET SALESGPCG ZRATIO SMALLEPSCNG 
CGEXOGENOUS MAJ20 BINDEPENDENT 
CGINSTRUMENTALS ANALYSTS LIABRATIO FINEXP LITI 
EMINSTRUMENTALS TACF ACQ 
FEEINSTRUMENTALS FEERATIO REPORTLAG 
ENDOFEE Predicted                 ,             and              from equations 19, 20 & 21. 
ENDOEM Predicted                 ,             and                         from equations 24, 25 & 26. 
 
Instrumental variables for audit fee (FEEINSTRUMENTALS) 
The new instrumental variables (FEERATIO and REPORTLAG) in the above first-stage 
equations 24-26 are used to predict the ENDOFEE variables, which are used in the second-
stage of the earnings management 2SLS model (Eq.27).  
 
First instrumental variable for the endogenous audit fees is FEERATIO and it is calculated as 
the amount of obtained additional services from the auditor divided by the total audit fees of 
the company. This variable is usually used to convey the level of auditor independency, which 
can be deemed poor if the ratio is high. As Hay et al. (2006) found in their meta-analysis, 
there is support for both directions for the association of the independency of the auditors and 
total audit fees: “On the one hand, it is argued that the provision of audit services can lead to 
lower fees because of cross-subsidization of fees or synergies between audit and nonaudit 
services. On the other hand, nonaudit services could be associated with higher audit fees 
because such services may lead to extensive changes in an organization that require additional 
audit effort, or because clients that buy consulting services may be problematic in general, or 
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because monopoly power and service efficiency in the nonaudit service market allow auditors 
to charge fee premiums.” (Hay et al., 2006, 178-179). However, they concluded that there is 
more support for the positive association for this variable. 
 
Second instrumental variable for the endogenous audit fee variable is REPORTLAG. The 
variable is calculated as the number of days between the fiscal year end and the issuance date 
on the auditor‟s report. This variable is sometimes interpreted as an indication of the 
efficiency of an audit because a longer delay is likely to indicate problems during the course 
of the audit, difficulties in resolving sensitive audit issues, or more complex financial reports 
to prepare (Knechel and Payne 2001). Therefore, audit report lag is expected to have a 
positive association with audit fees. 
 
Instrumental variables for discretionary accruals (EMINSTRUMENTALS) 
New instrumental variables are also needed for the discretionary accruals, because it might 
still suffer from endogeneity as it may correlate with the other control variables (and the error 
term) in the final audit fee 2SLS model (Eq.22). The instrumental variables to be used in the 
equivalent first-stage models (Eq.19-21) are TACF and ACQ and they are as follows: 
 
TACF is the total accruals, as calculated in the Eq.3 (Net income – Cash flow from 
operations). This variable is used by Frankel et al. (2002) and they reported a positive 
association for this variable and earnings management. Usually, the larger the amount of total 
accruals is, the higher the discretionary accruals are. There should be a positive association 
with the discretionary accruals.  
 
In the additional tests, where the balance sheet discretionary accruals (e.g. absolute modified 
Jones balance sheet discretionary accruals, ABSDACCMJS-BS) are used, this instrumental 
variable is replaced by the equivalent total accruals measure, TABS. The variable is calculated 
according to the Dechow et al. (1995) and it is calculated as follows: [(∆Current Assets - 
∆Cash) - ∆Current liabilities] - Depreciation and amortization costs divided by total assets at 
the beginning of the year. 
 
ACQ is the number of acquisitions the individual company made during the sample year. The 
data for the acquisitions is collected from Talouselämä‟s (Finnish business magazine) 
publicly available list of the acquisitions, where Finnish companies are involved. This 
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instrumental variable controls for the changes in the companies‟ data items, if they have been 
involved in an acquisition of another company. Hribar and Collins (2002) show that current 
(working capital) accruals are biased when estimated from changes in balance sheet data. The 
bias is larger around major financing events because these firms tend to have acquisitions (or 
other such transactions) that affect the numbers in consecutive balance sheets. When a 
company acquires a company, the balance sheet items tend to increase, thus a positive 
association is expected with the discretionary accruals measures. 
 
Predicted hypothesis variables with fee controls (ENDOFEE) 
As mentioned earlier, the predicted values of IAFALL and COM also change, because of the 
additional instrumental variables in the first-stage regressions (Eq.19-21). Therefore, the 
ENDOFEE variable set includes the new predicted variables IA A             ,            and  A          , 
which is used in the final audit fee 2SLS model (Eq. 22), where also the DACC is presumed 
to be endogenous. However, the predicted signs remain the same as hypothesized earlier also 
with these variables and therefore a positive association is also expected in this audit fee 
model. 
 
Predicted hypothesis variables with earnings management controls (ENDOEM) 
As with the previous set of variables, the newly included instrumental variables for the 
endogenous audit fees (Eq. 27) are used also in the first-stage regressions of the endogenous 
corporate governance variables (Eq. 24-26). The predictions (IA A             ,            and 
     A                    from the first-stage models are used as the independent variables in the second-
stage of the 2SLS earnings management model, where the audit fees are also endogenous. 
Also, with these variables, the association is predicted to be negative as hypothesized earlier. 
 
In sum, there are two main groups of models, which both are further divided to three 
subgroups. Firstly, the audit fee main group of models consist of OLS audit fee models 
equations 6-8 and 18), exogenous DACC 2SLS audit fee model (Eq. 11) and endogenous 
DACC 2SLS audit fee model (Eq.22). The most interesting of the 2SLS models is the 
exogenous DACC audit fee model (Eq.11) as it treats the internal audit and the audit 
committee endogenously. The DACC variable‟s effect on the audit fees should not originate 
internally in the corporate governance system. But for explorative purposes, it is also 
presumed to be endogenous in the final 2SLS model. 
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Secondly, the three subgroups in the earnings management main group of models consist of 
OLS earnings management models (equations 12-14 & 23), exogenous FEE 2SLS earnings 
management model (Eq. 17) and endogenous FEE 2SLS earnings management model 
(Eq.27). In addition to the OLS models, the most interesting 2SLS model is the final 2SLS 
model, where the audit fees are also treated endogenously (Eq.27). When considering the 
corporate governance factors affecting the magnitude of earnings management, all of the 
hypothesis variables should have a diminishing role, which originates from the inside of the 
system. 
 
Therefore, in addition to the OLS models, the main interests are the 2SLS audit fee model, 
where the discretionary accruals are treated exogenously (Eq.11) and the 2SLS model, where 
the audit fees are treated endogenously (Eq.27). The next section presents the descriptive 
statistics of the regression variables. 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in above mentioned 
regressions and they are presented in Table 7 below. 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of all regression variables (n=107) 
Variable (set) Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Std Error Sum Skewness Kurtosis 
FEE (Audit fee variables) 
LNFEEALL 0.466 0.222 0.024 1.887 0.507 0.049 49.894 1.331 3.564 
DACC (Earnings management variables) 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 0.068 0.048 0.000 0.356 0.063 0.006 7.236 2.214 9.527 
CGHYPOTHESIS (Hypothesis variables) 
IAFALL 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 0.048 49.000 0.169 1.029 
COM 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.502 0.049 53.000 0.019 1.000 
FEECONTROLS (Control variables for the fee models) 
LNASSETS 5.514 5.178 1.363 10.036 1.915 0.185 590.043 0.292 2.332 
SQRALLSUBS 4.631 3.873 1.414 12.288 2.734 0.264 495.534 1.231 3.745 
FOREIGN 0.586 0.632 0.000 1.000 0.278 0.027 62.669 -0.564 2.477 
CRATIO 1.736 1.454 0.417 5.247 1.030 0.100 185.754 1.476 4.944 
INVREC 0.357 0.334 0.023 0.913 0.187 0.018 38.150 0.421 2.607 
SWITCH 0.112 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.317 0.031 12.000 2.458 7.043 
FEERISK 0.047 0.015 0.001 0.690 0.094 0.009 5.000 4.869 30.495 
EMCONTROLS (Control variables for the earnings management models) 
LNMKTCAP 4.801 4.661 0.944 9.673 1.835 0.177 513.717 0.333 2.655 
LOSS 0.234 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.425 0.041 25.000 1.259 2.585 
OPCYCLE365 125.0 112.8 22.541 365.0 68.447 6.617 13 370.1 1.160 4.568 
MKTRET 0.062 0.020 -0.250 0.650 0.192 0.019 6.640 0.762 3.490 
SALESGPCG 0.056 0.053 -0.513 0.830 0.184 0.018 6.028 0.530 6.389 
ZRATIO 142.189 149.842 -16.061 453.133 49.709 4.806 15214.2 1.764 16.350 
SMALLEPSCNG 0.206 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.406 0.039 22.000 1.457 3.122 
CGEXOGENOUS (Exogenous corporate governance variables) 
MAJ20 0.477 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.502 0.049 51.000 0.094 1.009 
BINDEPENDENT 0.680 0.667 0.167 1.000 0.241 0.023 72.757 -0.289 2.128 
CGINSTRUMENTALS (Corporate governance variables used as instrumentals in both 2SLS models) 
ANALYSTS 6.710 5.000 0.000 29.000 6.722 0.650 718.000 1.287 4.356 
FINEXP 0.417 0.420 0.000 0.780 0.141 0.014 44.580 -0.032 2.917 
LIABRATIO 0.565 0.572 0.175 1.909 0.209 0.020 60.425 2.277 17.412 
LITI 0.168 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.376 0.036 18.000 1.774 4.147 
EMINSTRUMENTALS (Variables used as instrumentals in the audit fee 2SLS model) 
TACF -0.045 -0.044 -0.342 0.360 0.085 0.008 -4.814 0.553 8.245 
ACQ 0.832 0.000 0.000 10.000 1.707 0.165 89.000 3.315 15.471 
FEEINSTRUMENTALS (Variables used as instrumentals in the earnings management 2SLS model) 
FEERATIO 0.354 0.357 0.000 0.803 0.206 0.020 37.878 0.261 2.303 
REPORTLAG 43.916 42.000 22.000 90.000 12.013 1.161 4 699.000 1.667 6.843 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. ABSDACCMJS-CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from 
equation 5. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= 
Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. 
SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. 
CRATIO= Current Ratio, Current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total 
assets. SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of 
the particular audit firm's total revenue in the sample. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end market cap. LOSS= 
Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the company capped to 365 
days. MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. ZRATIO= Financial distress 
ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 
1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= 
Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. FINEXP= Percentage 
of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. 
LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. TACF= Cash flow total accruals. ACQ= 
Number of acquisitions made. FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related fees from the total fees paid to the auditor. 
REPORTLAG=Days the auditors signed the audit report from fiscal year end. 
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As seen in the Table 7, the variables are grouped in the same manner as in the previous 
subsections. As some variables (e.g. corporate governance variables) are studied earlier in the 
first section of this chapter, the main analysis of the variables is concentrated on the 
distribution analysis of the variables, indicated by skewness and kurtosis.  
 
Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more precisely, the lack of symmetry. A distribution, 
or data set, is symmetric if it looks the same to the left and right of the centre point. Thus, it is 
evenly distributed around the mean of the sample and should have skewness value near to 
zero. Negative values for the skewness indicate data that are skewed left and positive values 
for the skewness indicate data that are skewed right. 
 
Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. 
That is, data sets with high kurtosis tend to have a distinct peak near the mean, decline rather 
rapidly, and have heavy tails. Data sets with low kurtosis tend to have a flat top near the mean 
rather than a sharp peak. The kurtosis for a standard normal distribution is three. 
 
As a rule of thumb the skewness value should be within -1 and 1 and the kurtosis value should 
be smaller than 10. The skewness and kurtosis statistics show that there seems to be some 
problem with the distribution of some variables (e.g. ABSDACCMJS-CF, FEERISK, 
LIABRATIO, and ACQ). This is partly due to the fact that these variables are modified or are 
relative measures and therefore their characteristics are not normally distributed. This might 
infer the test statistics and the regression used, as they usually assume normal distribution of 
the variables.  
 
Aside from the distribution analysis, a few variables of interest are highlighted here. For 
example, most of the subsidiaries in the sample seem to be foreign (mean of 0.586). Also, 12 
companies have switched their auditor in between 2007 and 2008. The companies in the 
sample beat the market by 6.2%. This can be explained by the sharp decline of the market 
value of the financials companies during the market crash. Interestingly, the ZRATIO of seven 
listed companies was below the 70 threshold indicating a risk for a payment default in the 
future. Among these companies one company had a ZRATIO less than 50, indicating an 
apparent risk of default. The audit report lag was approximately 44 days on average, while all 
the auditors did stay within the 90 day limit from the end of the fiscal year. 
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There is also a more detailed presentation of the descriptive statistics in the Appendix 3, 
where the regression variables are grouped by OMX size categories. For example, it is 
possible to compare the absolute discretionary accruals values between the different 
categories. The comparison of the discretionary accruals indicates that the large group have 
lower means than the smaller group. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, the larger companies 
have a better financial reporting quality. 
 
The next chapter presents the results of the presented audit fee and earnings management 
models with the additional sensitivity analyses. 
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5. Empirical results 
 
In this chapter, the results from the models introduced in the previous chapter 4, are presented 
and interpreted accordingly to hypothesis proposed in the chapter 3. In the first section results 
related to the audit fees are presented. The second section shows the result related to the 
earnings management models. In both models the results from the OLS models are presented 
first, following by the 2SLS models, where the discretionary accruals or the audit fees are 
presumed to be exogenous and lastly the same variables are presumed to be endogenous in the 
final presentation of 2SLS models. Finally, the third section presents some sensitivity and 
additional tests to test the robustness of the results. This section presents the results when 
using other similar variables in the same models for to check the robustness of the main 
models. 
 
 
5.1 Results related to effects on audit fees 
This section presents the results of the three different audit fee models. First, the results of the 
OLS models are presented. Secondly, the results of the 2SLS model, where the discretionary 
accruals are presumed to be exogenous. And finally, the results of the 2SLS models, where 
the discretionary accruals are endogenous in the audit fee model. 
 
Audit fee OLS models 
The results from the different audit fee OLS models are presented in the Table 8 on the next 
page. All the OLS models have a satisfactory model fit as the adjusted R
2
 is about 0.8 in and 
the significance of F-values is smaller than 0.001. There are four different OLS models, 
where the first model has only the control variables for the audit fee models with the 
hypothesis variables. The second model has the exogenous corporate governance variables 
included in model. The third and fourth model has the instrumental variables added to the 
models as independent variables. The third model has the corporate governance related 
instrumentals, which are used to study the effect of the variables when the DACC is 
exogenous and the final fourth model has also the instruments for the DACC added to the 
model, used later for the 2SLS model where the discretionary accruals are endogenous in the 
models. Also, the predicted sign of the coefficients can be found in the second column from 
the left and the definitions of the regression variables. The Variance Inflator Factor scores 
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(VIF) of all the variables in all of the OLS and 2SLS models in this thesis are in the range of 
1-6, which suggests that no serious multicollinearity are present in the models. Unfortunately, 
as there is a lot models to be reported, the VIF scores had to be omitted from this thesis for 
the ease of reading. 
 
Table 8 Results from the audit fee OLS models (n=107) 
Model 
 
FEECONTROLS 
 
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS  
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS + 
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
 
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS + 
CGINSTRUMENTALS + 
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
Equation  Eq.6 
 
Eq.7 
 
Eq.8 
 
Eq.18 
Dependent variable  LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  -0.707 -6.130 *** 
 
-0.655 -4.800 *** 
 
-0.762 -3.580 *** 
 
-0.826 -3.800 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL + 0.023 0.380   
 
0.021 0.340   
 
0.007 0.110     -0.002 -0.030   
COM + 0.180 3.170 *** 
 
0.205 3.470 *** 
 
0.171 2.910 ***   0.160 2.680 *** 
ABSDACCMJS-CF + -0.154 -0.390   
 
-0.184 -0.460   
 
-0.471 -1.170     -0.568 -1.310   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS + 0.135 6.090 *** 
 
0.136 6.150 *** 
 
0.100 3.570 ***   0.108 3.820 *** 
SQRALLSUBS + 0.035 2.510 *** 
 
0.035 2.550 *** 
 
0.030 2.210 ***   0.026 1.890 **   
FOREIGN + 0.189 2.080 *** 
 
0.190 2.070 *** 
 
0.172 1.870 **     0.149 1.580 *     
CRATIO - -0.028 -1.180   
 
-0.030 -1.260   
 
0.006 0.200     0.013 0.440   
INVREC + 0.261 1.960 **   
 
0.269 2.010 *** 
 
0.285 2.150 ***   0.323 2.160 *** 
SWITCH - -0.101 -1.310   
 
-0.085 -1.100   
 
-0.051 -0.650     -0.034 -0.440   
FEERISK + 0.716 2.440 *** 
 
0.674 2.260 *** 
 
0.632 2.180 ***   0.618 2.140 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 +       
 
0.035 0.690   
 
0.028 0.560     0.030 0.600   
BINDEPENDENT +       
 
-0.126 -1.160   
 
-0.206 -1.900 **     -0.203 -1.870 **   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS +       
 
      
 
0.018 2.870 ***   0.017 2.670 *** 
LIABRATIO +       
 
      
 
0.280 1.940 **     0.284 1.970 **   
FINEXP +       
 
      
 
0.232 1.230     0.250 1.330   
LITI +       
 
      
 
-0.013 -0.180     -0.003 -0.040   
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
TACF +       
 
      
 
        -0.326 -1.000   
ACQ +       
 
      
 
        0.022 1.430   
R2  0.798     
 
0.803     
 
0.825       0.831     
Adjusted R2  0.777     
 
0.778     
 
0.794       0.797     
F-value  37.960 ***   
 
31.980 ***     26.600 ***     24.090 ***   
Significances for F-values: ***significant at the 0.05 level. **significant at the 0.10 level. *significant at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. ABSDACCMJS-CF= 
Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. SQRALLSUBS= 
Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. CRATIO= Current Ratio, current 
assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total assets. SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if 
auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of the particular audit firm's total revenue in the 
sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. 
BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. 
LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the 
whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. TACF= Cash flow total accruals. 
ACQ= Number of acquisitions made. 
 
For the hypothesis variables, the Table 8 above shows that the coefficient of variable COM is 
positive and statistically relevant (p<0.05) in all of the OLS models. Therefore, the positive 
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association between the existence of audit committee and audit fees support the 
complementary view of this corporate governance function. The coefficient of IAFALL is 
positive as hypothesized in almost all models, except in the last model, where the 
instrumentals for ABSDACCMJS-CF are entered in the OLS. However, IAFALL is not 
statistically significant at 0.15 level, which is used as the limit for relevance. Therefore, the 
OLS models do not provide strong enough evidence for the hypothesis 1, where the existence 
of the internal audit function was hypothesized to be positively related to audit fees. Also, the 
final hypothesis variable ABSDACCMJS-CF is not statistically relevant (p>0.15), while its 
coefficient interestingly is negative contrary to the hypothesis. This might be due the selected 
discretionary method and the sensitivity analyses try to overcome this problem by introducing 
other methods for proxying earnings management. Also, an alternative variable for internal 
audit and audit fees is used in the sensitivity analyses in section 5.3. Thus, the results from the 
audit fee OLS models only support the hypothesis 2, where the audit committee was seen to 
be positively associated to audit fees. 
 
The signs of the control variables are mostly as anticipated and almost all of them are also 
statistically relevant in the OLS models. Only the CRATIO controlling for the financial 
condition of the company is opposite to the predictions in the OLS models, where the 
instruments are included. However, this variable is not statistically relevant in any of the OLS 
models. Also, the control variable SWITCH is not statistically relevant in the models.  
 
The first of the exogenous CG variables, MAJ20, is not statistically relevant in these models, 
while the other exogenous variable is. However, contrary to the predictions, the sign of the 
second exogenous CG variable BINDEPENDENT is negative. This implies that the more 
independent members are in the board, the less work they seem to demand from their 
auditors. For example, the results of Hay et al. (2008) report that larger number of outside 
directors is positively associated with the greater demand for external auditing. Also, in their 
meta-analysis, Hay et al (2006) found this type of variable to be significantly positive in two 
of the five studies included in the analysis. As these types of variables measure for the more 
efficient board and thus corporate governance, this is quite unexpected. This may be 
explained from the supply side of the auditing, the auditors can lower their audit risk, 
especially control risk, when the boards are more effective in monitoring the company. This 
should lead to lower their audit fees. For example, similar conclusions have been made by 
Tsui et al. (2001). 
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Some of the instrumental variables are relevant (ANALYSTS and LIABRATIO). There is a 
possibility that the number of analysts can also control for company size, which can be 
confirmed by the high correlation (about 0.8) with LNASSETS as the correlation matrix in the 
Appendix 1 shows. Here the LIABRATIO is positive as some of the previous audit fee studies 
have found, contrary to the Hay et al. (2008) argument of mostly being irrelevant in similar 
studies. Therefore, there might be some indication that some of the selected instrumentals 
(ANALYSTS and LIABRATIO) are not valid for the purposes of alleviating endogeneity in the 
upcoming 2SLS models and these are further analyzed with the tests presented with the 
results for 2SLS models. 
 
In sum, the audit fee OLS models seem to support the Hypothesis 2, where the audit 
committee is hypothesized to have a positive association with the audit fees. There is no 
statistically significant support for the hypotheses 1 and 3. Therefore, the results favour the 
complementary view when considering the audit committee‟s effect on audit quality in the 
corporate governance network. To further study this effect when controlling for endogeneity 
between the governance actors, the results of the 2SLS models are presented. 
 
Audit fee 2SLS model with exogenous DACC  
The results from the 2SLS model, where the discretionary accruals variable is presumed to be 
exogenous in the, are presented in the Table 9 found on the next page. As mentioned 
previously, this is the more interesting 2SLS, because it has the relevant variables (IAFALL 
and COM) treated endogenously. The endogenous association of the magnitude of earnings 
management (ABSDACCMJS-CF) should not be relevant in the context of audit fees and 
corporate governance. 
 
In rightmost part of the Table 9, the results of the second-stage regression shows that the only 
statistically relevant and positive hypothesis variable is COM as in the OLS models. Also, the 
results for the ABSDACCMJS-CF are similar to the OLS models, where the sign was 
surprisingly negative and not relevant. Only the IAFALL has experienced a change of sign 
from positive to negative, but also it is not relevant in this model.  
 
In the second-stage equation (Eq.11), almost all of the control variables are as predicted 
earlier and most of them are significant. The variables that are not significant are CRATIO, 
SWITCH and MAJ20 in the second-stage, but their directions of associations are as expected. 
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Again, the BINDEPENDENT variable is not as expected, having a negative and significant 
coefficient as with the earlier OLS models. 
 
 
The model fits of the first-stage models are quite high (R
2
 is more than 0.4 and the F-values 
are significant at 0.001 level). However, in the IAFALL first-stage regression (Eq.9), the only 
statistically significant instrumental variable is LITI. Similarly, in the COM model (Eq.10), 
there is only one significant instrumental variable, LIABRATIO. As the other instrumental 
Table 9 Results from the 2SLS audit fee models, where the ABSDACCMJS-CF is exogenous in the 2SLS 
(n=107) 
Model  First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation  Eq.9 
 
Eq.10 
 
Eq.11 
Dependent variable IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  -0.900 -2.680 *** 
 
-1.035 -2.980 *** 
 
-0.454 -2.000 *** 
Hypothesis variables  
                 +       
 
      
 
-0.028 -0.090   
           +       
 
        0.671 2.210 *** 
              + 0.322 0.470     0.167 0.240     -0.497 -0.960   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS + 0.184 4.360 ***   0.122 2.800 ***   0.085 1.660 **   
SQRALLSUBS + 0.023 1.010     0.014 0.590     0.029 1.610 *     
FOREIGN + -0.093 -0.590     -0.031 -0.190     0.206 1.840 **   
CRATIO - 0.013 0.260     0.102 2.010 ***   -0.042 -1.410   
INVREC + 0.224 1.000     -0.363 -1.570 *       0.442 2.120 *** 
SWITCH - 0.224 1.720 **     0.166 1.240     -0.122 -1.160   
FEERISK + -0.485 -0.980     -0.565 -1.110     0.856 2.220 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 + 0.034 0.390     -0.059 -0.660     0.063 1.000   
BINDEPENDENT + -0.073 -0.400     0.362 1.920 **     -0.336 -1.740 **   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS + -0.004 -0.370     0.004 0.380           
LIABRATIO + 0.265 1.110     0.617 2.510 ***         
FINEXP + 0.063 0.200     0.397 1.190           
LITI + 0.289 2.410 ***   -0.002 -0.020           
R2  0.458       0.426       0.670     
F-value  5.550 ***     4.890 ***     18.900 ***   
Partial R2  0.073       0.068             
Partial F-value  1.800       1.690             
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                 0.927, CritF(0.05)=11.0 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                 4.295, Chi-sq(2)=0.117 
Endogeneity test (DWH)                 4.861, Chi-sq(2)=0.088 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. ABSDACCMJS-
CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. 
SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. 
CRATIO= Current Ratio, current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total 
assets. SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of 
the particular audit firm's total revenue in the sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder 
having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. 
ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= 
Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if 
company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. 
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variables are not significant, there might be problems with the powerfulness and the validness 
of the 2SLS method. 
 
This can be confirmed from the partial R
2
 and partial F-values of the first-stage models, where 
the test statistics show that there is some indication of weak instrumental variables. This is 
further proved by the low value of the joint test of weak instrumental variables (G-D Wald) 
0,927, which is well below the critical value of 11.0 at the selected significance of 0.05. 
While, the endogeneity test favours the use of 2SLS model instead of OLS (DWH-test 
statistics is significant at 0.088 level), the Sargan overidentification test suggests otherwise. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the 
structural equation, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the 
estimated equation (Baum et al., 2003). Because the reported test statistic is significant at 
0.117 level, the null hypothesis is rejected. To further study the weakest instruments 
separately, the validity of the instruments is tested individually in the upcoming sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
Overall, the test statistics suggest that it should be safer to rely on the results of the previously 
presented OLS models than the 2SLS results presented here. However, if not considering the 
test statistics favouring the use of OLS models, the 2SLS model results are very similar to the 
previously presented OLS models. Thus with caution, 2SLS model should provide a further 
proof of the complementary effect on the existence of the audit committee and audit fees 
when trying to control for self-selection bias and possible endogeneity in the complex 
corporate governance network.  
 
Audit fee 2SLS model with endogenous DACC 
The results from the audit fee models, where the discretionary accruals variable is presumed 
to be endogenous in the 2SLS model, are presented in the Table 10 found on the next page. 
The presentation of this table is similar to the previous Table 9, but here an additional first-
stage egression is used for to obtain predicted values for the ABSDACCMJS-CF. Also, the 
two other first-stage regressions now include the additional instrumental variables to satisfy 
the overidentification requirements. The results are fairly similar to the previous 2SLS model 
and, unfortunately, with the presence of weak instruments. 
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Table 10 Results from the 2SLS audit fee models, where the ABSDACCMJS-CF is endogenous in the 2SLS 
(n=107) 
Model  First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation  Eq.19 
 
Eq.20 
 
Eq.21 
 
Eq.22 
Dependent variable  IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  -0.869 -2.510 ***   -0.975 -2.760 ***   -0.075 -1.540 *     
 
-0.553 -2.900 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
                 +                       
 
0.081 0.290   
           +                       
 
0.486 1.840 **   
                                      +                         0.794 0.800   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS + 0.181 4.240 ***   0.119 2.710 ***   0.001 0.090     0.090 2.240 *** 
SQRALLSUBS + 0.014 0.600     0.002 0.100     -0.004 -1.270     0.036 2.230 *** 
FOREIGN + -0.076 -0.470     -0.006 -0.040     -0.014 -0.610     0.199 1.990 *** 
CRATIO - 0.018 0.380     0.105 2.130 ***   0.019 2.760 ***   -0.041 -1.540 *     
INVREC + 0.181 0.750     -0.448 -1.820 **     0.105 3.070 ***   0.288 1.370   
SWITCH - 0.225 1.740 **     0.176 1.330     -0.027 -1.460 *       -0.071 -0.730   
FEERISK + -0.453 -0.920     -0.515 -1.020     -0.025 -0.360     0.807 2.390 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 + 0.044 0.500     -0.047 -0.530     0.004 0.330     0.042 0.730   
BINDEPENDENT + -0.098 -0.530     0.328 1.750 **     0.000 0.010     -0.256 -1.490 *     
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS + -0.004 -0.370     0.004 0.350     0.001 0.710           
LIABRATIO + 0.279 1.210     0.610 2.600 ***   0.094 2.900 ***         
FINEXP + 0.130 0.410     0.469 1.440     0.076 1.690 **           
LITI + 0.288 2.410 ***   0.002 0.020     -0.016 -0.930           
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
TACF + 0.153 0.290     0.260 0.490     -0.277 -3.760 ***         
ACQ + 0.030 1.170     0.043 1.650 *       -0.003 -0.780           
R2  0.466       0.445       0.334       0.734     
F-value  5.280 ***     4.860 ***     3.050 ***     23.650 ***   
Partial R2  0.079       0.084       0.925             
Partial F-value  1.480       1.840       4.550 ***           
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                     0.515, CritF(0.05)=12.2 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                        5.192, Chi-sq(3)=0.158 
Endogeneity test (DWH)                     8.232, Chi-sq(3)=0.042 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***significant at the 0.05 level. **significant at the 0.10 level. *significant at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. ABSDACCMJS-CF= 
Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. 
SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. CRATIO= 
Current Ratio, current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total assets. 
SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of the 
particular audit firm's total revenue in the sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having 
more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= 
Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial 
educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk 
industry, 0 otherwise. TACF= Cash flow total accruals. ACQ= Number of acquisitions made. 
 
Similarly to the previous 2SLS model, this 2SLS model, with the endogenous 
ABSDACCMJS-CF, shows that the only statistically relevant and positive hypothesis variable 
is COM. Now, the IAFALL and ABSDACCMJS-CF have experienced a change of sign from 
negative to positive as hypothesized, but unfortunately both are not statistically significant. 
The interpretation of the control and exogenous corporate governance variables are still the 
same as in the previous models with the exception of INVREC becoming not statistically 
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significant. However, its sign is still positive as predicted. Overall, the signs and the 
significances are similar as in the previous models. 
 
Here, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test favours the use of 2SLS and also the over identification 
test also supports the results of the endogeneity test. However, as in the previous 2SLS model, 
there is an indication of weak IVs. Thus, as the joint test of weak IV‟s shows, the results of 
this model should be interpreted with caution. Therefore, the OLS models‟ results are more 
statistically sound and they should be used to draw the final conclusions. But as mentioned 
earlier, the only statistically significant hypothesis variable still is COM and there seems to be 
evidence that this is the only hypothesis that can be statistically accepted. 
 
In sum, based on the results from the audit fee models, the null of the hypothesis 2 can be 
rejected, but the null of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected at the selected 0.15 
level. Therefore, the models presented seem to show that the existence of the audit committee 
is positively associated to audit fees, thus providing additional evidence to the complementary 
effect of the audit committee and audit fees. These results can be confirmed, with some 
caution while there are indications of weak instrumental variables, to be robust when 
controlling for endogeneity. In the next section 5.2, the results related to the earnings 
management models are presented. 
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5.2 Results related to effects on earnings management 
 
Similarly to the previous section, this section presents the results of the three different 
earnings management models. First, the results of the OLS models are presented. Secondly, 
the results of the 2SLS model, where the audit fees are presumed to be exogenous. Finally, 
the results of the earnings management 2SLS model are presented, where the audit fees are 
endogenous. 
 
Earnings management OLS models 
The results from the different earnings management OLS models are presented in the Table 11 
on the next page. 
 
All of the OLS models have a satisfactory model fit as the adjusted R
2
 is between 0.3 and 0.4, 
which is usual for earnings management models. The significance of the F-values is smaller 
than 0.001 also indicating a good fit. The VIFs of the earnings management models are in the 
range of 1-5, thus also suggesting no serious multicollinearity between the variables in these 
models. 
 
For the hypothesis variables, the Table 11 shows that the coefficient of the variable 
LNFEEALL is negative as predicted and statistically relevant (p<0.05) in all of the OLS 
models. Therefore, the null of the hypothesized negative association between the audit fees 
and discretionary accruals can be rejected at the mentioned level. The sign of the variable 
COM is also negative, in accordance with the predictions, but the sign of the IAFALL is 
positive contrary to predictions. However, these hypothesis variables are not statistically 
relevant (p>0.15) and therefore the hypothesized effects cannot be validated with the OLS 
models. 
 
The signs of the control variables are mostly as anticipated and almost all of them are also 
statistically relevant in the OLS models. The control variables opposite to the predictions are 
SALESGPCG and ZRATIO. SALESGPCG being negative indicates companies with a higher 
sales growth do not manage earnings as much as the companies with the slower growth. 
Similar results have been reported by Miettinen (2008). The interpretation may be 
contradictory to the hypothesized, because of the exceptional financial climate during the 
sample year. This may also true with the ZRATIO controlling for the financial condition of the 
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company being opposite to the predictions in the OLS models. However, this variable is not 
statistically relevant in any of the OLS models, where the different instrumental variables are 
included. Also, LNMKTCAP and both exogenous corporate governance variables (MAJ20 and 
BINDEPENDENT) are not statistically relevant in the earnings management OLS models. 
 
Table 11 Results from the earnings management OLS models (n=107) 
Model 
 
EMCONTROLS 
 
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS  
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS 
+CGINSTRUMENTALS 
 
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS + 
CGINSTRUMENTALS+ 
FEEINSTRUMENTALS 
Equation  Eq.12 
 
Eq.13 
 
Eq.14 
 
Eq.23 
Dependent variable  ABSDACCMJS-CF 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  0.048 1.910 **     0.060 1.940 **   
 
-0.007 -0.160   
 
-0.035 -0.680   
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL - 0.004 0.280     0.004 0.250     0.005 0.320     0.008 0.550   
COM - 0.000 -0.010     0.001 0.100     -0.004 -0.270     -0.009 -0.570   
LNFEEALL - -0.048 -2.330 ***   -0.049 -2.350 ***   -0.061 -2.740 ***   -0.063 -2.790 *** 
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP - 0.004 0.720     0.004 0.820     0.002 0.300     0.003 0.460   
LOSS + 0.041 2.870 ***   0.042 2.860 ***   -0.047 -1.370     0.034 2.250 *** 
OPCYCLE365 + 0.000 3.220 ***   0.000 3.200 ***   0.033 2.240 ***   0.000 3.740 *** 
MKTRET ? -0.061 -1.900 **     -0.066 -1.960 **     0.000 3.660 ***   -0.043 -1.220   
SALESGPCG + -0.069 -2.160 ***   -0.070 -2.150 ***   -0.068 -2.080 ***   -0.075 -2.270 *** 
ZRATIO + -0.004 -1.460 *       -0.004 -1.520 *       -0.001 -0.230     -0.003 -0.730   
SMALLEPSCNG + 0.029 1.870 **     0.030 1.930 **     0.028 1.660 *       0.026 1.550 *     
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 ?         -0.004 -0.360     -0.003 -0.210     -0.002 -0.190   
BINDEPENDENT -         -0.017 -0.650     -0.028 -1.080     -0.030 -1.120   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS +                 0.002 1.090     0.002 1.070   
LIABRATIO +                 0.045 1.380     0.050 1.500 *     
FINEXP +                 0.092 2.050 ***   0.076 1.650 *     
LITI +                 -0.021 -1.260     -0.018 -1.070   
FEEINSTRUMENTALS  
FEERATIO +                         0.045 1.380   
REPORTLAG +                         0.000 0.820   
R2  0.299       0.302       0.352       0.371     
Adjusted R2  0.226       0.213       0.237       0.242     
F-value  4.090 ***     3.390 ***     3.060 ***     2.880 ***   
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ABSDACCMJS-CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal 
audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 
otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end market cap. LOSS= 
Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the company capped to 365 days.  
MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. ZRATIO= Financial distress ratio. 
SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the 
company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of 
independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total 
assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 
1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related fees from the total fees paid 
to the auditor. REPORTLAG=Days the auditors signed the audit report from fiscal year end. 
 
Some of the instrumental variables are significant and their association is as predicted. The 
positive and significant influence of the financial expertise to the magnitude of earnings 
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management can be seen as interesting. This positive association can be interpreted as the 
greater portion of financial experts in the board and management team, the higher is the 
magnitude of earnings management. As the management team is included in the variable, they 
might be more aware of the earnings management techniques, but still the more financially 
educated board and management should constrain earnings management as hypothesized.  
 
But still, when moving to the 2SLS models, these instrumental variables should have no 
correlation to the discretionary accruals in the OLS and there might be some indication that 
the selected instrumentals are not valid for the upcoming 2SLS models. Some of the 
instrumental variables are relevant (LIABRATIO and FINEXP). This is not unexpected as the 
amount of liabilities is often used as variable in such models.  
 
In sum, all of the OLS models seem to be in favour the hypothesis 6, where the auditors were 
seen to have a constraining effect on the magnitude of earnings management. There was no 
support for the other hypotheses. Also the different earnings management models are further 
tested in the sensitivity analysis section, where the different measures for the discretionary 
accruals are used in the place of the modified Jones cash flow discretionary accruals. In the 
following sections, the results of the 2SLS earnings management models are presented. 
 
Earnings management 2SLS model with exogenous LNFEEALL 
The results from the discretionary accruals models, where the LNFEEALL is presumed to be 
exogenous in the 2SLS model, are presented in the Table 12 found on the next page. 
 
The second-stage of the 2SLS, where only the IAFALL and COM are treated endogenously, 
suggests that only the audit fees (LNFEEALL) is negatively associated to earnings 
management. The other two hypothesis variables have a positive association contrary to the 
predictions. Also, the only statistically significant hypothesis variable is LNFEEALL, while 
the other two hypothesis variables are not. Thus, these results implicate that only the null of 
the hypothesis 6 can be rejected at the 0.15 level. 
 
The significances of the control variables in the second-stage are poor. Only the 
OPCYCLE365 and ZRATIO are significant at the 0.15 level or better. The poor significance of 
the control variables can be seen also in the R
2
 of the second-stage regression, which is 
negative and F-value is low (0.900). According to the Stata FAQ, this can be very common in 
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the 2SLS method and is not a serious problem, because the statistic R
2
 has no similar 
statistical meaning in the context of 2SLS. 
 
Table 12 Results from the 2SLS earnings management models, where the LNFEEALL is exogenous in the 
2SLS (n=107) 
Model  First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation  Eq.15 
 
Eq.16 
 
Eq.17 
Dependent variable IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  -0.109 -0.320         
 
-0.408 -1.220         
 
0.099 1.470  *     
Hypothesis variables 
                 -               
 
0.042 0.390         
           -               
 
0.256 1.260         
LNFEEALL - 0.121 0.780           0.454 2.990  *** 
 
-0.180 -1.570  *     
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP - 0.080 1.730  **     0.015 0.340           -0.004 -0.230         
LOSS + 0.121 1.130           0.104 0.990           0.003 0.070         
OPCYCLE365 + 0.001 0.840           -0.001 -0.930           0.000 2.040  *** 
MKTRET ? -0.169 -0.680           -0.213 -0.870           0.010 0.110         
SALESGPCG + 0.260 1.100           -0.135 -0.580           -0.045 -0.660         
ZRATIO + -0.012 -0.510           0.046 2.040  ***   -0.013 -1.470  *     
SMALLEPSCNG + -0.353 -3.060  ***   0.123 1.090           0.012 0.280         
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 ? -0.025 -0.290           -0.133 -1.520  *       0.035 0.880         
BINDEPENDENT - -0.055 -0.290           0.398 2.170  ***   -0.130 -1.260         
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS + 0.013 1.130           0.002 0.180                 
LIABRATIO + 0.265 1.130           0.104 0.450                 
FINEXP + -0.175 -0.540           0.423 1.330                 
LITI + 0.237 1.970  **     -0.086 -0.730                 
R2  0.438       0.459       -2.037     
F-value  5.130 ***     5.570 ***     0.900     
Partial R2  0.072       0.023             
Partial F-value  1.797       0.532             
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                0.431, CritF(0.05)= 11.0 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                0.142, Chi-sq(2)= 0.932 
Endogeneity test (DWH)                7.034, Chi-sq(2)= 0.030 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ABSDACCMJS-CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if 
internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the 
company, 0 otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end 
market cap. LOSS= Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the 
company capped to 365 days. MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. 
ZRATIO= Financial distress ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 
otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 
otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the 
company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and 
executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise 
 
The significant exogenous control variables in the first-stage models seem to indicate that the 
larger the market cap of the company the more likely there is an internal audit function 
present. Also, the internal audit function is less likely to be present, when EPS growth is near 
zero. The similar variables seem to suggest that the audit committee is formed, when 
company is in a good financial condition (ZRATIO) and the board has more independent 
 92 
members (BINDEPENDENT). Also, the existence of a major owner (MAJ20) seems to have a 
negative effect on the existence of the audit committee. 
 
The first-stage models with the IAFALL and COM have similar relevance as in the audit fee 
models. The R
2
 is near the 0.45 as in the audit fees and F-value hovers above five making the 
fit of the first-stage regression statistically relevant. However, as with the audit fee models, 
the partial values of these models indicate that the used instruments are still weak. As the 
first-stage regressions indicate, there is only one statistically significant instrumental variable 
(LITI) in the IAFALL regression (Eq.15). The COM regression (Eq.16) has no statistically 
relevant instrumental variables.  
 
The poor significance of the instrumental variables can be further justified by the poor F-
value of the joint weak IV test, which is well below the critical F-value threshold of 11.0. 
However, the over-identification test and endogeneity test are valid and highly significant 
favouring the use of 2SLS models instead of the previously presented OLS models. But as 
there is presence of weak variables, the OLS model still should be more consistent for 
interpretation. 
 
In sum, the results of the 2SLS earnings management model, where the audit fees are treated 
exogenously, suggests that the auditors constrain earnings management as hypothesized in 
hypothesis 6. Again, there were no support for the other hypotheses 4 and 5. However, as 
there are indications of weak IVs, but the results are consistent with the previously presented 
OLS models. As mentioned earlier, the more interesting of the earnings management 2SLS 
models is the model were all of the hypothesis variables are treated endogenously, because 
they should have an effect on the earnings management jointly. 
 
Earnings management 2SLS model with endogenous LNFEEALL 
The results from the discretionary accruals models, where also the audit fee variable is 
presumed to be endogenous in the 2SLS model, are presented in the Table 13 in the next page.  
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Table 13 Results from the 2SLS earnings management models, where the LNFEEALL is endogenous in the 
2SLS (n=107) 
Model  First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation  Eq.24 
 
Eq.25 
 
Eq.26 
 
Eq.27 
Dependent var.  IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
  Pred. Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Intercept  -0.099 -0.280     -0.763 -2.120 *** 
 
-0.478 -2.040 ***   0.091 1.740 **   
Hypothesis variables 
                 -                         0.040 0.370   
           -                         0.178 1.180   
                        -                         -0.134 -0.850   
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP - 0.092 2.210 ***   0.083 1.970 **     0.136 4.990 ***   -0.004 -0.260   
LOSS + 0.137 1.310     0.192 1.830 **     0.187 2.720 ***   0.012 0.370   
OPCYCLE365 + 0.000 0.770     0.000 0.270     0.001 2.960 ***   0.000 2.090 *** 
MKTRET ? -0.253 -1.010     -0.219 -0.860     -0.158 -0.960     -0.007 -0.110   
SALESGPCG + 0.280 1.180     -0.194 -0.810     -0.053 -0.340     -0.053 -1.010   
ZRATIO + -0.004 -0.180     0.022 0.880     -0.022 -1.390     -0.010 -1.190   
SMALLEPSCNG + -0.335 -2.850 ***   0.047 0.390     -0.100 -1.300     0.020 0.630   
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 ? -0.035 -0.390     -0.113 -1.250     0.020 0.340     0.023 0.730   
BINDEPENDENT - -0.053 -0.280     0.267 1.420     -0.227 -1.850 **     -0.094 -1.150   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS + 0.018 1.620 *       0.011 1.000     0.024 3.250 ***         
LIABRATIO + 0.277 1.200     0.339 1.460 *       0.431 2.840 ***         
FINEXP + -0.048 -0.150     0.286 0.850     0.039 0.180           
LITI + 0.215 1.760 **     -0.064 -0.520     -0.017 -0.210           
FEEINSTRUMENTALS 
FEERATIO + -0.282 -1.250     0.527 2.310 ***   0.315 2.120 ***         
REPORTLAG + -0.001 -0.190     0.000 0.100     -0.003 -1.390           
R2  0.444       0.439       0.767       -0.861     
F-value  4.850 ***     4.750 ***     19.950 ***     1.230     
Partial R2  0.106       0.102       0.233             
Partial F-value  1.798       1.721 **     4.598 ***           
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                     0.223, CritF(0.05)= 12.2 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                     0.625, Chi-sq(3)= 0.891 
Endogeneity test (DWH)                     8.818, Chi-sq(3)= 0.032 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
ABSDACCMJS-CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from equation 5. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal 
audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 
otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end market cap. 
LOSS= Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the company capped to 
365 days. MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. ZRATIO= Financial 
distress ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy 
variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= 
Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total 
liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. 
LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related 
fees from the total fees paid to the auditor. REPORTLAG=Days the auditors signed the audit report from fiscal year end. 
 
When all of the hypothesis variables are treated endogenous, none of these variables are 
statistically relevant. Also, only the endogenous audit fees seem to have the predicted 
negative association with the discretionary accruals. Contrary to the predictions, the 
instrumented IAFALL and COM seem to be positively associated to the magnitude of earnings 
management as in the previous 2SLS models.  
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The only control variable statistically significant in the second-stage is OPCYCLE365, but its 
coefficient is close to zero, which indicates no clear direction of association to the absolute 
discretionary accruals. Also, some of the non-significant control variables (LNMKTCAP, 
SALESGPCG and ZRATIO) have opposite signs to the predictions. The exogenous corporate 
governance variables are not significant at the 0.15 level, but their signs are similar to the 
earlier 2SLS model. 
 
Here again, the models fits of first-stage models are satisfactory, but the partial R
2
, partial F 
and joint test of weak IV indicate that the selected instrumentals variables are weak especially 
in equations 24 and 25. The only non-significant instrumental variables in any of the first-
stage models are FINEXP and REPORTLAG. For example, the number of analysts following 
the company (ANALYSTS), the percentage of the liabilities (LIABRATIO) and the auditor 
independency variable (FEERATIO) seem to have a significant and anticipated effect in 
multiple first-stage regressions.  
 
The endogeneity test statistics of the 2SLS model seem to favour using this model instead of 
the OLS models, but there still are indications of weak instrumentals as the Wald test (0.223) 
is well below the critical value of 12.2. The weak instrumentals may skew the coefficients of 
the hypothesis variables, but while being not significant, the LNFEEALL is still negative as in 
the OLS models. Therefore, as the overidentification and endogeneity tests favour the use of 
2SLS models, but the results of the second-stage model must be interpreted with caution due 
to the weak IVs.  
 
In sum, based on the previous results of the earnings management OLS models, the null of the 
H6 can be rejected, thus indicating that the greater the amount of audit fees, the smaller the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals. This can be interpreted so that the higher audit quality 
can lead to higher financial reporting quality. However, this result can not be confirmed when 
treating for endogeneity due the weak instrumental variables.  
 
As all of the 2SLS models suffered from weak IVs, they are further studied in the sensitivity 
analyses coming in the next section. Also, as mentioned before, there are several different 
discretionary accruals measures available which can be used to test the robustness of the 
results from these regressions. Further, one of the more recent earnings management proxies 
(the final quarter earnings reversal, NPPN) is also presented in the next section. 
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5.3 Sensitivity and other additional tests 
 
This section presents various different sensitivity tests and other additional tests to check the 
robustness of the main models‟ results in the previous section. Firstly, the instruments used in 
the main models are separately tested for. Secondly, the same models are tested with different 
discretionary accruals measures in place of modified cross-sectional cash flow Jones model 
used in the main models. Thirdly, a new indicator for earnings management, earnings reversal 
dummy, is tested in same manner as different discretionary accruals methods. Fourthly, the 
audit quality indicator, total audit fees, is replaced with two additional fee variables. Finally, 
two additional variables for the existence of the internal audit is used in place of the previous 
variable including both the outsourced and the company‟s own internal audit.  
 
Testing the validity of the instrumentals separately 
As the Sargan-Hansen test of joint over-identification in the main audit fee models indicated, 
some of the instrumental variables are not independent from the error term in the structural 
equation. In the context of the audit fee models and as Larcker & Rusticus (2009) suggested, 
while IV estimation is the standard textbook solution to endogeneity, it is only reliable if (1) 
there is an instrumental variable that is strongly correlated with the endogenous variables in 
the first-stage models and (2) the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the error term in 
the second-stage. 
 
The first condition can be checked from the Appendix 1, where the correlation matrix of the 
endogenous and the instrumental variables is found. For example, the correlation matrix 
shows that the instrumental variable ANALYSTS is strongly correlated with both the IAFALL 
and COM (Spearman correlations are just below 0.5). This variable is also highly correlated 
with the LNFEEALL, which can impair the fulfilling of the second condition. This result can 
also be confirmed from the final audit fee 2SLS model, where this instrumental variable was 
highly significant in the first-stage (Eq.21). The correlation matrix also shows that there are 
only few instrumental variables having a strong correlation with the IAFALL. Also, there is 
only two instrumental variables (TACF and LIABRATIO), which is correlated with the 
ABSDACCMJS-CF. 
 
To study the second condition of the validity of the instrumentals, a GMM distance or C test 
is used. In Stata software, the orthog( ) option of the ivreg2 command tests whether a subset 
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of the model‟s overidentifying restrictions appear to be satisfied. Under the null, the error 
term is uncorrelated with the instruments. This is carried out by calculating two Sargan–
Hansen statistics: one for the full model and a second for the model in which the listed 
variables are (a) considered endogenous, if included regressors, or (b) dropped, if excluded 
regressors. In case (a), the model must still satisfy the order condition for identification. The 
difference of the two Sargan–Hansen statistics, often termed the GMM distance or C statistic 
will be distributed X
2
 under the null hypothesis that the specified orthogonality conditions are 
satisfied, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of those conditions.  
 
The Table 14 below presents the results of the main models as in the previous chapters. The 
table presents all of the instrumental variables used in the four separate 2SLS models and they 
are tested for their exogeneity in the 2SLS models. Also, the overidentification and 
endogeneity tests are showed in the bottom part of the table. The significances of the test 
statistics are colour coded for ease of reading, where the green colour indicates the validity of 
the test statistic and vice versa, red colour indicates that test is not favourable in the 2SLS 
models. 
Table 14 Tests of validity of the instrumental variables as used in the different models (n=107) 
Model category 2SLS Audit fee models   2SLS Earnings management models 
Model Eq.11 
 
Eq.22 
 
Eq.17 
 
Eq. 27 
Endogenous variables IAFALL & COM 
 
IAFALL, COM & 
 DACC  
IAFALL & COM 
 
IAFALL, COM & 
 LNFEEALL 
Dependent variable LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 
IV analysis Statistic p-value   Statistic p-value   Statistic p-value   Statistic p-value 
Orthogonality tests of CGEXOGENOUS variables (Instruments valid, if p > 0.15) 
MAJ20 0.086 0.769   0.204 0.651   0.141 0.708   0.158 0.691 
BINDEPENDENT 2.917 0.088   2.438 0.118   0.003 0.959   0.002 0.963 
 Orthogonality tests of all the instrumental variables (Instruments valid, if p > 0.15) 
ANALYSTS 4.277 0.039   4.351 0.037   0.069 0.792   0.172 0.678 
FINEXP 0.030 0.864   0.008 0.928   0.112 0.738   0.182 0.670 
LIABRATIO 0.188 0.664   0.666 0.414   0.028 0.868   0.040 0.842 
LITI 0.790 0.374   1.332 0.248   0.139 0.710   0.624 0.430 
TACF       0.069 0.793             
ACQ       0.458 0.499             
FEERATIO                   0.544 0.461 
REPORTLAG                   0.055 0.814 
 
Over-id. of all instrumentals 4.295 0.117   5.192 0.083   0.142 0.932   0.625 0.792 
DWH endogeneity test 4.861 0.088   4.141 0.126   7.034 0.030   8.818 0.032 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. ABSDACCMJS-CF= Absolute modified Jones discretionary accruals from 
equation 5. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= 
Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a 
major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent 
board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. 
FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy 
variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. TACF= Cash flow total accruals. ACQ= Number of 
acquisitions made. FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related fees from the total fees paid to the auditor. 
REPORTLAG=Days the auditors signed the audit report from fiscal year end.  
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As the Table 14 shows, the main culprit seems to be ANALYSTS variable in the audit fee 
models. While it had a strong correlation with both of the endogenous CG variables, the 
orthogonality test suggests that it is correlated with the error term. Omitting ANALYSTS from 
the models does improve the overidentification and the endogeneity statistics, making the 
2SLS favourable and the results remain similar (not reported). However, as the variable was 
statistically significant in the models, it cannot be omitted entirely from the models and it has 
to be therefore included in the 2SLS regressions as an exogenous corporate governance 
variable. If the ANALYSTS variable is used as an exogenous control variable in both stages, 
the results remain similar as in the main models (not reported). 
 
Also, the surprising result of the exogenous CG variable BINDEPENDENT in the audit fee 
models may be explained by being endogenous in the 2SLS models as the orthogonality test 
shows. By omitting the variable, the findings were the same as in main models, but the 
overidentification test became valid. However, as with the ANALYSTS variable was 
significant and therefore it cannot be omitted entirely. Thus, by changing places with an 
instrumental variable, a one combination fulfilling all the econometric requirements was 
found (not reported). By using ANALYSTS as the exogenous corporate governance variable in 
both stages and by using MAJ20 as an instrumental variable made the overidentification and 
endogeneity test valid in all of the models. The results for the hypothesis variables were the 
same as with the main models, but the 2SLS models still suffered from weak IVs. However, 
also the sign of the BINDEPENDENT remained the same as well.  
 
For future references, by performing these types of analyses it is possible to interpret and/or 
find a better set of stronger instrumentals (similar to e.g. TACF), which can make the 2SLS 
models econometrically (and theoretically) robust. 
 
Different discretionary accruals as the earnings management indicator 
In order to test the robustness of the main model chosen in this thesis, some of the most 
popular discretionary accruals methods have been used to replace the modified Jones cash 
flow model as an earnings management proxy (not reported). Used proxies were the cross-
sectional and industry non-modified Jones and modified Jones discretionary accruals. Also, 
all of the mentioned methods were tested using balance sheet total accruals instead of the cash 
flow total accruals as used in the main model.  
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The additional tests performed provided no consistent significant differences for the both 
main models tested in the previous chapter. For example, the additional cash flow 
discretionary accruals OLS models provided similar results as with the main models earlier. 
Also, there was still indication of weak IVs in both the additional audit fee and the earnings 
management 2SLS models. Overall, the results for the audit fee models seem to hold even 
when the earnings management is measured with different cross-sectional and industry 
discretionary accruals or with the cash flow and balance sheet total accruals 
 
However, there seemed to be some contradiction with the earnings management models. 
When using cross-sectional Jones models with the balance sheet total accruals, the 
independent audit fee variable was not significant. Also, different from the cross-sectional 
DACCs, the industry DACCs seemed to show that the audit committee is positively related to 
the earnings management, even in the OLS models. However, there was still evidence that the 
audit fees are negatively associated, as suggested in Hypothesis 6, also when using the 
industry DACCs in the earnings management models.  
 
Earnings reversal as the earnings management indicator 
The most recent of different earnings management indicators is the last quarter earnings 
reversal (NPPN). This insightful study has been conducted by Das et al. (2007) with the U.S. 
sample, where they found support for their hypothesis that companies, which have 
experienced reversal of earnings in the last quarter may have been managing earnings. 
 
The main idea of the earnings reversal is that the pattern of quarterly earnings may represent 
possible earnings management behaviour designed to achieve annual earnings targets. One 
can assume that if a poor performance in interim quarters (Q1-Q3) is followed by a surge in 
earnings in the last quarter, it may indicate that managers are attempting to obtain a desired 
level of reported annual earnings. Also, vice versa, if exceptionally good performance in 
interim quarters is followed by a decline in earnings of the last quarter, it may indicate that the 
management is trying to save part of the good earnings to build up a bad day reserve, and 
also, especially in Finnish institutional setting to minimize taxes (e.g. Troberg, 2007). 
 
For example, in her master‟s thesis, Salminen (2008) have studied the effect of fourth quarter 
earnings reversal as an indicator of earnings management in Finnish setting. Salminen found 
some evidence, that Finnish quarterly reversal firms are likely to have managed earnings, but 
 99 
the result were not as high in explanatory power as the underlying study by Das et al (2007) 
due the limited data available from Finland. But, as they both recommend, the earnings 
reversal test is highly applicable as an additional test of earnings management. Encouraged by 
the suitability for the purpose and ease of calculation of the earnings reversal variable, it is 
used as a new dummy variable proxying for the earning management.  
 
The calculation of the variable is done by “dividing the observations into three samples 
according to the presence and nature of a possible earnings reversal pattern found on the 
changes of the quarterly earnings per shares (EPS)” A firm belongs to the negative-positive 
(NP) sample if it presents negative earnings change in at least two interim quarters as well as 
the combined interim quarters, and positive earnings change in the fourth quarter. Conversely, 
a firm belongs to the positive-negative (PN) sample if it presents positive earnings change in 
at least two interim quarters as well as the combined interim quarters, and negative earnings 
change in the fourth quarter. Firms not presenting the reversal effect of either type belongs to 
sample referred as the group Other. (Salminen, 2008) To illustrate this further, the formation 
of these samples is shown in the following tables.  
 
Aspo Oyj is used as an example for companies belonging to the NP sample as seen below: 
An example of a company belonging to NP sample 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quarterly EPS of year 2008 (t) 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.03 
Quarterly EPS of year 2007 (t-1) 0.07 0.40 0.10 0.02 
Changes in EPSs -0.02 -0.28 -0.06 0.01 
Direction of change (+/-) - - - + 
 
The quarterly changes of the interim quarters are jointly and separately negative, while the 
change between the years in the last quarter is suddenly positive. This might indicate a 
positive earnings manipulation. 
 
An example of the firms belonging to PN-sample, Metso Oyj, is shown below: 
An example of a company belonging to PN sample 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quarterly EPS of year 2008 (t) 0.55 0.72 0.69 0.79 
Quarterly EPS of year 2007 (t-1) 0.50 0.66 0.68 0.85 
Changes in EPSs 0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.06 
Direction of change (+/-) + + + - 
 
Here the interim quarters are positive and the annual change in the EPS of the last quarters is 
negative. There might be a desire to manage earnings downwards to smooth the annual 
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results. However, the negative change in the last quarters might also be due to the 
deteriorating financial situation experienced in the end of the 2008. But, there are only six 
companies in the PN sample, whereas the PN sample has 12 companies, which should 
indicate that, despite the credit crunch, the earning power of the companies was still high. 
 
And finally, an example of a company (Uponor Oyj), which belongs to the Other –sample: 
An example of a company belonging to Other sample 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Quarterly EPS of year 2008 (t) 0.18 0.24 0.20 -0.22 
Quarterly EPS of year 2007 (t-1) 0.29 0.45 0.36 0.29 
Changes in EPSs -0.09 -0.21 -0.16 -0.51 
Direction of change (+/-) - - - - 
 
As all of the quarterly results between the years are negative, there is no last quarter change of 
sign. Therefore, there is no clear evidence of the last quarter reversal for these kinds of 
companies and they are included in the Other category.  
 
The new dummy variable, NPPN, is 1 if company belongs to either NP sample of the PN 
sample. In addition to this variable, the Appendix 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all 
different additional variables used in the sensitivity and additional analyses.  
 
Table 15, in the next page, presents the summary results for the hypothesis variables for the 
audit fee models and Appendix 5 presents the more precise results of the audit fee and 
earnings management models with the NPPN as the earnings management indicator. 
 
As the Table 15 shows, the audit fee OLS models have a similar good fit as with the main 
audit fee models. Here also the audit committee variable is positive and statistically 
significant. Additionally, the OLS models suggest that the quarterly earnings reversal dummy 
is significant and positive in the first two models (Eq.6 and Eq.7), where the instrumentals 
have not been included. Therefore, there is some support for the rejecting the null of the 
hypothesis 3, where the earnings management was seen to be positively related to audit fees. 
 
There is also additional support for the described results in the 2SLS model, where the NPPN 
is treated exogenously (Eq.11). It supports the hypotheses 2 and 3, while the hypothesis 1 
cannot be rejected at the selected level of 0.15. The final 2SLS model, where the audit fees 
are treated endogenously, has no significant results for the hypothesis variables. However, as 
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with the previous 2SLS audit fee models the weak instrumental variables statistic, over-
identification test and endogeneity test favours using OLS models instead of 2SLS models. 
 
Table 15 Results of the hypothesis variables from the audit fee models with NPPN as the proxy for the 
earning management (n=107) 
Dependent variable LNFEEALL  Model test statistics 
  Coeff. t-value  Test Stat. Sig. Test Stat. Sig. 
OLS: FEECONTROLS (Eq.6.) 
IAFALL 0.026 0.440    Adj. R
2 0.804      
COM 0.176 3.160 ***  R
2 0.783      
NPPN 0.114 1.690 **    F-value 39.310 ***    
OLS: FEECONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS (Eq.7) 
IAFALL 0.024 0.390    Adj. R
2 0.809      
COM 0.202 3.500 ***  R
2 0.785      
NPPN 0.121 1.780 **    F-value 33.230 ***    
OLS: FEECONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS + CGINSTRUMENTALS (Eq.8) 
IAFALL 0.010 0.170    Adj. R
2 0.826      
COM 0.177 3.000 ***  R
2 0.795      
NPPN 0.094 1.330    F-value 26.740 ***    
OLS: FEECONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS + CGINSTRUMENTALS + EMINSTRUMENTALS (Eq.18) 
IAFALL -0.004 -0.070    Adj. R
2 0.833      
COM 0.170 2.830 ***  R
2 0.798      
NPPN 0.076 1.080    F-value 24.300 ***    
2SLS: NPPN exogenous (Eq.11) 
                 0.017 0.070 
 
 R2 0.770   Weak IV (G-D Wald F) 0.924 CritF(0.05)=11.0 
           0.457 1.930 **  F-value 27.040 *** Over-id. test (Sargan) 6.129 Chi-sq(2)=0.047 
NPPN 0.121 1.700 **     Endogeneity test (DWH) 2.106  Chi-sq(2)=0.349 
2SLS: NPPN endogenous (Eq.22) 
                 0.139 0.590 
 
 R2 0.775   Weak IV (G-D Wald F) 0.704 CritF(0.05)=12.2 
           0.209 0.950 
 
 F-value 27.860 *** Over-id. test (Sargan) 7.957 Chi-sq(3)=0.047 
             0.371 1.400 
 
    Endogeneity test (DWH) 3.701 Chi-sq(3)=0.296 
Significances for t-values: ***significant at the 0.05 level. **significant at the 0.10 level. *significant at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. NPPN= Dummy 
variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter, 0 otherwise 
 
The next paragraphs illustrate the NPPN as the dependent variable in the earnings 
management models. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, probit method has been used 
instead of the OLS in the previous models, where the earnings management indicator was 
continuous. Also, the previously used 2SLS is replaced by the two-stage probit method. 
However, the OLS method is still used in the first-stage to obtain the predictions for IAFALL 
and COM of the two-stage probit. Finally, the probit method is used in the second-stage for 
the NPPN with the OLS estimated endogenous variables. The regressions were calculated 
with Stata and its command ivprobit with the option twostep. By default, ivprobit uses the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. A further light is shed on this method in a book by 
Wooldridge (2002, pp.472-477). The results from the probit regressions and Two-stage probit 
regressions are presented in the Table 16 found on the next page. 
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As can be seen from the Table 16, the results are not statistically significant in the probit 
models and especially poor in the two-stage probit models. Only the third probit model‟s 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) is significant at the 0.15 level. Pseudo R
2
 is near the same levels as the 
OLS models before, but there is no analog for the similar R
2
 used in OLS. However, none of 
the hypothesis variables are still statistically relevant in any probit models. The more detailed 
results can be found in the Appendix 4. The above probit models were also conducted with 
OLS and 2SLS method as in the previous models and the results were as similar (not 
reported). 
 
Table 16 Results of the hypothesis variables from the earnings management models with NPPN as the proxy for 
the earning management (n=107) 
Dependent variable NPPN  Model test statistics 
  Coeff. z-value  Test Stat. Sig. Test Stat. Sig. 
Probit: EMCONTROLS (Eq.12.) 
IAFALL -0.284 -0.660   Log lik.hood -39.944      
COM -0.196 -0.480   LR 13.800 0.182    
LNFEEALL 0.646 1.070   Pseudo R
2 0.147     
Probit: EMCONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS (Eq.13) 
IAFALL -0.281 -0.650   Log lik.hood -39.391      
COM -0.305 -0.690   LR 14.910 0.247     
LNFEEALL 0.742 1.190   Pseudo R
2 0.159     
Probit: EMCONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS + CGINSTRUMENTALS (Eq.14) 
IAFALL -0.180 -0.400   Log lik.hood -35.464      
COM -0.358 -0.780   LR 22.760 0.120    
LNFEEALL 0.350 0.510   Pseudo R
2 0.243     
Probit: EMCONTROLS + CGEXOGENOUS + CGINSTRUMENTALS + FEEINSTRUMENTALS (Eq.23) 
IAFALL -0.155 -0.330   Log lik.hood -34.859      
COM -0.430 -0.900   LR 23.970 0.156     
LNFEEALL 0.514 0.690   Pseudo R
2 0.256     
Two-stage probit: LNFEEALL exogenous (Eq.17) 
                 1.337 0.370        F-value 4.010 0.983 Weak IV (G-D Wald F) 0.430  CritF(0.05)=11.04 
           7.904 1.120          Over-id. test (A-L-N) 0.634  0.728 
LNFEEALL -3.504 -0.890          Exogeneity test (Wald) 4.720  0.094 
Two-stage probit: LNFEEALL endogenous (Eq.27) 
                 2.475 0.650   F-value 4.910 0.961 Weak IV (G-D Wald F) 0.223 CritF(0.05)=12.02 
           5.735 1.050      Over-id. test (A-L-N) 1.725 0.631 
                        -3.801 -0.680      Exogeneity test (Wald) 3.640 0.303 
Significances for z-values: ***significant at the 0.05 level. **significant at the 0.10 level. *significant at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter, 0 otherwise. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if 
internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 
otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees 
 
The usual tests of the endogeneity, weak instruments and over identification are replaced by 
those used, when using the probit models. The weak IV test is the same by using the ivreg2 
command as performed with the other models, which shows that there is presence of weak 
instruments. According to the Stata help file, the overidentification test is Amemiya-Lee-
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Newey minimum Chi-square statistic. The overidentification test after the ivprobit requests 
Newey's (1987) minimum-distance (or minimum-chi-squared) for IV probit estimator, 
respectively. Lee (1992) shows that the minimized distance for this estimator provides a test 
of overidentifying restrictions. The test statistic is distributed as Chi-squared with (Number of 
instruments – Number of regressors) degrees of freedom under the null that the instruments 
are valid. Here, the null cannot be rejected, thus favouring that the instruments are jointly 
valid. 
 
The test for endogeneity is a Wald test of exogeneity. That is, the test simply asks whether the 
error terms in the structural equation and the reduced-form equation for the endogenous 
variable are correlated. In the two-step estimator, in the second stage residuals from the first-
stage OLS regression(s) are included as regressors. The Wald test is a test of significance on 
those residuals' coefficients. As the name of the test suggests, the null of the test is that the 
instrumented variables are exogenous. Therefore, the results of the Wald test statistics shows 
that in the first two-stage probit model (Eq.17), the variables are endogenous and in the 
second model (Eq.27) also the exogeneity cannot be rejected at 0.303 level. However, as seen 
in the Table 16, none of the hypothesis variables are statistically significant. 
 
In sum, the results of the earnings management models are as poor and none of the hypothesis 
variables are statistically relevant. Thus unfortunately, earnings reversal variable does not 
provide any additional proof on the effect of the hypothesis variables in the earnings 
management models. However, some of the audit fee models with the earnings reversal 
indicator (NPPN) suggest that the earnings management is positively associated to audit fees 
Also, the existence of the audit committee is still positively associated to the audit fees. Thus, 
the audit fee models with the NPPN variable provide support for the Hypotheses 2 and 3. 
 
Different variables for audit fees 
Also, LNFEEALL in the models is replaced by additional measures of audit effort, LNFEE 
and LNNONAUDFEE. The LNFEE is the natural logarithm of the fees only related to the 
statutory audit. As this variable does not include the fees from the additional services 
provided by the auditor, it should represent better the relationships of the control variables 
directly to the audit engagement. On the other hand, the LNNONAUDFEE is the natural 
logarithm of the fees paid to the auditor not related to the audit itself. These fees usually 
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contain advisory services performed by the same audit company. Therefore this variable 
represents the consultancy and advisory effort made by the auditors.  
 
The additional tests (not reported) of the different audit fee measures are very similar as in the 
main models. The audit fee models suggested that the existence of audit committee is 
positively associated to LNFEE. In the earnings management models, the nonaudit fees seem 
to have a slightly less of a negative impact on the magnitude of earnings management than the 
purely audit related fees. The overidentification and endogeneity test statistics favoured the 
using of the 2SLS, in all of the models with the LNFEE. However, there still were indications 
of weak instruments. Thus, the results of these models indicate that the when controlling the 
effects of the audit related fees, the audit committee has a positive effect on these fees. These 
results are robust when treating internal audit and audit committee endogenously. 
 
In the LNNONAUDFEE models, the results of the fee models were similar as above. The 
audit committee has a positive effect also to the consultancy and advisory fees performed by 
the auditors. The test statistics only favoured using the 2SLS, where the discretionary accruals 
were treated exogenously (Eq. 11). In the earnings management models, the results were very 
similar to the main model. However, the negative effect of the nonaudit fees was only 
significant in the final OLS (Eq. 23) and in the 2SLS, where the nonaudit fees were treated 
exogenously (Eq.17). 
 
Different variables for internal audit 
In this additional analysis, the IAFALL variable is replaced by other internal audit variables. 
The first of the additional variables is IAF. This dummy variable gets the value of 1, if the 
company has established its own internal audit function. The second additional variable is 
IAFOUT, which consists of only the outsourced internal audit functions. The purpose of this 
analysis is to check the robustness of the used variable and if there are differences between 
outsourcing and establishing an own internal audit function.  
 
The results (not reported) were robust with different internal audit variables showing no 
significant results for the internal audit variables. The audit fee models‟ results between the 
IAF and IAFOUT models are very similar to the main models and thus no differences are 
found between the outsourced and established internal audit functions. The existence of audit 
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committee is still statistically significant and positively associated in all of the audit fee 
models. 
 
The results (not reported) of the earnings management models with the different internal audit 
variable provided similar results as the main models. However, one of the earnings 
management OLS models (Eq.23) suggested that the IAF is positively connected to the 
magnitude of earnings management. But, as mentioned, this is a one-off result and the other 
earnings management models did not provide any additional support for this association.  
 
In sum, the additional tests indicated that the results of the main models are robust with very 
slight differences. The last quarter earnings reversal (NPPN), used as the indicator for the 
earnings management, provided additional proof for the positive association with the audit 
fees (Hypothesis 3) while the other main findings are still robust. Also, some of the balance 
sheet discretionary accruals showed that the existence of the audit committee was positively 
associated to the magnitude of earnings management (Hypothesis 5). The different industry 
discretionary accruals provided similar results as their cross-sectional counterparts. Also, the 
audit fee and earnings management models were tested using different measures for the audit 
fees and the existence of internal audit function. Both measures provided fairly similar results 
as the main models. Unfortunately, the most of results of the additional tests had to be omitted 
due to space constrains. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The final chapter of the main text is divided to two parts. First, there is a brief summary of the 
thesis and discussion of the results presented above. Also, the final conclusions of this thesis 
are presented. Secondly, the limitations of this study are discussed and few ideas for the 
future research are presented. 
 
 
6.1 Discussion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to study the joint effects of the internal corporate governance 
structures, audit fees and earnings management in Finnish listed companies. More precisely, 
the thesis studied the effect of the internal governance structures firstly to the audit fees and 
secondly to the magnitude of earnings management. The connective factor between the two 
presented research directions is the financial reporting quality. The better the quality of the 
financial reporting by the companies is, the more useful the information is to its users. The 
audit fees were used to portray the audit effort the auditors have used to lower the audit risk to 
an acceptable level thus improving the reliability and usability of the disclosed information by 
the company. Also, the quality of the disclosed information should be more useful to the users 
of the information, if the magnitude of earnings management is as low as possible making the 
information more reliable. Usually, these relationships are further affected by the actions of 
the internal corporate governance structures as well. 
 
In the similar studies conducted earlier, the close relationship of the governance actors has 
raised a worry of endogeneity problems, which may skew the results. To control for the 
possible endogeneity problems between these actors, the 2SLS regression method has been 
used in the empirical part of this thesis to explore the associations between the mentioned 
internal governance actors, audit fees and earnings management. The internal governance 
actors studied more accurately in this thesis were internal audit and audit committee.  
 
This thesis had two major research paths. First major path was the audit fee models, where the 
effects of the internal governance structures and magnitude of earnings management to the 
level of audit fees were studied. The second major research path was the earnings 
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management models, where the effects of the internal governance structures and audit fees to 
the magnitude of earnings management was the main interest.  
 
Firstly, the research on the effects of internal audit and audit committee to the audit fees is 
mixed. For example, the earlier studies (e.g. Sherer & Kent, 1983 and Felix et al., 2001) have 
found support for the substitution effect of the governance structures. By intuition, the 
substitution effect of the governance structures to the audit fees is easy to understand 
especially in the case of internal audit. Usually, the work of the internal and external auditors 
is interwoven and thus the work done by the internal auditors should diminish the effort 
required from the external auditors. But the more recent studies (e.g. Abbott et al., 2003; 
Knechel & Willekens, 2006 and Hay et al., 2008) have supported the complementary view of 
these structures. The complementary view on the effect governance structures on the audit 
fees sees the demand for auditors increase as the additional governance structures require 
more from the auditors or the auditors need to direct more audit work on these additional 
structures. The hypotheses of this thesis were formed accordingly to the complementary view 
on the effects of the internal governance structures to the audit fees found in the more recent 
studies. Also, the larger magnitude of the earnings management is hypothesized to have a 
positive effect on the audit fees. This can be justified by the increasing inherent risk of the 
audit or as the risk of the misrepresentation of earnings information grows, the more audit 
effort is required from the auditors.  
 
The results of the audit fee models in this thesis found support only for the complementary 
effect of the audit committee (Hypothesis 2). There were no statistically relevant results on 
the effect of the internal audit (Hypothesis 1) or the magnitude of the earnings management 
(Hypothesis 3) in the main models. This result can also be confirmed when controlling for 
endogeneity of the internal audit and audit committee. However, the results from the 2SLS 
models should be interpreted cautiously as there were presences of weak instrumentals. 
 
Secondly, the association of the internal governance structures and audit fees were 
hypothesized to be negative to the magnitude of the earnings management as interpreted in 
the previous studies. There is some evidence that the internal auditors (e.g. Schneider & 
Wilner, 1990; Clikeman, 2003 and Prawitt et al., 2006 & 2009) diminish the level of earnings 
management through supervision or by educating the managers on the dangers of this 
practise. Similarly, there is a similar connection found with the existence of the audit 
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committee lowering this fraudulent behaviour (e.g. McMullen & Raghundan, 1996; Davidson 
et al, 2005 and Janin et al., 2007). The main ideas for this effect are that the audit committee 
members have a more direct responsibility to review the financial processes of the companies 
and the members of the audit committee are usually more aware of the consequences as they 
usually are more financially educated. Also, there are also similar findings on the role of the 
auditors to constrain the earnings management (e.g. Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
 
This study hypothesized that the more efficient the internal corporate governance structures 
and the auditors are, the smaller the magnitude of earnings management is, thus improving 
financial reporting quality. The results of the earnings management models found support 
only for the negative association between the auditors and earnings management (Hypothesis 
6). No statistically relevant results were found on the negative associations of the internal 
governance structures and earnings management (Hypotheses 4 and 5). The endogeneity tests 
did favour the using of the 2SLS models, but as with the audit fee models, there were 
presence of weak instruments also in the earnings management 2SLS models. 
 
Additionally, the secondary purpose of this thesis was to explore the ever more popular 2SLS 
method used in these types of studies to alleviate the possible endogeneity problems. At the 
same time, this study seeked to find strong instrumental variables for to use in future research. 
Thus, the methods used were extensively reported as suggested by Chenhall & Moers (2007a) 
and Larcker & Rusticus (2009) in their articles on using the 2SLS models and also how to 
interpret the instrumental variables. As the empirical chapter shows, the goal of finding new 
strong instrumental variables was not quite reached, because all of the 2SLS models suffered 
for the weak instrumentals. However, as mentioned, the extensive testing and reporting of the 
results of the 2SLS method used can help the other researchers to reach this goal. Therefore, 
the instrumental variables used were also tested separately for their validness in the sensitivity 
test section. Also, this should further improve the reliability of the conclusions by lowering 
the possibility of Type I and II errors of this study. 
 
The robustness of the above results were further tested in the sensitivity test using different 
indicators for the hypothesis variables and these tests further verified the results of the main 
models. For example, the sensitivity tests used a different discretionary accruals separate for 
each industry measures replacing the cross-sectional discretionary accrual measure as in the 
main model. Moreover, some additional tests were performed to further study the 
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hypothesized effects. These additional tests found that there is also some evidence that 
earnings management can result in higher audit fees, when using the last quarter earnings 
reversal as the indicator for earnings management. Additionally, there was some evidence that 
the positive effect of the audit committee is associated to both audit and nonaudit related fees. 
 
In sum, similarly to the study by Pomeroy & Thornton (2008), the audit committees are more 
effective at enhancing audit quality (e.g. through averting auditor resignations) than they are 
at fostering financial statement quality (e.g. by making high quality accruals and avoiding 
restatements). Also, this study suggested that auditors are the most efficient actors in 
improving financial reporting quality. There was no evidence on the relationship of the 
internal auditors to the audit fees or the magnitude of earnings management. For example, 
similar results have been reported by Davidson et al. (2005) in an Australian setting using a 
dummy variable for the existence of the internal audit. However, the meaning of internal audit 
functions in the efficient corporate governance network should not be understated. As Mercer 
(2004) notes, measuring the efficiency of the internal audit is difficult to evaluate from the 
publicly available data: 
 
Internal auditors often serve as the first line of defence against disclosure errors, 
ferreting out unintentional errors caused by weaknesses in a company's internal 
controls and intentional errors due to fraud. Consequently, if investors can assess 
internal audit quality, then firms with a strong internal audit department may have 
higher disclosure credibility. (Mercer, 2004, p.190) 
 
For example, Holt and DeZoort (2009) provide initial evidence that a publicly available 
Internal Audit Report as required by SEC describing the composition, activities and 
responsibilities of internal audit positively affects investor judgement and decision-making. 
As Gramling et al. (2004) highlight, the perceptions of internal audit function effectiveness 
depend on the structure of the internal audit function, the types of activities undertaken by the 
function, and the quality of the work performed by the internal audit function. Therefore, by 
making this type of information publicly available can be beneficial to both the companies 
and its interest groups. 
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6.2 Limitations and future research 
 
But as mentioned before, there were some limitations in this study. The main limitation was 
the failure to find strong and valid instrumental variables as this can skew the results of the 
2SLS models. Therefore, most of the results were interpreted from the OLS models and thus 
the endogeneity problem was not entirely controlled in this thesis.  
 
This is mostly due that finding strong instrumental variables that are both econometrically and 
theoretically sound is very hard, because the real corporate relation network is broad and 
closely tied. As Hay et al. (2008) mentioned the (powerful) instrumental variables have not 
been greatly explored in the previous audit fee literature. Also, if they are explored, they 
usually are not justified or their validity is difficult to interpret from the available results. 
Therefore, as Larcker & Rusticus (2009) mentioned, for such powerful instrumentals to be 
found and debated in the research community, the equivalent tests and results need to reported 
and analysed more extensively. However, the lack of extensive reporting and discussion may 
be easily explained by the space constrains set by the research journals. 
 
Additionally, the fact of not finding powerful instruments may also be explained by the small 
sample size in this thesis. This problem could be overcome by using additional sample years 
or using a wider geographical base for the sample. But as Larcker & Rusticus (2009) note in 
the footnote of page 29 in their article, the weak instruments are not just a small sample 
problem. There was still evidence of weak instrumentals with the sample size as large as 
300,000. However, as there was only one sample year in this thesis, no autocollinearity 
problems were present. 
 
As the data is from the single year 2008, there might be some unobserved errors in the data 
due to the rather financially exceptional year. This was the year when the credit crunch was 
affecting the worldwide economy at its full strength. However, as the companies in the 
sample are from the same period and the same geographical area, the worldwide economic 
downturn should affect the sample companies equally. Also, this unusual period may provide 
an interesting event study for the future research.  
 
Further, as Healy (1996), Bernard & Skinner (1996) and Heninger (2001) point out, the 
discretionary accruals are a noisy proxy for earnings management. This problem was to some 
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extent solved by introducing different proxies for the earnings management. For example, the 
last quarter earnings reversal indicator used in the audit fee models lead to similar results as in 
the main models. Also, this variable provided some evidence of the positive relationship to 
audit fees as hypothesized, while the main models did not. The same variable was also in the 
earnings management models, but the results from these models were not statistically very 
sound. Therefore, there is still a demand for alternative powerful earnings management 
indicators. 
 
As the corporate governance mosaic presented in the beginning showed, there are other viable 
internal and external actors in the governance network. This study only included audit 
committee, internal audit and auditors as the main interests of this study. The endogenously 
controlled effect of other actors (e.g. board members and management) in the governance 
network may also be interesting for future research to study. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the corporate governance dummy variables used in this study might not 
capture the efficiency of the corporate governance structures. The composition of the 
variables is partly due to the fact, that there is no more detailed data publicly available in 
Finland. Especially, this is the case with the internal audit, as there is very little research on 
the subject in the Finnish setting. Thus, there should be growing demand for a more detailed 
publicly available data on the various corporate governance actors also for research purposes.  
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Appendix 2 Detailed descriptive statistics of board, executive and audit committee data classified by OMX 
size category 
OMX size category Data item Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
All (n=107) Board size 6.084 6.000 1.518 3.000 10.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.439 0.429 0.214 0.000 1.000 
  - of independent % 0.680 0.667 0.241 0.167 1.000 
  Executive group size 7.617 8.000 3.027 2.000 19.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.410 0.400 0.184 0.000 0.833 
  Board and exec. group size in total 13.701 14.000 3.842 5.000 26.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.417 0.417 0.140 0.000 0.778 
  AC size 1.505 0.000 1.622 0.000 5.000 
  - of independent % 0.868 1.000 0.172 0.500 1.000 
       LARGE (n=25) Board size 7.400 7.000 1.555 5.000 10.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.432 0.429 0.173 0.143 0.800 
  - of independent % 0.774 0.800 0.177 0.333 1.000 
  Executive group size 9.520 9.000 2.931 5.000 19.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.461 0.444 0.163 0.167 0.833 
  Board and exec. group size in total 16.920 17.000 3.214 13.000 26.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.438 0.444 0.108 0.214 0.588 
  AC size 3.040 3.000 1.136 0.000 5.000 
  - of independent % 0.841 0.750 0.160 0.600 1.000 
       MEDIUM (n=31) Board size 6.258 6.000 0.893 5.000 8.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.491 0.500 0.208 0.000 0.857 
  - of independent % 0.699 0.800 0.289 0.167 1.000 
  Executive group size 8.452 8.000 2.656 3.000 15.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.408 0.400 0.190 0.000 0.800 
  Board and exec. group size in total 14.710 15.000 2.866 9.000 21.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.434 0.438 0.138 0.182 0.733 
  AC size 1.419 0.000 1.544 0.000 4.000 
  - of independent % 0.906 1.000 0.169 0.500 1.000 
       SMALL (n=51) Board size 5.333 5.000 1.337 3.000 8.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.411 0.400 0.233 0.000 1.000 
  - of independent % 0.622 0.600 0.224 0.167 1.000 
  Executive group size 6.176 6.000 2.590 2.000 15.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.387 0.375 0.190 0.000 0.750 
  Board and exec. group size in total 11.510 11.000 3.270 5.000 22.000 
  - of financially educated % 0.396 0.364 0.154 0.000 0.778 
  AC size 0.804 0.000 1.357 0.000 5.000 
  - of independent % 0.872 1.000 0.196 0.500 1.000 
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Appendix 3.1 Descriptive statistics of regression variables in Large OMX size category (n=25) 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Std Error Sum Skewness Kurtosis 
LNFEEALL 1.168 1.065 0.284 1.887 0.446 0.089 29.200 -0.100 2.040 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 0.049 0.039 0.004 0.147 0.042 0.008 1.219 1.070 3.000 
IAFALL 0.960 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.200 0.040 24.000 -4.695 23.042 
COM 0.880 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.332 0.066 22.000 -2.339 6.470 
LNASSETS 7.934 7.986 6.353 10.036 1.048 0.210 198.343 0.362 2.429 
SQRALLSUBS 8.147 8.660 2.828 12.288 2.842 0.568 203.667 -0.192 1.803 
FOREIGN 0.681 0.755 0.114 0.929 0.215 0.043 17.021 -1.142 3.472 
CRATIO 1.589 1.397 0.515 3.744 0.741 0.148 39.735 1.465 5.016 
INVREC 0.363 0.336 0.078 0.736 0.181 0.036 9.080 0.539 2.561 
SWITCH 0.120 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.332 0.066 3.000 2.339 6.470 
FEERISK 0.111 0.088 0.008 0.690 0.136 0.027 2.776 3.265 14.344 
LNMKTCAP 7.283 7.300 6.111 9.673 0.994 0.199 182.077 0.882 3.134 
MKTRET -0.008 -0.010 -0.240 0.290 0.131 0.026 -0.200 0.237 2.630 
LOSS 0.160 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.374 0.075 4.000 1.855 4.440 
OPCYCLE365 140.050 131.866 40.854 278.097 64.294 12.859 3 501.251 0.642 2.488 
SALESGPCG 0.057 0.053 -0.222 0.344 0.145 0.029 1.434 -0.106 2.559 
ZRATIO 147.509 151.247 93.561 186.502 25.166 5.033 3687.731 -0.158 2.117 
SMALLEPSCNG 0.080 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.277 0.055 2.000 3.096 10.587 
MAJ20 0.400 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.100 10.000 0.408 1.167 
BINDEPENDENT 0.774 0.800 0.333 1.000 0.177 0.035 19.346 -0.571 2.785 
ANALYSTS 15.680 15.000 0.000 29.000 6.927 1.385 392.000 -0.019 3.062 
FINEXP 0.437 0.440 0.210 0.590 0.109 0.022 10.930 -0.481 2.260 
LIABRATIO 0.573 0.585 0.339 0.743 0.111 0.022 14.326 -0.194 2.245 
LITI 0.120 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.332 0.066 3.000 2.339 6.470 
TACF -0.026 -0.026 -0.131 0.107 0.061 0.012 -0.653 0.079 2.390 
ACQ 1.920 1.000 0.000 10.000 2.722 0.544 48.000 1.831 5.610 
FEERATIO 0.393 0.382 0.061 0.803 0.166 0.033 9.828 0.110 3.101 
REPORTLAG 37.600 36.000 23.000 56.000 6.238 1.248 940.000 0.542 4.978 
Variables used in the additional analysis 
LNFEE 0.853 0.833 0.176 1.655 0.389 0.078 21.313 0.142 2.390 
LNNONAUDFEE 0.629 0.588 0.077 1.361 0.363 0.073 15.736 0.413 2.284 
ABSDACCJS-BS 0.061 0.046 0.003 0.216 0.052 0.010 1.517 1.235 4.358 
ABSDACCJS-CF 0.049 0.038 0.002 0.137 0.041 0.008 1.232 0.860 2.502 
ABSDACCMJS-BS 0.059 0.042 0.001 0.230 0.055 0.011 1.482 1.403 4.757 
ABSDACCJS-BS_ind 0.077 0.058 0.007 0.436 0.086 0.017 1.916 3.074 13.371 
ABSDACCJS-CF_ind 0.069 0.045 0.001 0.460 0.090 0.018 1.737 3.474 15.783 
ABSDACCMJS-BS_ind 0.075 0.060 0.001 0.512 0.100 0.020 1.885 3.503 15.885 
ABSDACCMJS-CF_ind 0.073 0.046 0.005 0.490 0.095 0.019 1.813 3.567 16.276 
NPPN 0.160 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.374 0.075 4.000 1.855 4.440 
IAF 0.960 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.200 0.040 24.000 -4.695 23.042 
IAFOUT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - 
TABS -0.030 -0.037 -0.157 0.213 0.076 0.015 -0.747 1.373 5.671 
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Appendix 3.2 Descriptive statistics of regression variables in Medium OMX size category (n=31) 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Std Error Sum Skewness Kurtosis 
LNFEEALL 0.420 0.291 0.053 1.606 0.364 0.065 13.026 1.727 5.606 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 0.070 0.050 0.008 0.356 0.067 0.012 2.177 2.757 11.923 
IAFALL 0.419 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.502 0.090 13.000 0.327 1.107 
COM 0.516 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.508 0.091 16.000 -0.065 1.004 
LNASSETS 6.027 5.941 3.797 8.412 1.180 0.212 186.825 0.009 2.088 
SQRALLSUBS 4.500 4.243 2.000 10.050 1.714 0.308 139.512 1.144 4.810 
FOREIGN 0.566 0.625 0.000 1.000 0.319 0.057 17.537 -0.411 1.978 
CRATIO 1.554 1.209 0.442 4.709 0.969 0.174 48.183 1.624 5.426 
INVREC 0.337 0.306 0.040 0.913 0.208 0.037 10.456 0.776 3.197 
SWITCH 0.065 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.250 0.045 2.000 3.545 13.569 
FEERISK 0.032 0.016 0.003 0.122 0.034 0.006 0.983 1.390 3.700 
LNMKTCAP 5.344 5.422 4.269 6.437 0.577 0.104 165.676 -0.191 2.050 
MKTRET 0.041 0.020 -0.250 0.510 0.181 0.032 1.280 0.384 2.634 
LOSS 0.194 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.402 0.072 6.000 1.551 3.407 
OPCYCLE365 117.661 108.915 29.720 282.685 69.064 12.404 3 647.484 0.722 2.711 
SALESGPCG 0.069 0.073 -0.271 0.344 0.112 0.020 2.137 -0.293 4.831 
ZRATIO 144.941 151.980 62.748 188.924 34.221 6.146 4493.166 -0.931 3.151 
SMALLEPSCNG 0.194 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.402 0.072 6.000 1.551 3.407 
MAJ20 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.506 0.091 14.000 0.194 1.038 
BINDEPENDENT 0.699 0.800 0.167 1.000 0.289 0.052 21.664 -0.479 1.881 
ANALYSTS 6.548 7.000 0.000 15.000 3.623 0.651 203.000 -0.077 2.750 
FINEXP 0.434 0.440 0.180 0.730 0.137 0.025 13.450 0.100 2.668 
LIABRATIO 0.565 0.609 0.192 0.765 0.150 0.027 17.521 -0.999 3.241 
LITI 0.097 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.301 0.054 3.000 2.728 8.440 
TACF -0.026 -0.044 -0.183 0.360 0.101 0.018 -0.815 1.879 8.430 
ACQ 0.710 0.000 0.000 7.000 1.395 0.251 22.000 3.227 14.582 
FEERATIO 0.346 0.351 0.029 0.759 0.205 0.037 10.721 0.141 2.185 
REPORTLAG 43.290 42.000 29.000 58.000 7.435 1.335 1 342.000 0.680 2.849 
Variables used in the additional analysis 
LNFEE 0.297 0.166 0.025 1.065 0.279 0.050 9.211 1.510 4.339 
LNNONAUDFEE 0.182 0.095 0.007 1.192 0.240 0.043 5.634 2.691 11.235 
ABSDACCJS-BS 0.085 0.068 0.001 0.302 0.076 0.014 2.641 1.100 3.648 
ABSDACCJS-CF 0.073 0.053 0.013 0.360 0.070 0.012 2.253 2.521 10.543 
ABSDACCMJS-BS 0.082 0.065 0.006 0.268 0.070 0.013 2.533 0.916 3.023 
ABSDACCJS-BS_ind 0.110 0.081 0.000 0.392 0.097 0.017 3.424 0.971 3.431 
ABSDACCJS-CF_ind 0.089 0.061 0.005 0.370 0.086 0.015 2.770 1.438 4.926 
ABSDACCMJS-BS_ind 0.111 0.093 0.007 0.382 0.095 0.017 3.429 0.951 3.357 
ABSDACCMJS-CF_ind 0.087 0.059 0.007 0.369 0.087 0.016 2.710 1.432 4.701 
NPPN 0.161 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.374 0.067 5.000 1.842 4.392 
IAF 0.387 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495 0.089 12.000 0.464 1.215 
IAFOUT 0.032 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.180 0.032 1.000 5.295 29.033 
TABS -0.084 -0.072 -0.344 0.112 0.091 0.016 -2.603 -0.751 4.061 
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Appendix 3.3 Descriptive statistics of regression variables in Small OMX size category (n=51) 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Std Error Sum Skewness Kurtosis 
LNFEEALL 0.150 0.120 0.024 0.956 0.146 0.020 7.668 3.642 19.659 
ABSDACCMJS-CF 0.075 0.052 0.000 0.347 0.069 0.010 3.840 1.817 7.098 
IAFALL 0.235 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.428 0.060 12.000 1.248 2.558 
COM 0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.460 0.064 15.000 0.904 1.817 
LNASSETS 4.017 4.027 1.363 6.827 1.019 0.143 204.875 -0.053 3.651 
SQRALLSUBS 2.987 2.828 1.414 5.831 1.121 0.157 152.356 0.395 2.363 
FOREIGN 0.551 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.274 0.038 28.112 -0.380 2.593 
CRATIO 1.918 1.549 0.417 5.247 1.166 0.163 97.836 1.233 3.977 
INVREC 0.365 0.351 0.023 0.707 0.178 0.025 18.615 0.093 2.092 
SWITCH 0.137 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.348 0.049 7.000 2.108 5.445 
FEERISK 0.024 0.006 0.001 0.569 0.080 0.011 1.241 6.384 43.833 
LNMKTCAP 3.254 3.340 0.944 4.958 0.870 0.122 165.964 -0.547 3.204 
MKTRET 0.109 0.100 -0.240 0.650 0.212 0.030 5.560 0.677 3.000 
LOSS 0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.460 0.064 15.000 0.904 1.817 
OPCYCLE365 121.987 106.656 22.541 365.000 70.215 9.832 6 221.353 1.690 6.605 
SALESGPCG 0.048 0.050 -0.513 0.830 0.233 0.033 2.456 0.673 5.125 
ZRATIO 137.909 140.231 -16.061 453.133 64.763 9.069 7033.368 1.947 12.491 
SMALLEPSCNG 0.275 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.451 0.063 14.000 1.011 2.021 
MAJ20 0.529 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.504 0.071 27.000 -0.118 1.014 
BINDEPENDENT 0.622 0.600 0.167 1.000 0.224 0.031 31.746 0.100 2.284 
ANALYSTS 2.412 2.000 0.000 8.000 2.410 0.337 123.000 0.685 2.417 
FINEXP 0.396 0.360 0.000 0.780 0.155 0.022 20.200 0.136 2.913 
LIABRATIO 0.560 0.556 0.175 1.909 0.270 0.038 28.578 2.387 13.243 
LITI 0.235 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.428 0.060 12.000 1.248 2.558 
TACF -0.066 -0.046 -0.342 0.129 0.080 0.011 -3.346 -0.919 5.192 
ACQ 0.373 0.000 0.000 4.000 0.799 0.112 19.000 2.799 11.516 
FEERATIO 0.340 0.300 0.000 0.777 0.225 0.031 17.329 0.450 2.186 
REPORTLAG 47.392 43.000 22.000 90.000 14.886 2.085 2 417.000 1.243 4.461 
Variables used in the additional analysis 
LNFEE 0.095 0.068 0.015 0.589 0.095 0.013 4.855 3.444 16.907 
LNNONAUDFEE 0.064 0.035 0.000 0.587 0.093 0.013 3.283 3.835 21.000 
ABSDACCJS-BS 0.099 0.071 0.005 0.430 0.092 0.013 5.043 1.710 5.902 
ABSDACCJS-CF 0.075 0.052 0.000 0.348 0.070 0.010 3.834 1.733 6.690 
ABSDACCMJS-BS 0.100 0.071 0.007 0.422 0.092 0.013 5.103 1.660 5.539 
ABSDACCJS-BS_ind 0.120 0.083 0.005 0.609 0.130 0.018 6.143 2.175 7.694 
ABSDACCJS-CF_ind 0.081 0.056 0.001 0.544 0.091 0.013 4.142 3.076 14.862 
ABSDACCMJS-BS_ind 0.108 0.085 0.001 0.649 0.119 0.017 5.525 2.400 10.353 
ABSDACCMJS-CF_ind 0.081 0.054 0.000 0.531 0.091 0.013 4.150 2.868 13.367 
NPPN 0.157 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.367 0.051 8.000 1.887 4.561 
IAF 0.118 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.325 0.046 6.000 2.373 6.633 
IAFOUT 0.118 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.325 0.046 6.000 2.373 6.633 
TABS -0.065 -0.056 -0.434 0.208 0.125 0.017 -3.323 -0.476 4.049 
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Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics of the regression variables used in the additional 
analyses 
 
Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics of the regression variables used in the additional analyses 
Variable (set) Mean Median Min Max Std Dev Std Error Sum Skewness Kurtosis 
FEE (Audit fee variables) 
LNFEE 0.331 0.128 0.015 1.655 0.390 0.038 35.379 1.496 4.278 
LNNONAUDFEE 0.230 0.091 0.000 1.361 0.319 0.031 24.653 1.865 5.786 
DACC (Earnings management variables) 
ABSDACCJS-BS 0.086 0.066 0.001 0.430 0.080 0.008 9.201 1.735 6.538 
ABSDACCJS-CF 0.068 0.048 0.000 0.360 0.065 0.006 7.319 2.111 8.983 
ABSDACCMJS-BS 0.085 0.061 0.001 0.422 0.080 0.008 9.118 1.684 6.247 
ABSDACCJS-BS_ind 0.107 0.072 0.000 0.609 0.113 0.011 11.483 2.195 8.541 
ABSDACCJS-CF_ind 0.081 0.056 0.001 0.544 0.088 0.009 8.649 2.720 12.314 
ABSDACCMJS-BS_ind 0.101 0.071 0.001 0.649 0.108 0.010 10.840 2.320 10.110 
ABSDACCMJS-CF_ind 0.081 0.052 0.000 0.531 0.090 0.009 8.673 2.665 11.801 
NPPN 0.159 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.367 0.036 17.000 1.866 4.483 
CGHYPOTHESIS (Hypothesis variables) 
IAF 0.393 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.491 0.047 42.000 0.440 1.194 
IAFOUT 0.065 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.248 0.024 7.000 3.515 13.356 
EMINSTRUMENTALS (Variables used as instrumentals in the audit fee 2SLS model) 
TABS -0.062 -0.047 -0.434 0.213 0.107 0.010 -6.672 -0.441 4.845 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEE= Natural logarithm of audit related fees. LNNONAUDFEE= Natural logarithm of fees paid to auditor not 
related to audit. ABSDACCJS-BS= Absolute discretionary accruals from the Jones balance sheet model. 
ABSDACCJS-CF= Absolute discretionary accruals from the Jones cash flow model. ABSDACCMJS-BS= 
Absolute discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones balance sheet model. ABSDACCJS-BS_ind= Absolute 
discretionary accruals from the Jones balance sheet industry model. ABSDACCJS-CF_ind= Absolute 
discretionary accruals from the Jones cash flow industry model. ABSDACCMJS-BS_ind= Absolute discretionary 
accruals from the Modified Jones balance sheet industry model. ABSDACCMJS-CF_ind= Absolute discretionary 
accruals from the Modified Jones cash flow industry model. NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 if company has had an 
earnings reversal in the last quarter. IAF= Dummy variable, 1 if company has an own internal audit function, 0 
otherwise. IAFOUT= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function is outsourced, 0 otherwise. TABS= Balance 
sheet total accruals. 
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Appendix 5 Results from the audit fee models with the earnings reversal dummy 
 
Appendix 5.1 Results from the audit fee OLS models with the NPPN as the EM indicator (n=107) 
Model FEECONTROLS   
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGEGNOUS 
  
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS+ 
CGINSTRUMENTAL
S 
  
FEECONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS+ 
CGINSTRUMENTALS+ 
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
Equation Eq.6 
 
Eq.7 
 
Eq.8 
 
Eq.18 
Dependent variable LNFEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value 
Intercept -0.764 -6.750 ***   -0.695 -5.240 ***   -0.710 -3.300 ***   -0.671 -3.050 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL 0.026 0.440     0.024 0.390     0.010 0.170     -0.004 -0.070   
COM 0.176 3.160 ***   0.202 3.500 ***   0.177 3.000 ***   0.170 2.830 *** 
NPPN 0.114 1.690 **     0.121 1.780 **     0.094 1.330     0.076 1.080   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS 0.139 6.340 ***   0.141 6.420 ***   0.104 3.730 ***   0.108 3.860 *** 
SQRALLSUBS 0.031 2.310 ***   0.032 2.340 ***   0.029 2.130 ***   0.023 1.650 *     
FOREIGN 0.242 2.540 ***   0.250 2.590 ***   0.214 2.190 ***   0.230 2.330 *** 
CRATIO -0.032 -1.360     -0.035 -1.480 *       -0.013 -0.440     -0.016 -0.530   
INVREC 0.245 1.890 **     0.248 1.920 **     0.260 1.990 ***   0.206 1.540 *     
SWITCH -0.087 -1.180     -0.069 -0.930     -0.040 -0.520     -0.021 -0.270   
FEERISK 0.761 2.620 ***   0.735 2.490 ***   0.702 2.380 ***   0.668 2.270 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20         0.022 0.440     0.017 0.330     0.018 0.360   
BINDEPENDENT         -0.152 -1.400     -0.215 -1.980 **     -0.227 -2.100 *** 
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS                 0.017 2.730 ***   0.016 2.680 *** 
LIABRATIO                 0.175 1.190     0.164 1.120   
FINEXP                 0.149 0.790     0.177 0.950   
LITI                 -0.002 -0.030     -0.001 -0.020   
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
TABS                         0.253 1.100   
ACQ                         0.022 1.470 *     
R2 0.804       0.809       0.826       0.833     
Adjusted R2 0.783       0.785       0.795       0.798     
F-value 39.310 ***     33.230 ***     26.740 ***     24.300 ***   
Significances for F-values: ***significant at the 0.05 level. **significant at the 0.10 level. *significant at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 
if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter, 0 otherwise. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. 
SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. CRATIO= 
Current Ratio, Current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total assets. SWITCH= 
Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of the particular audit firm's 
total revenue in the sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting 
rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the 
company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and 
executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. TABS= Balance 
sheet total accruals. ACQ= Number of acquisitions made.  
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Appendix 5.2 Results from the 2SLS audit fee models, where the NPPN is exogenous in the 2SLS 
Model First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation Eq.9 
 
Eq.10 
 
Eq.11 
Dependent variable IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
Intercept -0.939 -2.790 ***   -1.076 -3.100 ***   -0.585 -3.370 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL                 0.017 0.070   
COM                 0.457 1.930 **   
NPPN -0.094 -0.780     -0.112 -0.910     0.121 1.700 **   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS 0.179 4.230 ***   0.117 2.680 ***   0.109 2.740 *** 
SQRALLSUBS 0.025 1.080     0.017 0.730     0.029 1.960 *** 
FOREIGN -0.135 -0.810     -0.083 -0.480     0.258 2.590 *** 
CRATIO 0.028 0.570     0.118 2.290 ***   -0.042 -1.680 **   
INVREC 0.243 1.100     -0.353 -1.550 *       0.330 1.960 *** 
SWITCH 0.216 1.680 **     0.163 1.230     -0.085 -1.010   
FEERISK -0.549 -1.100     -0.640 -1.250     0.841 2.620 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 0.045 0.510     -0.048 -0.540     0.036 0.680   
BINDEPENDENT -0.064 -0.350     0.375 1.990 ***   -0.266 -1.690 **   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS -0.003 -0.300     0.005 0.430           
LIABRATIO 0.350 1.460 *       0.699 2.830 ***         
FINEXP 0.130 0.410     0.457 1.390           
LITI 0.279 2.350 ***   -0.009 -0.080           
R2 0.460       0.431       0.770     
F-value 5.600 ***     4.980 ***     27.040 ***   
Partial R2 0.078       0.086             
Partial F-value 1.950       2.180             
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                0.924, CritF(0.05)=11.0 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                6.129, Chi-sq(2)=0.047 
Endogeneity test (DWH)               2.106, Chi-sq(2)=0.349 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. NPPN= Dummy 
variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter, 0 otherwise. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total 
assets. SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. 
CRATIO= Current Ratio, Current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total 
assets. SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of 
the particular audit firm's total revenue in the sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder 
having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. 
ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= 
Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if 
company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 5.3 Results from the 2SLS audit fee models, where the NPPN is endogenous in the 2SLS 
Model First-stage 
 
Second-stage 
Equation Eq.19 
 
Eq.20 
 
Eq.21 
 
Eq.22 
Dependent 
variable 
IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
NPPN 
 
LNFEEALL 
  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
 
Coeff. t-value 
Intercept -0.875 -2.540 ***   -1.142 -3.270 ***   -0.224 -0.750   
 
-0.697 -3.250 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL                         0.139 0.590   
COM                         0.209 0.950   
NPPN                         0.371 1.400   
FEECONTROLS 
LNASSETS 0.184 4.360 ***   0.122 2.860 ***   -0.040 -1.100     0.132 2.730 *** 
SQRALLSUBS 0.014 0.580     0.009 0.360     0.032 1.570 *       0.020 1.270   
FOREIGN -0.079 -0.490     -0.083 -0.510     -0.436 -3.120 ***   0.374 2.390 *** 
CRATIO 0.017 0.350     0.126 2.520 ***   0.099 2.310 ***   -0.045 -1.760 **   
INVREC 0.197 0.870     -0.325 -1.410     -0.049 -0.250     0.214 1.310   
SWITCH 0.229 1.780 **     0.169 1.300     0.030 0.270     -0.071 -0.800   
FEERISK -0.473 -0.960     -0.462 -0.920     -0.700 -1.640 *       0.919 2.880 *** 
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 0.041 0.470     -0.037 -0.420     0.082 1.090     -0.001 -0.010   
BINDEPENDENT -0.094 -0.510     0.349 1.890 **     0.116 0.740     -0.199 -1.420   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS -0.004 -0.400     0.003 0.240     0.002 0.250           
LIABRATIO 0.271 1.170     0.650 2.780 ***   0.554 2.770 ***         
FINEXP 0.121 0.380     0.463 1.450     0.397 1.450 *             
LITI 0.287 2.400 ***   0.026 0.210     -0.046 -0.440           
EMINSTRUMENTALS 
TABS 0.088 0.220     -0.605 -1.540 *       0.426 1.260           
ACQ 0.031 1.200     0.043 1.660 *       0.012 0.530           
R2 0.465       0.457       0.258       0.775     
F-value 5.280 ***     5.110 ***     2.100 ***     27.860 ***   
Partial R2 0.088       0.128       0.114             
Partial F-value 1.470       2.230       1.940 ***           
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                     0.704, CritF(0.05)=12.2 
Over-id. test (Sargan)                      7.957, Chi-sq(3)=0.047 
Endogeneity test (DWH)                     3.701, Chi-sq(3)=0.296 
Significances for t- and F-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal audit function exist or has been 
outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 otherwise. NPPN= Dummy 
variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter. LNASSETS= Natural logarithm of total assets. 
SQRALLSUBS= Square root of total subsidiaries. FOREIGN= The ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries. 
CRATIO= Current Ratio, Current assets divided to current liabilities. INVREC= Inventories and receivables divided by total 
assets. SWITCH= Dummy variable, 1 if auditor has been changed from the last year. FEERISK= Percentage of audit fees of 
the particular audit firm's total revenue in the sample. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder 
having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. 
ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= 
Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if 
company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. TABS= Balance sheet total accruals. ACQ= Number of acquisitions 
made. 
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Appendix 5.4 Results from the earnings management probit models (n=107) 
Model EMCONTROLS 
 
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGEGNOUS  
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS+ 
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
 
EMCONTROLS + 
CGEXOGENOUS+ 
CGINSTRUMENTALS+ 
FEEINSTRUMENTALS 
Equation Eq.12 
 
Eq.13 
 
Eq.14 
 
Eq.23 
Dependent variable NPPN 
 
NPPN 
 
NPPN 
 
NPPN 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value 
Intercept -0.985 -1.300     -1.485 -1.580 *       -4.710 -2.580 ***   -5.543 -2.700 *** 
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL -0.284 -0.660     -0.281 -0.650     -0.180 -0.400     -0.155 -0.330   
COM -0.196 -0.480     -0.305 -0.690     -0.358 -0.780     -0.430 -0.900   
LNFEEALL 0.646 1.070     0.742 1.190     0.350 0.510     0.514 0.690   
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP -0.103 -0.640     -0.132 -0.810     -0.109 -0.510     -0.112 -0.500   
MKTRET -1.426 -1.410     -1.337 -1.260     -0.170 -0.140     -0.273 -0.230   
LOSS -0.052 -0.110     -0.054 -0.110     -0.518 -0.960     -0.620 -1.110   
OPCYCLE365 -0.004 -1.500 *       -0.005 -1.550 *       -0.003 -1.010     -0.004 -1.090   
SALESGPCG 2.331 2.380 ***   2.313 2.350 ***   2.646 2.450 ***   2.565 2.330 *** 
ZRATIO 0.151 1.820 **     0.169 1.940 **     0.312 2.640 ***   0.294 2.290 *** 
SMALLEPSCNG 0.256 0.590     0.185 0.420     -0.158 -0.280     -0.100 -0.170   
CGEXEGENOUS 
MAJ20         0.128 0.360     0.185 0.480     0.170 0.430   
BINDEPENDENT         0.812 1.040     0.381 0.460     0.564 0.660   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS                 0.018 0.360     0.018 0.350   
LIABRATIO                 2.724 1.930 **     2.636 1.920 **   
FINEXP                 2.676 1.720 **     2.490 1.580 *     
LITI                 -0.541 -1.010     -0.411 -0.750   
FEEINSTRUMENTALS 
FEERATIO                         0.232 0.210   
REPORTLAG                         0.019 1.060   
Log likelihood -39.944       -39.391       -35.464       -34.859     
Likelihood Ratio 13.800       14.910       22.760 *     23.970     
Pseudo R2 0.147       0.159       0.243       0.256     
Significances for z- and LR-values: ***sig. at the 0.05 level. **sig. at the 0.10 level. *sig. at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if internal 
audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the company, 0 
otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end market cap. 
MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. LOSS= Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. OPCYCLE365= 
Operation cycle of the company capped to 365 days. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. ZRATIO= Financial 
distress ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy 
variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= 
Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. LIABRATIO= Total 
liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives from the whole group. 
LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related 
fees from the total fees paid to the auditor. REPORTLAG=Days the auditors signed the audit report from fiscal year end.  
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Appendix 5.5 Results from the Two-stage probit EM models, where the LNFEEALL is exogenous (n=107) 
Model First-stage (OLS) 
 
Second-stage 
Equation Eq.15 
 
Eq.16 
 
Eq.17 
Dependent variable IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
NPPN 
  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. z-value 
Intercept -0.109 -0.320           -0.408 -1.220           -0.151 -0.070         
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL                 1.337 0.370         
COM                 7.904 1.120         
LNFEEALL 0.121 0.780           0.454 2.990  ***   -3.504 -0.890         
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP 0.080 1.730  **     0.015 0.340           -0.443 -0.840         
MKTRET -0.169 -0.680           -0.213 -0.870           1.441 0.460         
LOSS 0.121 1.130           0.104 0.990           -1.431 -0.950         
OPCYCLE365 0.001 0.840           -0.001 -0.930           0.001 0.070         
SALESGPCG 0.260 1.100           -0.135 -0.580           3.236 1.410         
ZRATIO -0.012 -0.510           0.046 2.040  ***   -0.099 -0.330         
SMALLEPSCNG -0.353 -3.060  ***   0.123 1.090           -0.433 -0.310         
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 -0.025 -0.290           -0.133 -1.520  *       1.380 1.020         
BINDEPENDENT -0.055 -0.290           0.398 2.170  ***   -2.900 -0.820         
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS 0.013 1.130           0.002 0.180                 
LIABRATIO 0.265 1.130           0.104 0.450                 
FINEXP -0.175 -0.540           0.423 1.330                 
LITI 0.237 1.970  **     -0.086 -0.730                 
Adjusted R2 0.353       0.376             
F-value 5.130 ***     5.570 ***     4.010, Chi-sq(12)=0.983 
Partial R2 0.072       0.023             
Partial F-value 1.797 *     0.532             
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                 0.430, CritF(0.05)=11.04 
Over-id. test (A-L-N)                 0.634, Chi-sq(2)= 0.728 
Exogeneity test (Wald)                 4.720, Chi-sq(2)= 0.094 
Significances for t-values, z-values and F-values: ***sig at the 0.05 level. **sig at the 0.10 level. *sig at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if 
internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the 
company, 0 otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end 
market cap. MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. LOSS= Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. 
OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the company capped to 365 days. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. 
ZRATIO= Financial distress ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 otherwise. 
MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 otherwise. 
BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the company. 
LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and executives 
from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix 5.6 Results from the Two-stage probit EM models, where the LNFEEALL is endogenous 
(n=107) 
Model First-stage (OLS) 
 
Second-stage 
Equation Eq.24 
 
Eq.25 
 
Eq.26 
 
Eq.27 
Dependent variable IAFALL 
 
COM 
 
LNFEEALL 
 
NPPN 
  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value  Coeff. z-value 
Intercept -0.099 -0.280     -0.763 -2.120 ***   -0.478 -2.040 ***   -0.988 -0.530   
Hypothesis variables 
IAFALL                         2.475 0.650   
COM                         5.735 1.050   
LNFEEALL                         -3.801 -0.680   
EMCONTROLS 
LNMKTCAP 0.092 2.210 ***   0.083 1.970 **     0.136 4.990 ***   -0.276 -0.530   
MKTRET -0.253 -1.010     -0.219 -0.860     -0.158 -0.960     0.576 0.250   
LOSS 0.137 1.310     0.192 1.830 **     0.187 2.720 ***   -1.039 -0.920   
OPCYCLE365 0.000 0.770     0.000 0.270     0.001 2.960 ***   0.000 -0.050   
SALESGPCG 0.280 1.180     -0.194 -0.810     -0.053 -0.340     2.523 1.360   
ZRATIO -0.004 -0.180     0.022 0.880     -0.022 -1.390     -0.053 -0.190   
SMALLEPSCNG -0.335 -2.850 ***   0.047 0.390     -0.100 -1.300     0.135 0.120   
CGEXOGENOUS 
MAJ20 -0.035 -0.390     -0.113 -1.250     0.020 0.340     1.131 1.000   
BINDEPENDENT -0.053 -0.280     0.267 1.420     -0.227 -1.850 **     -1.942 -0.680   
CGINSTRUMENTALS 
ANALYSTS 0.018 1.620 *       0.011 1.000     0.024 3.250 ***         
LIABRATIO 0.277 1.200     0.339 1.460 *       0.431 2.840 ***         
FINEXP -0.048 -0.150     0.286 0.850     0.039 0.180           
LITI 0.215 1.760 **     -0.064 -0.520     -0.017 -0.210           
FEEINSTRUMENTALS 
FEERATIO -0.282 -1.250     0.527 2.310 ***   0.315 2.120 ***         
REPORTLAG -0.001 -0.190     0.000 0.100     -0.003 -1.390           
Adjusted R2 0.353       0.347       0.728       -     
F-value 4.850 ***     4.750 ***     19.950 ***     4.910, Chi-sq(12)=0.961 
Partial R2 0.106       0.102       0.233             
Partial F-value 1.798 *     1.721 *     4.598 ***           
Weak IV (G-D Wald F)                         0.223, CritF(0.05)=12.02 
Over-id. test (A-L-N)                         1.725, Chi-sq(3)= 0.631 
Exogeneity test (Wald)                         3.640, Chi-sq(3)= 0.303 
Significances for t-values, z-values and F-values: ***sig at the 0.05 level. **sig at the 0.10 level. *sig at the 0.15 level. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
NPPN= Dummy variable, 1 if company has had an earnings reversal in the last quarter. IAFALL= Dummy variable, 1 if 
internal audit function exist or has been outsourced, 0 otherwise. COM= Dummy variable, 1 if audit committee exist in the 
company, 0 otherwise. LNFEEALL= Natural logarithm of all audit fees. LNMKTCAP= The natural logarithm of year end 
market cap. MKTRET= Market adjusted stock return. LOSS= Dummy variable, 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. 
OPCYCLE365= Operation cycle of the company capped to 365 days. SALESGPCG= The percentage of sales growth. 
ZRATIO= Financial distress ratio. SMALLEPSCNG= Dummy variable, 1 if absolute EPS change is between 0-5, 0 
otherwise. MAJ20= Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a major shareholder having more than 20% of the voting rights, 0 
otherwise. BINDEPENDENT= Percentage of independent board members. ANALYSTS= Number of analysts following the 
company. LIABRATIO= Total liabilities to total assets. FINEXP= Percentage of financial educated the board members and 
executives from the whole group. LITI= Dummy variable, 1 if company is in the litigation risk industry, 0 otherwise. 
FEERATIO= Percentage of the audit related fees from the total fees paid to the auditor. REPORTLAG=Days the auditors 
signed the audit report from fiscal year end.  
 
